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Abstract: What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate
“why” question. The “how” question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has
been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The “why” question is about the ﬁtness consequences that explain why humans
have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to
contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to
morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually
advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs
and beneﬁts of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer
more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving
property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants’ distributions aim at sharing the costs and
beneﬁts of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is inﬂuenced by effort and talent, and the
perception of each participant’s rights on the resources to be distributed.
Keywords: cooperation; fairness; economic games; evolutionary psychology; morality; partner choice
1. Introduction
Humans don’t just cooperate. They cooperate in a great
variety of quite speciﬁc ways and have strong views in
each case on how it should be done (with substantial cul-
tural variations). In collective actions aimed at a common
goal, there is a right way to share the beneﬁts: Those
who have contributed more should receive more. When
helping others, there is a right amount to give. One may
have the duty to give a few coins to beggars in the street,
but one does not owe them half of one’s wealth, however
helpful it would be to them. When people deserve to be
punished, there is a right amount of punishment. Most
people in societies with a modern penal system would
agree that a year in jail is too much for the theft of an
apple and not enough for a murder. People have strong
intuitions regarding the right way to share the beneﬁts of
activity, the right way to help the needy, and the right
way to punish the guilty. Do these intuitions, notwithstand-
ing their individual and cultural variability, have a common
logic, and, if so, to what extent is this logic rooted in evolved
dispositions?
To describe the logic of morality, many philosophers
have noted that when humans follow their moral intuitions,
they behave as if they had bargained with others in order to
reach an agreement about the distribution of the beneﬁts
and burdens of cooperation (Gauthier 1986; Hobbes
1651; Kant 1785; Locke 1689; Rawls 1971; Scanlon
1998). Morality, these “contractualist” philosophers argue,
is about maximizing the mutual beneﬁts of interactions.
The contract analogy is both insightful and puzzling. On
the one hand, it well captures the pattern of moral intui-
tions, and to that extent well explains why humans
cooperate, why the distribution of beneﬁts should be
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proportionate to each cooperator’s contribution, why the
punishment should be proportionate to the crime, why
the rights should be proportionate to the duties, and so
on. On the other hand, it provides a mere as-if explanation:
It is as if people had passed a contract – but since they
didn’t, why should it be so?
To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing con-
tract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the
missing designer in the design of life-forms, a puzzle essen-
tially resolved by Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Actu-
ally, two contractualist philosophers, John Rawls and David
Gauthier, have argued that moral judgments are based on a
sense of fairness that, they suggested, has been naturally
selected. Here we explore this possibility in some detail.
How can a sense of fairness evolve?
2. Explaining the evolution of morality
2.1. The mutualistic theory of morality
2.1.1. Cooperation andmorality.Hamilton (1964a; 1964b)
famously classiﬁed forms of social interaction between an
“actor” and a “recipient” according to whether the conse-
quences they entail for actor and recipient are beneﬁcial
or costly (with beneﬁts and costs measured in terms of
direct ﬁtness). He called behavior that is beneﬁcial to the
actor and costly to the recipient (+/−) selﬁshness, behavior
that is costly to the actor and beneﬁcial to the recipient
(−/+) altruism, and behavior that is costly to the actor
and costly to the recipient (−/−) spite. Following a
number of authors (Clutton-Brock 2002; Emlen 1997;
Gardner & West 2004; Krebs & Davies 1993; Ratnieks
2006; Tomasello et al. submitted), we call behavior that is
beneﬁcial to both the actor and the recipient (+/+) mutual-
ism.1 Cooperation is social behavior that is beneﬁcial to the
recipient, and hence cooperation can be altruistic or
mutualistic.
Not all cooperative behavior, whether mutualistic or
altruistic, is moral behavior. After all, cooperation is
common in and across many living species, including
plants and bacteria, to which no one is tempted to attribute
a moral sense. Among humans, kin altruism and friendship
are two cases of cooperative behavior that is not necessarily
moral (which is not to deny that being a relative or a friend
is often highly moralized). Unlike kin altruism, friendship is
mutualistic. In both cases, however, the degree of coopera-
tiveness is a function of the degree of closeness – genealogi-
cal relatedness in the case of parental instinct (Lieberman
et al. 2007), affective closeness typically linked to the force
of common interests in the case of friendship (DeScioli &
Kurzban 2009; Roberts 2005). In both cases, the parent or
the friend is typically disposed to favor the offspring or the
close friend at the expense of less closely related relatives
or less close friends, and to favor relatives and friends at
the expense of third parties.
Behavior based on parental instinct or friendship is
aimed at increasing the welfare of speciﬁc individuals to
the extent that this welfare is directly or indirectly ben-
eﬁcial to the actor. These important forms of cooperation
are arguably based on what Tooby et al. (2008) have
described as a Welfare Trade-Off Ratio (WTR). The
WTR indexes the value one places on another person’s
welfare and the extent to which one is disposed, on that
basis, to trade off one’s own welfare against the welfare
of that person (for an example, see Sell et al. 2009). The
WTR between two individuals is predicted to be a function
of the basic interdependence of their respective ﬁtness (see
also Rachlin & Jones [2008] on social discounting). Choices
based on WTR considerations typically lead to favoritism
and are quite different from choices based on fairness
and impartiality. Fairness may lead individuals to give
resources to people whose welfare is of no particular inter-
est to them or even to people whose welfare is detrimental
to their own. To the extent that morality implies impartial-
ity,2 parental instinct and friendship are not intrinsically
moral.
Forms of cooperation can evolve without morality, but it
is hard to imagine how morality could evolve without
cooperation. The evolution of morality is appropriately
approached within the wider framework of the evolution
of cooperation. Much of the recent work on the evolution
of human altruistic cooperation has focused on its conse-
quences for morality, suggesting that human morality is
ﬁrst and foremost altruistic (Gintis et al. 2003; Haidt
2007; Sober & Wilson 1998). Here we focus on the evol-
ution and consequences of mutualistic cooperation.
Advances in comparative psychology suggest that, during
their history, humans evolved new skills and motivations
for collaboration (intuitive psychology, social motivation,
linguistic communication) not possessed by other great
apes (Tomasello et al., submitted). We argue that morality
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may be seen as a consequence of these cooperative inter-
actions and emerged to guide the distribution of gains
resulting from these interactions (Baumard 2008; 2010a).
Note that these two approaches are not mutually incompa-
tible. Humans may well have both altruistic and mutualistic
moral dispositions. While a great deal of important research
has been done in this area in recent decades, we are still far
from a deﬁnite picture of the evolved dispositions under-
lying human morality. Our goal here is to contribute to a
rich ongoing debate by highlighting the relevance of the
mutualistic approach.
2.1.2. The evolution of cooperation by partner
choice. Corresponding to the distinction between altruistic
and mutualistic cooperation, there are two classes of
models of the way in which cooperation may have
evolved. Altruistic models describe the evolution of a dispo-
sition to engage in cooperative behavior even at a cost to
the actor. Mutualistic models describe the evolution of a
disposition to engage in cooperation that is mutually ben-
eﬁcial to actor and recipient (see Fig. 1).
Mutualistic models are themselves of two main types:
those focusing on partner control and those focusing on
partner choice (Bshary & Noë 2003).3 Earlier mutualistic
models were of the ﬁrst type, drawing on the notion of reci-
procity as deﬁned in game theory (Luce & Raiffa 1957; for
a review, see Aumann 1981) and as introduced into evol-
utionary biology by Trivers (1971).4 These early models
used as their paradigm case iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games (Axelrod 1984; Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). Partici-
pants in such games who at any time fail to cooperate
with their partners can be penalized by them in subsequent
trials as in Axelrod’s famous tit-for-tat strategy, and this way
of controlling one’s partner might in principle stabilize
cooperation.
In partner control models, partners are given rather than
chosen, and preventing them from cheating is the central
issue. By contrast, in more recently developed partner
choice models, individuals can choose their partners and
the emphasis is less on preventing cheating than in choos-
ing and being chosen as the right partner (Bull & Rice
1991; Noë et al. 1991; Roberts 1998).5 Consider, as an illus-
tration, the relationship of the cleaner ﬁsh Labroides dimi-
diatus with client reef ﬁsh. Cleaners may cooperate by
removing ectoparasites from clients, or they may cheat by
feeding on client mucus. As long as the cleaner eats just
ectoparasites, both ﬁsh beneﬁt from the interaction.
When, on the other hand, a cleaner ﬁsh cheats and eats
mucus, ﬁeld observations and laboratory experiments
suggest that clients respond by switching partners, ﬂeeing
to another cleaner, and thereby creating the conditions
for the evolution of cooperative behavior among cleaners
(Adam 2010; Bshary & Grutter 2005). Reciprocity can
thus be shaped either by partner choice or by partner
control only.
Mutually beneﬁcial cooperation might in principle be
stabilized either by partner control or by partner choice
(or, obviously, by some combination of both). Partner
control and partner choice differ from each other with
respect to their response to uncooperativeness, which is
generally described as “defection” or “cheating.” In
partner-control models, a cooperator reacts to a cheating
partner by cheating as well, thereby either causing the
ﬁrst cheater to return to a cooperative strategy or turning
the interaction into an unproductive series of defections.
In partner-choice models, on the other hand, a cooperator
reacts to a partner’s cheating by starting a new cooperative
relationship with another hopefully more cooperative
partner. Whereas in partner-control models, individuals
only have the choice between cooperating and not cooperat-
ing with their current partner, in partner-choice models,
individuals have the “outside option” of cooperating with
someone else. This difference has, we will see, major
implications.6
The case of cleaner ﬁsh illustrates another important
feature of partner choice. In partner-choice models, the
purpose of switching to another partner is not to inﬂict a
cost on the cheater and thereby punish him. It need not
matter to the switcher whether or not the cheater suffers
as a consequence. A client ﬁsh switching partners is indif-
ferent to the fate of the cleaner it leaves behind. All it
wants in switching partners is to beneﬁt from the services
of a better cleaner. Still, cheating is generally made costly
by the loss of opportunities to cooperate at all, and this
may well have a dissuasive effect and contribute to stabilize
cooperation. The choice of new partners is particularly
advantageous when it can be based on information about
their past behavior. Laboratory experiments show that
reef ﬁsh clients gather information about cleaners’ behavior
and that, in response, cleaners behave more cooperatively
in the presence of a potential client (Bshary & Grutter
2006).
The evolution of cooperation by partner choice can be
seen as a special case of social selection, which is a form
of natural selection where the selective pressure comes
from the social choices of other individuals (Dugatkin
1995; Nesse 2007; West-Eberhard 1979). Sexual selection
by female choice is the best-known type of social selec-
tion. Female bias for mating with ornamented males
selects for more elaborate male displays, and the advan-
tages of having sons with extreme displays (and perhaps
advantages from getting good genes) select for stronger
preferences (Grafen 1990). Similarly, a socially wide-
spread preference for reliable partners selects for psycho-
logical dispositions that foster reliability. When we talk of
social selection in the rest of this article, we always refer to
the special case of the social selection of dispositions to
cooperate.Figure 1. Evolutionary models of cooperation
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2.1.3. The importance of partner choice in humans.Many
historical and social science studies have demonstrated
that, in humans, partner choice can enforce cooperation
without coercion or punishment (McAdams 1997). Euro-
pean medieval traders (Greif 1993), Jewish New York jewe-
lers (Bernstein 1992), and Chinese middlemen in South
Asia (Landa 1981) have been shown, for instance, to
exchange highly valuable goods and services without any
binding institutions. What deters people from cheating
is the risk of not being chosen as partners in future
transactions.
In recent years, a range of experiments have conﬁrmed
the plausibility of partner choice as a mechanism capable
of enforcing human cooperative behavior. They demon-
strate that people tend to select the most cooperative indi-
viduals, and that those who contribute less than others are
gradually left out of cooperative exchanges (Barclay 2004;
2006; Barclay & Willer 2007; Chiang 2010; Coricelli et al.
2004; Ehrhart & Keser 1999; Hardy & Van Vugt 2006;
Page et al. 2005; Rockenbach & Milinski 2011; Sheldon
et al. 2000; Sylwester & Roberts 2010). Further studies
show that people are quite able to detect the cooperative
tendencies of their partners. They rely on cues such as
their partners’ apparent intentions (Brosig 2002), the
costs of their actions (Ohtsubo & Watanabe 2008), or the
spontaneity of their behavior (Verplaetse et al. 2007).
They also actively seek these types of information and are
willing to incur costs to get it (Kurzban & DeScioli 2008;
Rockenbach & Milinski 2011).
A recent experiment well shows how humans have the
psychological dispositions necessary for effective partner
choice (Pradel et al. 2008). A total of 122 students of six
secondary school classes played an anonymous “Dictator
Game” (see sect. 3 below), which functioned as a
measure of cooperation. Afterwards and unannounced,
the students had to estimate what their classmates’
decisions had been, and they did so better than chance.
Sociometry revealed that the accuracy of predictions
depended on social closeness. Friends (and also classmates
who were disliked) were judged more accurately than
others. Moreover, the more cooperative participants
tended to be friends with one another. There are two pre-
requisites for the evolution of cooperation through social
selection: the predictability of moral behavior and the
mutual association of more cooperative individuals. These
experimental results show that these prerequisites are typi-
cally satisﬁed. In a market of cooperative partners, the most
cooperative individuals end up interacting with one another
and enjoy more common good.
Did human ancestral ecology meet the required con-
ditions for the emergence of social selection? Work on con-
temporary hunter-gatherers suggests that such is indeed
the case. Many studies have shown that hunter-gatherers
constantly exchange information about others (Cashdan
1980; Wiessner 2005), and that they accurately distinguish
good cooperators from bad cooperators (Tooby et al. 2006).
Field observations also conﬁrm that hunter-gatherers
actively choose and change partners. For instance, Wood-
burn (1982) notes that, among the Hazda of northern Tan-
zania, “Units are highly unstable, with individuals
constantly joining and breaking away, and it is so easy to
move away that one of the parties to the dispute is likely
to decide to do so very soon, often without acknowledging
that the dispute exists” (p. 252). Inuit groups display the
same ﬂuidity: “Whenever a situation came up in which an
individual disliked somebody or a group of people in the
band, he often pitched up his tent or built his igloo at the
opposite extremity of the camp or moved to another settle-
ment altogether” (Balicki 1970). Studying the Chenchu,
von Fürer-Haimendorf (1967) notes that the cost of
moving away may be enough to force people to be moral:
Spatial mobility and the “settling of disputes by avoidance”
allows a man to escape from social situations made intolerable
by his egoistic or aggressive behaviour, but the number of
times he can resort to such a way out is strictly limited. There
are usually two or three alternative groups he may join, and a
man notorious for anti-social behaviour or a difﬁcult tempera-
ment may ﬁnd no group willing to accept him for any length
of time. Unlike the member of an advanced society, a
Chenchu cannot have casual and superﬁcial relations with a
large number of persons, who may be somewhat indifferent
to his conduct in situations other than a particular and limited
form of interaction. He has either to be admitted into the
web of extremely close and multi-sided relations of a small
local group or be virtually excluded from any social interaction.
Hence the sanctions of public opinion and the resultant
approval or disapproval are normally sufﬁcient to coerce indi-
viduals into conformity. (p. 21)
In a review of the literature on the food exchanges of
hunter-gatherers, Gurven (2004) shows that people
choose their partners on the basis of their willingness to
share (see, e.g., Aspelin 1979; Henry 1951; Price 1975).
As Kaplan and Gurven (2005, p. 97) put it, cooperation
may emerge from the fact that people in hunter-gatherer
societies “vote with [their] feet” (on this point, see also
Aktipis 2004). Overall, anthropological observations
strongly suggest that social selection may well have taken
place in the ancestral environment.
2.1.4. Outside options constrain the outcome of mutually
advantageous interactions. Although mutualistic inter-
actions have evolved because they are beneﬁcial to every
individual participating in these interactions, they nonethe-
less give rise to a conﬂict of interest regarding the quantitat-
ive distribution of payoffs. As Rawls (1971) puts it,
Although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual interest,
it is typically marked by a conﬂict as well as by an identity of
interests. There is an identity of interests since social
cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any
would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts.
There is a conﬂict of interests since persons are not indifferent
as to how the greater beneﬁts produced by their collaboration
are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each
prefer a larger to a lesser share. (p. 126)
How may such a conﬂict of interest be resolved among
competing partners? There are many ways to share the
surplus beneﬁt of a mutually beneﬁcial exchange, and
models of “partner control” are of little help here. These
models are notoriously underdetermined (a symptom of
what game theoreticians call the folk theorem; e.g.,
Aumann & Shapley 1992). This can be easily understood.
Almost everything is better than being left without a
social interaction at all. Therefore, when the individuals
engaged in a social interaction have no outside options, it
is generally more advantageous for them to accept the
terms of the interaction they are part of than to reject the
interaction altogether and be left alone. In particular,
even highly biased and unfair interactions may well be evo-
lutionarily stable in this case.
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What is more, when individuals have no outside options,
the allocation of the beneﬁts of cooperation is likely to be
determined by a power struggle. The fact that an individual
has contributed this or that amount to the surplus beneﬁt of
the interaction need not have any inﬂuence on that power
struggle, nor on the share of the beneﬁt this individual will
obtain. In particular, if a dominant individual has the ability
to commit to a given course of interaction, then the others
will have no better option than to accept it, however unfair
it might be (Schelling 1960). Quite generally, in the
absence of outside options, there is no particular reason
why an interaction should be governed by fairness con-
siderations. There is no intrinsic property of partner-
control models of cooperation that would help explain the
evolution of fairness and impartiality.
On the other hand, fairness and impartiality can evolve
when partner choice rather than partner control is at
work (Baumard 2010a). Using numerical simulations in
which individuals can choose with whom they wish to inter-
act, Chiang (2008) has observed the emergence of fairness
in an interaction in which partner control alone would have
led to the opposite. André and Baumard (2011a) develop a
formal understanding of this principle in the simple case of
a pairwise interaction. Their demonstration is based on the
idea that negotiation over the distribution of beneﬁts in
each and every interaction is constrained by the whole
range of outside opportunities, determined by the market
of potential partners. When social life is made up of a diver-
sity of opportunities in which one can invest time,
resources, and energy, one should never consent to enter
an interaction in which the marginal beneﬁt of one’s invest-
ment is lower than the average beneﬁt one could receive
elsewhere. In particular, if all the individuals involved
in an interaction are “equal” – not in the sense that they
have the same negotiation power within the interaction,
but in the more important sense that they have the same
opportunities outside the interaction – they should all
receive the same marginal beneﬁt from each resource
unit that they invest in a joint cooperative venture, irrespec-
tive of their local negotiating power. Even in interactions in
which it might seem that dominant players could get a
larger share of the beneﬁts, a symmetric bargaining
always occurs at a larger scale, in which each player’s poten-
tial opportunities are involved.
A biological way of understanding this result is to use the
concept of resource allocation. When individuals can freely
choose how to allocate their resources across various social
opportunities throughout their lives, biased splits disfavor-
ing one side in an interaction are not evolutionarily stable
because individuals then refuse to enter into such inter-
actions when they happen to be on the disfavored side.
This can be seen as a simple application of the marginal
value theorem to social life (Charnov 1976): In evolutionary
equilibrium, the marginal beneﬁt of a unit of resource allo-
cated to each possible activity (reproduction, foraging,
somatic growth, etc.) must be the same. In the social
domain, this entails, in particular, that the various sides of
an interaction must beneﬁt in the same manner from this
interaction; otherwise, one of them is better off refusing.
This general principle leads to precise predictions
regarding the way social interactions should take place.
We have just explained that individuals should share their
common goods equally when they have contributed
equally to their production. However, in many real-life
instances, individuals play distinct roles, and participate dif-
ferently in the production of a common good. In this
general case, we suggest that they should be rewarded as
a function of the effort and talent they invest into each
interaction. Let us explain why.
First, if a given individual, say A, participates in an inter-
action in which he needs to invest say three “units of
resources,” whereas B’s role only involves investing one
unit, then A should receive a payoff exactly three times
greater than B’s. If A’s payoff is less than three times B’s,
then A would be better off refusing, and playing three
times B’s role in different interactions (e.g., with other part-
ners). Individuals should always receive a net beneﬁt pro-
portional to the amount of resources they have invested
in a cooperative interaction so that they beneﬁt equally
from the interaction (given their investment). This, inci-
dentally, corresponds in moral philosophy to Aristotle’s
proportionality principle.
Second, individuals endowed with a special talent, who
have the ability to produce larger beneﬁts than others,
should receive a larger fraction of the common good. In
every potential interaction into which a talented individual
can potentially enter, she will ﬁnd herself in an efﬁcient
interaction (an interaction in which at least one player is
talented; namely, herself), whereas less talented individuals
may often ﬁnd themselves in inefﬁcient ventures. In any
given interaction, the average outside opportunities of a
talented player are thus greater, and hence she should
receive a larger fraction of the beneﬁts; otherwise, she is
better off refusing to take part in the interaction. Again,
individuals beneﬁt equally from the interaction, given the
value of the talents and abilities they invested in the
interaction.
In conclusion, mutualistic models of cooperation based
on partner control only (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton 1981)
are unable to generate quantitative predictions regarding
the way mutually beneﬁcial cooperation should take
place. In contrast, mutualistic models accounting explicitly
for the unsatisﬁed individuals’ option of changing partners
(André & Baumard 2011a) show that cooperative inter-
actions can only take a very speciﬁc form that has all the
distinctive features of fairness, deﬁned as mutual advan-
tage or impartiality. Individuals should be rewarded in
exact proportion to the effort they invest in each inter-
action, and as a function of the quality and rarity of
their skills; otherwise, they are better off interacting with
other partners.
2.2. Three challenges for mutualistic approaches
For a long time, evolutionary theories of human
cooperation were dominated by mutualistic theories
(Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971). In the last two
decades, it has been argued that mutualistic approaches
face several problems (Boyd & Richerson 2005; Fehr &
Henrich 2003; Gintis et al. 2003). Three problems in par-
ticular have been highlighted: (1) Humans cooperate in
anonymous contexts – even when their reputation is not
at stake, (2) humans spontaneously help others – even
when they have not been helped previously, and (3)
humans punish others – even at a cost to themselves. In
the following section, we show how a mutualistic theory
of cooperation can accommodate these apparent problems.
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2.2.1. The evolution of an intrinsic motivation to behave
morally. The mutualistic approach provides a straightfor-
ward explanation of why people should strive to be good
partners in cooperation and respect the rights of others:
If they failed to do so, they would incur the risk of being
left out of future cooperative ventures. On the other
hand, the theory of social selection as stated so far says
very little about the proximal psychological mechanisms
that are involved in helping individuals compete to be
selected as partners in cooperation. In particular, the
theory does not by itself explain why humans have a
moral sense, why they feel guilty when they steal from
others, and why they feel outraged when others are
treated unfairly (Fessler & Haley 2003).
In principle, people could behave as good partners and
do well in the social selection competition not out of any
moral sense and without any moral emotion, but by
wholly relying only upon self-serving motivations. They
could take into account others’ interests when this affects
their chances of being chosen as partners in future
cooperation and not otherwise. They could ignore others’
interests when their doing so could not be observed or
inferred by others. This is the way intelligent sociopaths
tend to behave (Cima et al. 2010; Hare 1993; Mealey
1995). Sociopaths can be very skilled at dealing with
others: They may bargain, make concessions, and be gener-
ous, but they only do so in order to maximize their own
beneﬁt. They never pay a cost without expectation of a
greater beneﬁt. Although normal people also do act
morally for self-serving motives and take into account the
reputational effect of their actions (see, e.g., Haley &
Fessler 2005; Hoffman et al. 1996; Rigdon et al. 2009),
the experimental literature has consistently shown that
most individuals – in particular in anonymous situations –
commonly respect others’ interests even when it is not in
their own interest to do so.
The challenge therefore is to explain why, when they
cooperate, people have not only selﬁsh motivations (that
may cause them to respect others’ interest for instrumental
reasons: for example, getting resources and attracting part-
ners) but also moral motivations causing them to respect
others’ interests per se.
To answer the challenge, it is necessary to consider not
only the perspective of an individual wanting to be chosen
as a partner, but also that of an individual or a group deciding
with whom to cooperate. This is an important decision that
may secure or jeopardize the success of cooperation.Hence,
just as there should have been selective pressure to behave
so as to be seen as a reliable partner, there should have
been selective pressure to develop and invest adequate cog-
nitive resources in recognizing truly reliable partners.
Imagine that you have the choice between two possible part-
ners, call them Bob and Ann, both of whom have, as far as
you know, been reliable partners in cooperation in the
past. Bob respects the interests of others for the reason
and to the extent that it is in his interest to do so. Ann
respects the interests of others because she values doing
so per se. In other words, she has moral motivations. As a
result, in circumstances where it might be advantageous
for your partner to cheat, Ann is less likely to do so than
Bob. This, everything else being equal, makes Ann a more
reliable and hence a more desirable partner than Bob.
But how can you know whether a person has moral or
merely instrumental motivations? Bob, following his own
interest, respects the interest of others either when theirs
and his coincide, or when his behavior provides others
with evidence of his reliability. Otherwise, he acts selﬁshly
and at the expense of others. As long as he never makes a
mistake and behaves appropriately when others are
informed of his behavior, the character of his motivations
may be hard to ascertain. Still, a single mistake – for
example, acting on the wrong assumption that there are
no witnesses –may cause others to withdraw their trust
and be hugely costly. Moreover, our behavior provides a
lot of indirect and subtle evidence of our motivations.
Humans are expert mind readers. They can exploit a
variety of cues, taking into account not only outcomes or
interactions but also what participants intentionally or unin-
tentionally communicate about their motivations. Tetlock
et al. (2000), for instance, asked people to judge a hospital
administrator who had to choose either between saving the
life of one boy or another boy (a tragic trade-off where no
solution is morally satisfactory), or between saving the life
of a boy and saving the hospital $1 million (another
trade-off, but one where the decision should be obvious
from a moral perspective). This experiment manipulated
(a) whether the administrator found the decision easy and
made it quickly or found the decision difﬁcult and took a
long time, and (b) which option the administrator chose.
In the easy trade-off condition, people were most positive
towards the administrator who quickly chose to save
Johnny whereas they were most punitive towards the
administrator who found the decision difﬁcult and even-
tually chose the hospital (which suggests that they could
sacriﬁce a boy for a sum of money). In the tragic trade-
off condition, people were more positive towards the
administrator who made the decision slowly rather than
quickly, regardless of which boy he chose to save. Thus, lin-
gering over an easy trade-off, even if one ultimately does
the right thing, makes one a target of moral outrage. But
lingering over a tragic trade-off serves to emphasize the
gravity of the issues at stake and the due respect for each
individual’s right. More generally, many studies suggest
that it is difﬁcult to completely control the image one pro-
jects; that there are numerous indirect cues to an individ-
ual’s propensity to cooperate (Ambady & Rosenthal 1992;
Brown 2003); and that participants are able to predict on
the basis of such cues whether or not their partners
intend to cooperate (Brosig 2002; Frank et al. 1993).
Add to this the fact that people rely not only on direct
knowledge of possible partners but also on information
obtained from others. Humans – unlike other social
animals – communicate a lot about one another through
informal gossip (Barkow 1992; Dunbar 1993) and more
formal public praises and blames (McAdams 1997). As a
result, an individual stands to beneﬁt or suffer not only
from the opinions that others have formed of her on the
basis of direct personal experience and observation, but
also from a reputation that is being built through repeated
transmission and elaboration of opinions that may them-
selves be based not on direct experience but on others’
opinions. A single mistake may compromise one’s repu-
tation not only with the partner betrayed but with a
whole community. There are, of course, costs of missed
opportunities in being genuinely moral and not taking
advantage of opportunities to cheat. There may be even
greater costs in pursuing one’s own selﬁsh interest all the
time: high cognitive costs involved in calculating risks and
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opportunities and, more importantly, risks of incurring
huge losses just in order to secure relatively minor beneﬁts.
The most cost-effective way of securing a good moral repu-
tation may well consist in being a genuinely moral person.
In a mutualistic perspective, the function of moral be-
havior is to secure a good reputation as a cooperator. The
proximal mechanism that has evolved to fulﬁll this function
is, we argue, a genuine moral sense (for a more detailed dis-
cussion, see Sperber & Baumard 2012). This account is in
the same spirit as a well-known argument made by Trivers
(1971; see also Frank 1988; Gauthier 1986):
Selection may favor distrusting those who perform altruistic
acts without the emotional basis of generosity or guilt because
the altruistic tendencies of such individuals may be less reliable
in the future. One can imagine, for example, compensating for a
misdeed without any emotional basis but with a calculating,
self-serving motive. Such an individual should be distrusted
because the calculating spirit that leads this subtle cheater
now to compensate may in the future lead him to cheat when
circumstances seem more advantageous (because of unlikeli-
hood of detection, for example, or because the cheated individ-
ual is unlikely to survive). (Trivers 1971, p. 51)
While we agree with Trivers that cooperating with genu-
inely moral motives may be advantageous, we attribute a
somewhat different role to moral motivation in
cooperation. In classic mutualistic theories, a moral dispo-
sition is typically seen as a psychological mechanism
selected to motivate individuals to give resources to
others. In a mutualistic approach based on social selection
like the one we are exploring here, we stress that much
cooperation is mutually beneﬁcial so that self-serving
motives might be enough to motivate individuals to share
resources. Individuals have indeed very good incentive to
be fair, for if they fail to offer equally advantageous deals
to others, they will be left for more generous partners.
What we are arguing is that the function securing a good
reputation as a cooperator is more efﬁciently achieved, at
the level of psychological mechanisms, by a genuine
moral sense where cooperative behavior is seen as intrinsi-
cally good, rather than by a selﬁsh concern for one’s repu-
tation.7 Moreover, the kind of cooperative behavior that
one has to value in order to achieve useful reputational
effects is fairly speciﬁc. It must be behavior that makes
one a good partner in mutual ventures. Imagine, for
instance, a utilitarian altruist willing to sacriﬁce not only
his beneﬁts (or even his life) but also those of his partners
for the greater good of the larger group: This might be
commended by utilitarian philosophers as the epitome of
morality, but, even so, it is not the kind of disposition one
looks for in potential partners. Partner choice informed
by potential partners’ reputation selects for a disposition
to be fair rather than for a disposition to sacriﬁce oneself
or for virtues such as purity or piety that are orthogonal
to one’s value as a partner in most cooperative ventures.
This is not to deny that these other virtues may also have
evolved either biologically or culturally, but, we suggest,
the selective pressures that may have favored them are dis-
tinct from those that have favored a fairness-based
morality.
Distinguishing a more general disposition to cooperate
from a more speciﬁc moral disposition to cooperate fairly
has important evolutionary implications. Some social
traits, for instance, Machiavellian intelligence, are advan-
tageous to an individual whether or not they are shared
in its population. Other social traits, for instance, a disposi-
tion to emit and respond to alarm calls, are advantageous to
an individual only when they are shared in its population. In
this respect, a mere disposition to cooperate and a disposi-
tion to do so fairly belong to different categories. An
evolved disposition to cooperate is adaptive only when it
is shared in a population: A mutant disposed to share
resources with others would be at a disadvantage in a popu-
lation where no one else would have the disposition to reci-
procate. On the other hand, in a population of cooperators
competing to be chosen as partners, a mutant disposed to
cooperate fairly, not just when it is to her short-term advan-
tage but always, might well be overall advantaged, even if
no other individual had the same disposition, because this
would enhance her chances to be chosen as a partner.
This suggests a two-step account of the evolution of
morality:
Step 1: Partner choice favors individuals who share
equally the costs and beneﬁts of cooperative interactions
(see sect. 2.1.4). At the psychological level, mutually advan-
tageous reciprocity is motivated by selﬁsh reasons and
Machiavellian calculus.
Step 2: Competition among cooperative partners leads to
the selection of a disposition to be intrinsically motivated to
be fair (as discussed in this section). At the psychological
level, mutually advantageous reciprocity is motivated by a
genuine concern for fairness.
2.2.2. The scope of cooperation in mutualistic
approaches. As we mentioned in section 2.1, early mutua-
listic approaches to cooperation were focused on partner
control in strictly reciprocal relationships, real-life
examples of which are provided by barter or the direct
exchange of gifts or services. Many cooperative acts,
however, like giving a ride, holding doors, or giving
money to the needy, cannot be adequately described in
terms of reciprocity so understood. One might, of course,
describe such acts as examples of “generalized reciprocity,”
a notion that, according to Sahlins who made it popular,
“refers to transactions that are putatively altruistic, trans-
actions on the line of assistance given and, if possible and
necessary, assistance returned. […] This is not to say that
handing over things in such form … generates no
counter-obligation. But the counter is not stipulated by
time, quantity, or quality: the expectation of reciprocity is
indeﬁnite” (Sahlins 1965, p. 147). Such forms of
cooperation are indeed genuine and important. Their
description in terms of “reciprocity” however, can be mis-
leading if it leads one to expect that the evolution of gener-
alized reciprocity could be explained by generalizing
standard models of the evolution of strict reciprocity.
Free-riding, which is already difﬁcult to control in strict
reciprocity situations, is plainly not controlled in these
cases; hence, the evolution of generalized reciprocity
cannot be explained in terms of partner control. We
prefer therefore to talk of “mutualism” rather than of
“generalized reciprocity.”
A ﬁrst step towards clarifying the issue is to characterize
mutualistic forms of cooperation directly rather than by
loosening the notion of reciprocity. The clearest real-life
example of mutualistic cooperation is provided by mutual
insurance companies (such as the “Philadelphia Contribu-
tionship for the Insurance of Houses from Loss by Fire”
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founded by Benjamin Franklin in 1752), where every
member contributes to covering the risks of all members
(Broten 2010; Emery & Emery 1999; Gosden 1961). All
members pay a cost, but only some members get an
actual beneﬁt. Still, paying the cost of an insurance is
mutually beneﬁcial to all in terms of expected utility. Gen-
erally speaking, we have mutualism when behaving coop-
eratively towards others is advantageous because of the
average beneﬁts that are expected to result for the individ-
ual from such behavior. These beneﬁts can be direct, as in
the case of reciprocation, or indirect and mediated by the
effect of the individual behavior on her chances to be
recruited in future cooperative interactions.
When it is practiced informally, mutualistic cooperation
so understood does not allow proper bookkeeping and
might therefore seem much more open to free-riding
than strict reciprocity. With partner choice, however, the
reverse may well be the case. Informal mutualistic coopera-
tive actions differ greatly in the degree to which they are
individually compensated by speciﬁc cooperative actions
of others, but nearly all contribute to some degree to the
individual’s moral reputation. A mutualistic social life is
dense with information relevant to everyone’s reputation.
This information is not conﬁned to cases of full defection
(e.g., refusal to cooperate) but is present in all intermediate
cases between full defection and perfect equity. Each time
one holds the door a bit too brieﬂy or hesitates to give a
ride, one signals one’s reluctance to meet the demands of
mutually advantageous cooperation. More generally, the
more varied the forms of informal mutual interaction, the
richer the evidence which can sustain or, on the contrary,
compromise one’s reputation. Hence, being uncooperative
in a mutualistic community may be quite costly; “free-
riding” may turn out anything but free. In such conditions,
it is prudent – a prudence which, we suggest, is built into
our evolved moral disposition – to behave routinely in a
moral way rather than check each and every time
whether one could, without reputational costs, proﬁt by
behaving immorally (Frank 1988; Gauthier 1986; Trivers
1971).
Partner choice combined with reputational information
makes possible among humans the evolution of mutualistic
cooperation well beyond the special case of reciprocal
interactions. How far and how deep can mutualistic
relationships extend? This is likely to depend largely on
social and environmental factors. But mutatis mutandis,
the logic is likely to be the same as in mutual aid societies:
Individuals should help one another in a way that is
mutually advantageous; that is, they should help one
another to the extent that the cost of helping is less than
the expected beneﬁt of being helped when in need.
Thus, we will hold doors when people are close to them,
but not when they are far away; we will offer a ride to a
friend who has lost his car keys, but not drive him home
every day; we will help the needy, but only up to a point
(the poverty line).
The requirement that interaction should be mutually
beneﬁcial limits the forms of help that are likely to
become standard social practices. If I can help a lot at a
relatively low cost, I should. If, on the other hand, I can
help only a little and at a high cost, I need not. In other
words, the duty to help others depends on the costs (c) to
the actor and beneﬁts (b) to the recipient. As in standard
reciprocity theories, individuals should help others only
when, on average, b>c. Our obligations to help others are
thus limited: we ought to help others only insofar as it is
mutually advantageous to do so. Mutual help, however,
can go quite far. Consider, for instance, a squad of soldiers
having to cross a mineﬁeld. If each follows his own path,
their chances of surviving are quite low. If, on the other
hand, they walk in line one behind another, they divide
the average risk. But who should help his comrades by
walking in front? Mutuality suggests that they should take
equal turns.
The best partners are thus those who adjust their help to
the circumstances so as to always behave in mutually advan-
tageous way. This means that evolution will select not only a
disposition to cooperate with others in a mutually advan-
tageous manner, but also a disposition to cooperate with
others whenever it is mutually advantageous to do so.8 If,
say, offering a ride to a friend who has lost his car keys is
mutually advantageous (it helps your friend a lot and does
not cost you too much), then if you fail to offer a ride,
not just I but also others may quickly ﬁgure out that you
are not an interesting cooperator. If the best partners are
those who always behave in mutually advantageous way,
this explains why morality is not only reactive (compensat-
ing others) but also proactive (helping one another; see
Elster [2007] for such a distinction). Indeed, in a system
of mutuality, individuals really owe others many goods
and services – they have to help others – for if they failed
to fulﬁll their duties towards others, they would reap the
beneﬁts of mutuality without paying its costs (Scanlon
1998). This “proactive” aspect of much moral behavior is
responsible for the “illusion” that individuals act as if they
had previously agreed on a contract with one another.
2.2.3. Punishment from a mutualistic perspective.
Recently, models of altruistic cooperation and experimen-
tal evidence have been used to argue that punishment is
typically altruistic, often meted out at a high cost to the
punisher, and that it evolved as an essential way to
enforce cooperation (Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis et al. 2003;
Henrich et al. 2006). In partner-choice models, on the
other hand, cooperating is made advantageous not so
much by the cost punishment in the case of non-
cooperation, as by the need to attract potential partners.
There is much empirical evidence that is consistent with
the mutualistic approach. Punishment as normally under-
stood (i.e., behavior that not only imposes a cost but has
the function of doing so) is uncommon in societies of fora-
gers (see Marlowe [2009] for a recent study) and, in these
societies, most disputes are resolved by self-segregation
(Guala 2011; see also Baumard [2010b] for a review). In
most cases, people simply stop wasting their time interact-
ing with immoral individuals. If the wrongdoing is very
serious and threatens the safety of the victim, she may
retaliate in order to preserve her reputation or deter
future aggression (McCullough et al. 2010). Such behavior,
however, cannot be seen as punishment per se since it is
aimed only at protecting the victim (as in many nonhuman
species; Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995). Furthermore,
although punishment commonly seeks to ﬁnely rebalance
the interests of the wrongdoer and the victim, retaliation
can be totally disproportionate and much worse than the
original aggression (Daly & Wilson 1988). There is, in
fact, good evidence that people in small-scale societies
distinguish between legitimate (and proportionate)
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punishment and illegitimate (and disproportionate) retalia-
tion (von Fürer-Haimendorf 1967; Miller 1990).9
Although humans, in a mutualistic framework, have not
evolved an instinct to punish, some punishment is nonethe-
less to be expected in three cases: (1) when the victim is also
the punisher and has a direct interest in punishing (punish-
ment then coinciding with retaliation or revenge); (2) when
the costs of punishing are incurred not by the punishers but
by the organization – typically the state – that employs and
pays them; and (3) when the cost of punishing is negligible
or insigniﬁcant (indeed, in this case, refraining from pun-
ishing would amount to being an accomplice in the wrong-
doing). In these cases, punishment does not serve to deter
cheating as in altruistic theories, but to restore fairness and
balance between the wrongdoer and the victim.
How costly should the punishment be to the person pun-
ished? Basically, from a mutualistic point of view, the cost
should be high enough to re-establish fairness but low
enough not to create additional injustice (by harming the
wrongdoer disproportionately). The guilty party who has
harmed or stolen from others should, if at all possible, com-
pensate his victims and should suffer in proportion to the
advantage he had unfairly sought to enjoy. Here, punish-
ment involves both restorative and retributive justice and
is the symmetric counterpart of distributive justice and
mutual help. Just as people give resources to others when
others are entitled to them or need them, people take
away resources from those who are not entitled to them
and impose a cost on others that is proportionate to the
beneﬁt they might have unfairly enjoyed.
2.3. Predictions
Is human cooperation governed by a principle of impartial-
ity? In this section, we spell out the predictions of the
mutualistic approach in more detail and examine whether
they ﬁt with moral judgments.
2.3.1. Exchange: Proportionality between contributions
and distributions. Human collective actions, for instance,
collective hunting or collective breeding, can be seen as
ventures in which partners invest some of their resources
(goods and services) to obtain new resources (e.g., food,
shelter, protection) that are more valuable to them than
the ones they have initially invested. Partners, in other
words, offer their contribution in exchange for a share of
the beneﬁts. For this, partners need to assess the value of
each contribution, and to proportionate the share of the
beneﬁts to this value. In section 2.1.4, we outlined the
results of an evolutionary model predicting that individuals
should share the beneﬁts of social interactions equally,
when they have equally contributed to their production
(André & Baumard 2011a). We saw that this logic predicts
that participants should be rewarded as a function of the
effort and talent that they invest in each interaction
(although a formal proof will require further modeling).
Experimental evidence conﬁrms this prediction, showing
a widespread massive preference for meritocratic distri-
butions: the more valuable your input, the more you get
(Konow 2001; Marshall et al. 1999). Similarly, ﬁeld obser-
vations of hunter-gatherers have shown that hunters
share the beneﬁts of the hunt according to each partici-
pant’s contribution (Gurven 2004). Bailey (1991), for
instance, reports that in group hunts among the Efe
Pygmies, initial game distributions are biased towards
members who participated in the hunt, and that portions
are allocated according to the speciﬁc hunting task. The
hunter who shoots the ﬁrst arrow gets an average of 36%,
the owner of the dog who chased the prey gets 21%, and
the hunter who shoots the second arrow gets only 9% by
weight (for the distribution of beneﬁts among whale
hunters, see Alvard & Nolin 2002).
Social selection should, moreover, favor considerations
of fairness in assessing each partner’s contribution. For
instance, most people who object to the huge salaries of
chief executive ofﬁcers (CEOs) or football stars do so not
out of simple equalitarianism but because they see these
salaries as far above what would be justiﬁed by the actual
contributions to the common good of those who earn
them (for an experimental approach, see Konow 2003).
Such assessments of individual contributions are them-
selves based, to a large extent, on the assessor’s understand-
ing of the workings of the economy and of society. As a
result, a similar sense of fairness may lead to quite different
moral judgments on actual distribution schemes. Eur-
opeans, for instance, tend to be more favorable to redistri-
bution of wealth than are Americans. This may be not
because Europeans care more about fairness but because
they have less positive views of their society and think
that the poor are being unfairly treated. For instance,
54% of Europeans believe that luck determines income,
as compared to only 30% of Americans. (Incidentally,
social mobility is quite similar in the two continents, with
a slight advantage for Europe.) As a consequence of this
belief, Europeans are more likely to support public policies
aimed at ﬁghting poverty (Alesina & Glaeser 2004; on the
relationships between belief in meritocracy and judgment
on redistribution, see also Fong 2001; on factual beliefs
about wealth distribution, see Norton & Ariely 2011). In
other words, when Americans and Europeans disagree on
what the poor deserve, their disagreement may stem
from their understanding of society rather than from the
importance they place on fair distribution.
2.3.2. Mutual aid: Proportionality between costs and
beneﬁts. In the kind of collective actions just discussed,
the beneﬁts are distributed in proportion to individual con-
tributions. As we already insisted, mutualistic cooperation
in not limited to such cases. In mutual aid in particular, con-
tributions are based on the relationship between one’s cost
in helping and one’s beneﬁt in being helped. Mutual aid
may be favored over strict reciprocity for several reasons:
for example, because risk levels are high and mutual aid
provides insurance against them, or because individuals
cooperate on a long-term basis where everyone is likely
to be in turn able to help or in need of help. Mutual aid
is widespread in hunter-gatherer societies (Barnard &
Woodburn 1988; for a review, see Gurven 2004). Among
Ache (Kaplan & Gurven 2005; Kaplan & Hill 1985), Mai-
mande (Aspelin 1979), and Hiwi (Gurven et al. 2000),
shares are distributed in proportion to the number of con-
sumers within the recipient family. Among the Batak,
families with high dependency tend to be net consumers,
whereas those with low dependency are net producers
(Cadeliña 1982). Among the Hiwi, the largest shares of
game are ﬁrst given to families with dependent children,
then to those without children, and the smallest shares
are given to single individuals (Silberbauer 1981).
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Note that mutual aid is quite compatible with the kind of
meritocratic distributions observed in collective actions.
Among hunter-gatherers, non-meat items and cultigens
whose production is highly correlated with effort are
often distributed according to merit, whereas meat items
whose production is highly unpredictable are distributed
much more equally (Alvard 2004; Gurven 2004; Wiessner
1996). Similarly, it is often possible in hunter-gatherer
societies to distinguish the primary distribution based on
merit, in which hunters are rewarded as a function of
their contribution to the hunt, and the secondary distri-
bution, which is based on need, in which the same
hunters share their meat with their neighbors, thereby
obtaining insurance against adversity (Alvard 2004;
Gurven 2004).
Of course, the help we owe to others varies according to
circumstances, and from society to society. Higher levels of
mutual aid are typically observed among relatives or close
friends because their daily interactions and their long-
term association make mutual aid less costly, more advan-
tageous, and more likely to be reciprocated on average
(Clark & Jordan 2002; Clark & Mills 1979). It also
depends on the type of society: In modern societies
where the state and the market provide many services, indi-
viduals tend to see their duties towards others as less
important than they do in collectivist societies. This can
be explained by the fact that, in these modern societies,
the state and the market provide alternative to mutual
aid. In more traditional societies, people depend more
mutual aid and therefore see themselves as having more
duties towards others (Baron & Miller 2000; Fiske 1992;
Levine et al. 2001).
Mutual aid is no less constrained by fairness principles
than strict reciprocity. If people want to treat others in a
mutually advantageous way, they need to share the costs
and beneﬁts of mutual aid equitably. This means that the
help given and the help received (when either situation
arises) must be of comparable value. People who think
that it is appropriate to hold the door for someone who is
less than two meters away from it and who act accordingly
have every reason to expect others to do the same – pro-
vided that they have equal chances to be the one holding
the door (one cannot, for instance, ask people whose
ofﬁce is close to the door to always open the door for
others). This means also that individuals can’t ask others
to do more than what they are ready to do themselves,
and that they may depart from being seen as optimal part-
ners if they provide help well beyond set mutual expec-
tation – for instance, by holding the door for someone
who is 10 meters away, thereby sending the wrong signal
that this is what they would expect when the roles are
switched.
The amount of help we owe to one another depends
also on the number of people involved in a particular situ-
ation. In a group of, say, ten friends, when one is in need,
nine friends can help. When this is so, each must provide
a ninth of the help needed. The smaller the group, the
greater the duty of each towards a member in need;
the larger the group, the lesser the duty. This group-
size factor should play a role in explaining why people
feel they have more duty towards their friends than
towards their colleagues, towards their colleagues than
towards their fellow citizens, and so on (Haidt & Baron
1996).
2.3.3. Punishment: Proportionality between tort and
compensation. The mutualistic account of punishment
makes speciﬁc predictions. Indeed, to the extent that pun-
ishment is about restoring fairness, the more unfair the
wrongdoing, the bigger the punishment should be. Anthro-
pological observations have extensively shown that, in
keeping with this prediction, the level of compensation in
stateless societies is directly proportional to the harm
done to the victim: For example, the wrongdoer owes
more to the victim if he has killed a family member or
eloped with a wife than if he has stolen animals or
destroyed crops (Hoebel 1954; Howell 1954; Malinowski
1926). Similarly, laboratory experiments have shown that
in modern societies people have strong and consistent judg-
ments that the wrongdoer should offer compensation
equivalent to the harm inﬂicted to the victim or, if compen-
sation is not possible, should incur a penalty proportionate
to the harm done to the victim (Robinson & Kurzban
2006).
On the other hand, taking the perspective of an altruistic
model of morality, the function of punishment is to impose
cooperation and deter people from cheating and causing
harm. To that extent, punishment for a given type of
crime should be calibrated so as to deter people from com-
mitting it. In many cases, altruistic deterrence and mutua-
listic retribution may favor similar punishments, making it
impossible to directly identify the underlying moral intui-
tion, let alone the evolved function. But in some cases,
the two approaches result in different punishments. Con-
sider, for instance, two types of crime that cause the
same harm to the victim and bring the same beneﬁts to
the culprit. From a mutualistic point of view, they should
be equally punished. From an altruistic point of view, if
one of the two types of otherwise equivalent crime is
easier to commit, it calls for stronger deterrence and
should be more heavily punished (Polinsky & Shavell
2000; Posner 1983). At present, we lack the large-scale
cross-cultural experimental studies of people’s intuitions
on cases allowing clear comparisons to be able to ascertain
the respective place of altruistic and mutualistic intuitions
in matters of punishment (but see Baumard 2011). What
we are suggesting here is that, from an evolutionary point
of view, not only should mutualistic intuitions regarding
punishment be taken into consideration, but they may
well play a central role.
2.4. Conclusion
The mutualistic approach not only provides a possible
explanation for the evolution of morality, it also makes
ﬁne-grained predictions about the way individuals should
tend to cooperate. It predicts a very speciﬁc pattern: Indi-
viduals should seek to make contributions and distributions
in collective actions proportionate to each other; they
should make their help proportionate to their capacity to
address needs effectively; and they should make punish-
ments proportionate to the corresponding crimes. These
predictions match the particular pattern described by con-
tractualist philosophers. Contractualist philosophers,
however, faced a puzzle: They explained morality in
terms of an implicit contract, but they could not account
for its existence. A naturalist approach need not face the
same problem. At the evolutionary level, the selective
pressure exercised by the cooperation market has favored
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the evolution of a sense of fairness that motivates individ-
uals to respect others’ possessions, contributions, and
needs. At the psychological level, this sense of fairness
leads humans to behave as if they were bound by a real
contract.10
3. Explaining cooperative behavior in economic
games
In recent years, economic games have become the main
experimental tool to study cooperation. Hundreds of exper-
iments with a variety of economic games all over the world
have shown that, in industrialized as well as in small-scale
societies, participants’ behavior is far from being purely
selﬁsh (Camerer 2003; Henrich et al. 2005), raising the
question, If not selﬁsh, then what? In this section, we inves-
tigate the extent to which the mutualistic approach to mor-
ality helps explain in a ﬁne-grained manner this rich
experimental evidence.
Here we consider only three games: the Ultimatum
Game, the Dictator Game, and the Trust Game. In the
Ultimatum Game, two players are given the opportunity
to share an endowment, say, a sum of $10. One of the
players (the “proposer”) is instructed to choose how
much of this endowment to offer to the second player
(the “responder”). The proposer can make only one offer
that the responder can either accept or reject. If the
responder accepts the offer, the money is shared accord-
ingly. If the responder rejects the offer, neither player
receives anything. The Dictator Game is a simpliﬁcation
of the Ultimatum Game. The ﬁrst player (the “dictator”)
decides how much of the sum of money to keep. The
second player (the “recipient”), whose role is entirely
passive, receives the remainder of the sum. The Trust
Game is an extension of the Dictator Game. The ﬁrst
player decides how much of the initial endowment to
give to the second player, with the added incentive that
the amount she gives will be multiplied (typically doubled
or trebled) by the experimenter, and that the second
player, who is now in a position similar to that of the dicta-
tor in the Dictator Game, will have the possibility of giving
back some of this money to the ﬁrst player. These three
games are typically played under conditions of strict anon-
ymity (i.e., players don’t know with whom they are paired,
and the experimenter does not know what individual
players decided). Since the Dictator Game removes the
strategic aspects found in the Ultimatum Game and in
the Trust Game, it is often regarded as a better tool to
study genuine cooperation and, for this reason, we will
focus on it.
3.1. Participants’ variable sense of entitlement
3.1.1. Cooperative games with a preliminary earning
phase. In economic games, participants are given money,
but they may hold different views on the extent to which
each has rights over this money. Do they, for instance,
have equal rights, or does the player who proposes or
decides how it should be shared have greater rights?
Rather than having to infer participants’ sense of entitle-
ment from their behavior, the games can be modiﬁed so
as to give reasons to participants to see one of them as
being more entitled to the money than the other. In
some dictator games, in particular, one of the participants –
the dictator or the recipient – has the opportunity to earn
the money that will be later allocated by the dictator.
Results indicate that the participant who has earned the
money is considered to have more rights over it.
In a study by Cherry et al. (2002), half of the participants
took a quiz and earned either $10 or $40, depending on
how well they answered. In a second phase, these partici-
pants became dictators and were each told to divide the
money they had earned between themselves and another
participant who had not been given the opportunity to
take the quiz. The baseline condition was an otherwise
identical dictator game but without the earning phase. Dic-
tators gave much less in the earning than in the baseline
condition: 79% of the $10 earners and 70% of the $40
earners gave nothing at all, compared to 19% and 15% in
the matching no-earning conditions. By simply manipulat-
ing the dictator’s sense of entitlement, the transfer of
resources is drastically reduced.
Cherry et al.’s study was symmetric to an earlier one by
Rufﬂe (1998). In Rufﬂe’s study, it was the recipient who
earned money by participating in a quiz contest and
either winning the contest and earning $10 or losing and
earning $4. That sum was then allocated by the dictator
(who had not earned any money). In the baseline condition,
the amount to be allocated, $10 or $4, was decided by the
toss of a coin. Offers made to the winners of the contest
were higher and offers made to the losers were lower
than in the matching baseline conditions.
These two experiments suggest that participants attri-
bute greater right to the player who has earned the
money. When it is the dictator who has earned the
money, she is less generous, and when it is the recipient
who has earned the money, she is more generous than in
the baseline condition. Having earned the money to be
shared entitles the earner to a larger share, which is what
a fairness account would predict.
A recent study by Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) provides a
more detailed demonstration of the same kind of effects. In
this study, individuals had the opportunity to earn money
based on their performance in a 20-questions exam.
Speciﬁcally, participants were given $10 (Canadian) by
answering correctly between 0 and 8 questions; $20 by
answering correctly between 9 and 14 questions; and $40
by answering correctly 15 or more questions. Three types
of conditions were compared: conditions where the
money to be allocated was earned by the dictators, con-
ditions where it was earned by the recipients, and standard
dictator game conditions where the amount of money was
randomly assigned. In this last baseline condition, on
average, dictators allocated receivers 20% of the money,
which is consistent with previous dictator game exper-
iments. In conditions where the money was earned by
the dictators themselves, they simply kept all of it
(making, that is, the “zero offer” that rational choice
theory predicts self-interested participants should make
in all dictator games). In conditions where the money was
earned by receivers, on the other hand, the dictators gave
them on average more than 50%.
Oxoby and Spraggon’s study goes further in showing how
the size of the recipients’ earnings affects the way in which
dictators allocate them. To recipients who had earned $40,
no dictator made a zero offer (to be compared with 11%
such offer in the corresponding baseline condition), and
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63% of the dictators offered more than 50% of the money
(to be compared with no such offer in the corresponding
baseline condition). Offers made to recipients who had
earned only the minimum of $10 were not statistically
different from those made in the corresponding baseline
condition. Offers made to recipients who had earned $20
were halfway between those made to the $40 and the $10
earners. Since $10 was guaranteed even to participants
who failed to answer any question in the quiz, participants
could consider that true earnings corresponded to money
generated over and above $10. As the authors note, “only
when receivers earned CAN$ 20 or CAN$ 40 were dicta-
tors sure that receivers’ property rights were not simply
determined by the experimenter. These wealth levels pro-
vided dictators with evidence that these rights were legiti-
mate in that the receiver had increased the wealth
available for the dictator to allocate” (Oxoby & Spraggon
2008, p. 709). The authors further note that “the modal
offer is 50 percent for the CAN$ 20 wealth level and 75
percent for the CAN$ 40 wealth level, exactly the
amount that the receiver earned over and above the CAN
$ 10 allocated by the experimenter” (p. 709). In other
words, the dictator gives the recipient full rights over the
money clearly earned in the test. Overall, the authors con-
clude, such results are best explained in terms of fairness
than in terms of welfare (e.g., “other-regarding prefer-
ences”). Dictators, it seems, give money to the recipients
not in order to help them, but only because and to the
extent that they think that the recipients are entitled to it
(see also Bardsley [2008] for further experimental results).
3.1.2. The variability of rights explains the variability of
distributions. The results of dictator game experiments
with a ﬁrst phase in which participants earn money
suggest that dictators allocate money on the basis of con-
siderations of rights. The dictator takes into account in a
precise manner the rights both players may have over the
money. In standard dictator games, however, there is no
single clear basis for attributing rights over the money to
one or the other player, and this may explain the variability
of dictators’ decisions: Some consider they should give
nothing, others consider they should give some money,
and yet others consider they should split equally (Hagen
&Hammerstein 2006; for a similar point, see Heintz 2005).
More speciﬁcally, there are three ways for participants to
interpret standard cooperative games. First, some dictators
may consider that, since the money has been provided by
the experimenter without clear rationale or intent, both
participants should have the same rights over it. Dictators
thinking so would presumably split the money equally.
Second, other dictators may consider that, since they
have been given full control over the money, that they
are fully entitled to keep it. After all, in everyday life, you
are allowed to keep the money handed to you unless
there are clear reasons why you may not. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, possession is commonly con-
sidered evidence of ownership. Dictators who keep all
the money need not, therefore, be acting on purely
selﬁsh considerations. They may be considering what is
fair and think that it is fair for them to keep the money.11
Third, dictators may consider that the recipient has some
rights over the money –why else should they have been
instructed to decide how much to give to the recipient? –
but feel that their different roles in the game justify the
dictators and recipients having different entitlements. Dic-
tators are in charge and hence can be seen as enjoying
greater rights and as being fair in giving less than 50% to
the recipient.
This interpretation of dictators’ reasoning in standard
versions of the game is conﬁrmed by some of the ﬁrst
experiments on participants’ sense of entitlement, done
by Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman et al.
(1996). Hoffman and colleagues observe that when individ-
uals must compete to earn the role of dictator, they give less
to the recipient than they do in a control condition where
they become dictator by, for example, the ﬂipping of a
coin. In the same way, participants’ behaviors vary when
a trust game is called osotua (a long-term relationship of
mutual help among the Maasai; Cronk 2007) or a Public
Goods Game (PGG) a harambee (a Kenyan tradition of
community self-help events; Ensminger 2004) or when a
public goods game is framed as a community event or as
an economic investment (Liberman et al. 2004; Pillutla &
Chen 1999). Participants use the name of the game to
decide whether the money involved in the game belongs
to them or is shared with the other participants.
There is an interesting asymmetry observed in games
where participants’ sense of entitlement is grounded on
earnings or competition: Dictators keep everything when
they have earned the money, but do not give everything
when it is the recipient who has earned the money. Why?
Of course, it could be mere selﬁshness. More consistent
with the detailed results of these experiments and their
interpretation in terms of entitlement and fairness, is the
alternative hypothesis that dictators interpret their position
as giving them more rights over the money than the recipi-
ent. Remember, for instance, that, in Oxoby and Sprag-
gon’s experiment, the modal offer is exactly the amount
that the receiver earned over and above the $10 provided
anyhow by the experimenter. In other words, dictators
seem to consider both that they are entitled to keep the
initial $10 and that the recipients are fully entitled to
receive the money they earned over and above these $10.
The same approach can explain the variability of offers in
ultimatum games. As Lesorogol writes,
If player one perceives himself as having ownership rights over
the stake, then … low offers would be acceptable to both giver
and receiver. This would explain why many player twos
accepted low offers. On the other hand, if ownership is con-
strued as joint, then … low offers would be more likely to be
rejected as a violation of fairness norms, explaining why some
players do reject offers up to ﬁfty percent of the stake. (Lesor-
ogol, forthcoming)
Explaining the variability of dictators’ allocations in terms
of the diverse manner in which they may understand their
and the recipient’s rights is directly relevant to explaining
the variability of dictators’ allocations observed in cross-cul-
tural studies. These behaviors correlate with local coopera-
tive practices. In societies where much is held in common
and sharing is a dominant form of economic interaction,
participants behave as if they assumed that they have
limited rights over the money they got from the exper-
imenter. In societies where property rights are mostly indi-
vidual and sharing is less common, dictators behave as if
they assumed that the money is theirs.
Consider, the case of the Lamalera, one of the 15 small-
scale societies compared in Henrich et al.’s (2005) study:
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Among the whale hunting peoples on the island of Lamalera
(Indonesia), 63% of the proposers in the ultimatum game
divided the pie equally, and most of those who did not,
offered more than half (the mean offer was 58% of the pie).
In real life, when a Lamalera whaling crew returns with a
large catch, a designated person meticulously divides the prey
into pre-designated parts allocated to the harpooner, crew-
members, and others participating in the hunt, as well as to
the sailmaker, members of the hunters’ corporate group, and
other community members (who make no direct contribution
to the hunt). Because the size of the pie in the Lamalera exper-
iments was the equivalent of 10 days’ wages, making an exper-
imental offer in the UG [Ultimatum Game] may have seemed
similar to dividing a whale. (Henrich et al. 2005, p. 812)
Henrich et al. contrast the Lamalera to the Tsimane of
Bolivia and the Machiguenga of Peru who “live in societies
with little cooperation, sharing, or exchange beyond the
family unit. … Consequently, it is not very surprising that
in an anonymous interaction both groups made low UG
offers” (p. 812). In accord with their cultural values and
practices, Lamalera proposers in the Ultimatum Game
think of the money as owned in common with the recipient,
whereas Tsimane and Machigenga proposers see the
money as their own and feel entitled to keep it.
To generalize, the inter-individual and cross-cultural
variability observed in economic games may be precisely
explained by assuming that participants aim at fair allo-
cation and that what they judge fair varies with their under-
standing of the participants’ rights in the money to be
allocated. The mutualistic hypothesis posits that humans
are all equipped with the same sense of fairness but may
distribute resources differently for at least two reasons:
1. They do not have the same beliefs about the situation.
Remember, for instance, the differences between Eur-
opeans and Americans regarding the origin of poverty.
Surveys indicate that Europeans generally think that the
poor are exploited and trapped in poverty, whereas Amer-
icans tend to believe that poor people are responsible for
their situation and could pull themselves out of poverty
through effort. (Note that both societies have approxi-
mately the same level of social mobility; Alesina &
Glaeser 2004.)
2. They do not face the same situations (Baumard et al.
2010). For instance, the very same good will be distributed
differently if it has been produced individually or collec-
tively. In the ﬁrst case the producer will have a claim to a
greater share of the good, whereas in the second the
good will need to be shared among the various contribu-
tors. Whether the good is kept to one individual or
shared between collaborators, the same sense of fairness
will have been applied.
Such situational and informational variations may explain
some cross-cultural differences in cooperative games. In
the foregoing example, Lamalera ﬁshers give more than
the Tsimane in the Ultimatum Game because they have
more reason to believe that the money they have to distri-
bute is a collective good. The Lamalera indeed produce
most of their resources collectively, whereas the Tsimane
produce their resources in individual gardens. Here, Lama-
lera and Tsimane do not differ in their preferences, and
they all share the same sense of fairness; but because of
differences in features of their everyday lives they do not
frame the game in the same way.
Incidentally, children’s beliefs may explain their behavior
in economic games. Indeed, children younger than age 7
seem to be shockingly ungenerous when playing these
games (Bernhard et al. 2006; Blake & Rand 2010).
Although these observations seem to suggest a late devel-
opment of a sense of justice, it contrasts with other
results in developmental psychology that demonstrate a
very early emergence of a preference for helping rather
than hindering behavior (Hamlin et al. 2007), fairness-
based behavior (Hamann et al. 2011; Warneken et al.
2011), and fairness-based judgments (Baumard et al.
2012; Geraci & Surian 2011; LoBue et al. 2011; McCrink
et al. 2010; Schmidt & Sommerville 2011). One way to
reconcile these apparently contradictory ﬁndings starts
from the observation that young children do not have the
same experience or perspective as adults. Whereas adults
rarely, if ever, get money for free, receiving resources
from others is actually the norm rather than the exception
for children. Proposers might thus see themselves as fully
entitled to the resource they get in the game, exactly as
they are fully entitled to the candies or the toys given by
their aunt or their older sibling. The apparent lack of gen-
erosity among children may have more to do with their
understanding of the game than with a late development
of their moral sense.
3.2. Exchanges
3.2.1. Proportionality between contributions and
distributions. To the extent that the social selection
approach is correct, considerations of fairness and imparti-
ality should also explain the distribution of resources in
cases where both participants have collaborated in produ-
cing them. As we have seen in section 2, the social selection
approach predicts that the distribution should be propor-
tionate to the contribution of each participant. This is, of
course, not the only possible arrangement (Cappelen
et al. 2007). From a utilitarian point of view, for instance,
global welfare should be maximized; in the absence of rel-
evant information, participants should assume that the rate
of utility is the same for both of them; hence, both partici-
pants should get the same share, whatever their individual
contributions.
A number of experiments have studied the distribution
of money in situations of collaboration (Cappelen et al.
2007; 2010; Frohlich et al. 2004; Jakiela 2007, 2009;
Konow 2000). In Frohlich et al. (2004), for instance, the
production phase involves both dictators and recipients
proofreading a text to correct spelling errors. One dollar
of credit is allocated for each error corrected properly
(and a dollar is removed for errors introduced). Dictators
receive an envelope with dollars corresponding to the net
errors corrected by the pair and a sheet indicating the pro-
portion of errors corrected by the dictator and the
recipient.
Frohlich et al. compare Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inﬂu-
ential “model of inequity aversion” with an expanded
version of this model that takes into account “just desert.”
According to the original model, participants in economic
games have two preferences: one for maximizing their
own payoff, the other for minimizing unequal outcomes.
It follows in particular from this model that proposers in
the Ultimatum Game or dictators in the Dictator Game
should never give more than half of the money, which
would go against both their preference for maximizing
money and their preference for minimizing equality.
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Frohlich et al. claim that people have also a preference for
fair distributions based on each participant’s contribution.
This claim is conﬁrmed by their results: First, the modal
answer in their experiment (in this case, 30 of 73 subjects)
is for participants to leave an amount of money exactly cor-
responding to the number of errors corrected by the reci-
pient. Second, contrary to the prediction following from
Fehr and Schmidt’s initial model, Frohlich et al. found
that some of the dictators who had been less productive
than their counterparts left more than 50% of the money
jointly earned (8 dictators out of 35 in this situation com-
pared to none of the 38 dictators who had been more pro-
ductive than their counterparts).
The pattern of evidence in Frohlich et al. has also been
found in experiments framed as transactions on the labor
market. In the study by Fehr et al. (1997; see also Fehr
et al. 1993; 1998), a group of participants is divided into a
small set of “employers” and a larger set of “employees.”
The rules of the game are as follows: The employer ﬁrst
offers a “contract” to employees specifying a wage and a
desired amount of effort. The employee who agrees to
these terms receives the wage and supplies an effort
level, which need not equal the effort agreed upon in the
contract. (Although subjects may play this game several
times with different partners, each employer–employee
interaction is an anonymous one-shot event.)
If employees are self-interested, they will choose to
make no effort, no matter what wage is offered. Knowing
this, employers will never pay more than the minimum
necessary to get the employee to accept a contract. In
fact, however, this self-interested outcome rarely occurs
in the experiment, and the more generous the employer’s
wage offer to the employee, the greater is the effort pro-
vided. In effect, employers presumed the cooperative pre-
dispositions of the employees, making quite generous wage
offers and receiving greater effort, as a means to increase
both their own and the employees’ payoff. More precisely,
employees contributed in proportion to the wage proposed
by their employer. Similar results have been observed in
Fehr et al. (1993; 1998).
The Trust Game can also be used to study the effect of
participants’ contributions on the distribution of money.
The money given by the ﬁrst player to the second is
usually multiplied by two or three. The total amount to
be divided could therefore be seen as the product of a
common effort of the two players, the ﬁrst player being
an investor, who takes the risk of investing money, and
the second player being a worker, who can both earn part
of the money invested and return a beneﬁt to the investor.
Most experiments indeed report that Player 2 takes into
account the amount sent by Player 1: The greater the
investment, the greater the return (Camerer 2003). Note,
moreover, that the more Player 1 invests, the bigger the
risks she takes. Players 2 aiming at a fair distribution
should take this risk into account. This is exactly what
Cronk (2007) observed (see also Cronk & Wasielewski
2008). In their experiments, the more Player 1 invests,
the bigger not only the amount but also the proportion of
the money she gets back (see also Willinger et al. 2003;
and, with a different result, Berg et al. 1995).
3.2.2. Talents and privileges. It is consistent with the
mutualistic approach (according to which people behave
as if they had passed a contract) that, in a collective
action, the beneﬁts to which each participant is entitled
should be a function of her contribution. How do people
decide what counts as contribution? This is not a simple
matter. In political philosophy, for instance, the doctrine
of choice egalitarianism defends the view that people
should only be held responsible for their choices (Fleur-
baey 1998; Roemer 1985). The allocation of beneﬁts
should not take into account talents and other assets that
are beyond the scope of the agent’s responsibility. In coop-
erative games, a reasonable interpretation of this fairness
ideal would be to consider that a fair distribution is one
that gives each person a share of the total income that
equals her share of the total effort (rather than a share of
the raw contribution). From the perspective of the social
selection of partners, however, choice egalitarianism is
not an optimal way to select partners: Those who contrib-
ute more, be it thanks to greater efforts or to greater
skills, are more desirable as partners and hence their
greater contribution should entitle them to greater
beneﬁts. Hence, choice egalitarianism and partner-selec-
tion-based morality lead to subtly different predictions.
Cappelen et al. (2007) have tested these two types of pre-
diction in a dictator game. In the production phase, the
players were randomly assigned one of two documents
and asked to copy the text into a computer ﬁle. The value
of their production depended on the price they were paid
for each correctly typed word (arbitrary rate of return),
on the number of minutes they had decided to work to
produce a correct document (effort), and on the number
of correct words they were able to type per minute
(talent). The question was: Which factors would partici-
pants choose to reward? In line with choice egalitarianism
and partner selection, almost 80% of the participants found
it fair to reward people for their working time, that is, for
choices that were fully within individual control (effort).
Almost 80% of the participants found it unfair to reward
people for features that were completely beyond their
control (arbitrary rate of return). Finally, and more rele-
vantly, almost 70% of the participants found it fair to
reward productivity even if productivity may have been pri-
marily outside individual control (talent). This conﬁrms the
predictions of partner selection.
The mutualistic approach thus predicts that people
should be fully entitled to the product of their contribution.
There are limits to this conclusion, though: If what they
bring to others has been stolen from someone, an individ-
ual should not remunerate their contribution for it would
mean being an accomplice to the theft. More generally,
goods acquired in an unfair way do not confer rights over
the resources they help to produce. Cappelen et al.
(2010) compared the allocation of money in economic
games where the difference in input was either fair or
unfair. At the beginning of the experiment, each participant
was given 300 Norwegian kroner. In the production phase,
participants were asked to decide how much of this money
they wanted to invest, and were randomly assigned a low or
a high rate of return. Participants with a low rate of return
doubled their investment, while those with a high rate of
return quadrupled their investment. In the distribution
phase, two games were played. Participants were paired
with a player who had the same rate of return in one
game and with a player who had a different rate of return
in the other game. In each game, they were given infor-
mation about the other participant’s rate of return,
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investment level, and total contribution, and they were
then asked to propose a distribution of the total income.
The results show that the modal allocation decision is for
participants to take into account the amount invested by
each player but not the rate of return that differed in an
unfair manner (43% of the participants were in line with
this principle) (for more about effort and luck in a bargain-
ing game, see Burrows & Loomes 1994; for similar results
with a benevolent third party, see Konow 2000).
This analysis might explain the developmental trends
observed by Almås et al. (2010). They observed a decline
in egalitarian distribution during adolescence. This
decline corresponds to an increasing awareness that some
differences in productivity are due to pure luck and that
others are under the control of individuals. At the begin-
ning, children probably do not fully understand that some
participants are more gifted than others, and therefore
they prefer an egalitarian distribution. As they come to
understand that participants do not contribute equally to
the common work, they realize that some participants
deserve a larger share of money than others. The same
moral logic may thus lead young children to be egalitarian
and older children to be meritocratic.
3.3. Mutual aid
3.3.1. Rights and duties in mutual help. As we have seen
in section 2, mutual aid works as a form of mutual insur-
ance. Individuals offer their contribution (helping others)
and receive a beneﬁt in exchange (being helped when
they need it). A number of economic games have shown
that, indeed, people feel that they have the duty to help
others in need and, of course, greater need calls for
greater help (Aguiar et al. 2008; Branas-Garza 2006;
Eckel & Grossman 1996).
When an economic game is understood in terms of
mutual help, this should alter participants’ decisions and
expectations accordingly. Several cross-cultural exper-
iments that frame economic games in locally relevant
mutual help terms well illustrate this effect. Lesorogol
(2007), for example, ran an experiment on gift giving
among the Samburu of Kenya. She compared a standard
dictator game with a condition where the players were
asked to imagine that the money given to Player 1 rep-
resented a goat being slaughtered at home and that
Player 2 arrived on the scene just when the meat was
being divided. In the standard condition, the mean offer
was 41.3% of the stake (identical to a mean of 40% in a
standard dictator game played in a different Samburu com-
munity; Lesorogol 2007). By contrast, the mean offer in the
hospitality condition was 19.3%. Informal discussions and
interviews in the weeks following the games revealed that
in a number of real-world sharing contexts a share of
20% would be appropriate (Lesorogol 2007). For instance,
women often share sugar with friends and neighbors who
request it. When asked how much sugar they would give
to friends if they had a kilogram of sugar, most women
responded that they would give a “glass” of sugar, about
200 grams.
Cronk (2007) compared, among the Maasai of Kenya,
two versions of a modiﬁed trust games where both players
were given an equal endowment (Barr 2004). In one of
the two versions, the game was introduced with the words
“this is an osotua game.” (As we already mentioned, in
Maasai, an osotua relationship is a long-term relationship
of mutual help and gift giving between two people.)
Cronk observed that this osotua condition was associated
with lower transfers by both players and with lower
expected returns on the part of the ﬁrst players. As Cronk
explains, in an osotua relationship, the partners have a
“mutual obligation to respond to one another’s genuine
needs, but only with what is genuinely needed.” Since
both players had received money, Player 2 was not in a situ-
ation of need and could not expect to be given much.
Understanding people’s sense of rights and duties in
mutualistic terms helps make sense of further aspects of
Cronk’s results. Compare a transfer of resources made in
order to fulﬁll a duty to help the receiver with an equivalent
transfer made in the absence of any such duty. This second
situation is well illustrated by the case of an investor who
lends money to a businessman. Since the businessman
was not entitled to this money, he is indebted to the inves-
tor and will have to give her back a sum of money propor-
tionate to her contribution to the joint venture. This
corresponds to what we observe in the standard trust
game. The more Player 1 invests, the more he gets back.
By contrast, in a situation of mutual help, individuals do
not have to give anything back in the short run (except
maybe to show their gratitude). What they provide in
exchange for the help they enjoyed is an insurance of
similar help should the occasion arise, the amount of
which will be determined more by the needs of the
person to be helped than by how much was received on a
previous occasion.
Such an account of mutual help makes sense of Cronk’s
results. In his experiment, osotua framing was associated
with a negative correlation between amounts given by the
ﬁrst player and amounts returned by the second. Player 2
returns less money to Player 1 in the context of mutual
help than in the context of investment. In the context of
mutual help, Player 2 does not share the money according
to each participant’s contribution. She takes the money as a
favor and gives only a small amount back as a token of grati-
tude. Participants reciprocate less in the mutual help con-
dition than in the standard condition because they see
themselves as entitled to the help they receive:
Although osotua involves a reciprocal obligation to help if asked
to do so, actual osotua gifts are not necessarily reciprocal or
even roughly equal over long periods of time. The ﬂow of
goods and services in a particular relationship might be
mostly or entirely one way, if that is where the need is greatest.
Not all gift giving involves or results in osotua. For example,
some gift giving results instead in debt (sile). Osotua and debt
are not at all the same. While [osotua partners] have an obli-
gation to help each other in time of need, this is not at all the
same as the debt one has when one has been lent something
and must pay it back. (Cronk 2007, p. 353)
In this experiment, the standard trust game and the
mutual help trust game exhibit two very different patterns.
In the standard game, the more you give, the greater are
your rights to the money and the greater the amount of
money you receive. In the mutual help game, the more
you give to the other participant, the greater the amount
of money she keeps. This contrast makes clear sense in a
mutualistic morality of fairness and impartiality. Every
gift creates an obligation. The character of the obligation,
however, varies according to the kind of partnership
involved. The resources you received may be interpreted
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as a contribution for a joint investment, and must be
returned with a commensurate share of the beneﬁts; or
they may be interpreted as help received when you were
entitled to it, with the duty to help when the occasion
arises and in a manner commensurate to the need of the
person helped.
3.3.2. Refusals of high offers. A remarkable ﬁnding in
cross-cultural research with the Ultimatum Game is that,
in some societies, participants refuse very high offers (in
contrast to the more common refusal of very low offers).
Interpreting economic games in terms of a mutualistic
morality suggests a way to explain such ﬁndings. Outside
of mutual help, we claim, gifts received create a debt and
a duty to reciprocate. Gifts, in other terms, are not, and
are not seen as, merely altruistic. Of course, in an anon-
ymous one-shot ultimatum game, reciprocation is not poss-
ible and there is no duty to do what cannot be done. But, it
is not that easy (or, arguably, not even possible) to shed
one’s intuitive social and moral dispositions when partici-
pating in such a game. It may not be possible either to
fully inhibit one’s spontaneous attitudes to giving,
helping, or receiving. Such inhibition should be even
more difﬁcult in a small traditional society where anon-
ymous relationships are absent or very rare. Moreover, in
some societies, the duty to reciprocate and the shame
that may accompany the failure to do so are culturally high-
lighted. Gift giving and reciprocation are highly salient,
often ritualized forms of interaction. From an anthropolo-
gical point of view, it is not surprising therefore that the
refusal of very high offers should have been particularly
observed in small traditional New Guinean societies such
as the Au and the Gnau, where accepting a gift creates
onerous debts and inferiority until the debt is repaid. In
these societies, large gifts which may be hard to reciprocate
are often refused (Henrich et al. 2005; Tracer 2003).12
3.4. Punishment
3.4.1. Restoring fairness. Participants display a range of
so-called punishing behaviors in economic games. Most
such behaviors, however, can be explained by direct self-
interest. The Ultimatum Game, for instance, involves
only two individuals. This is the kind of situation that trig-
gers revenge behaviors because each partner has a direct
interest in deterring cheating by the other (McCullough
et al. 2010; Petersen et al. 2010). For this reason, the
game of choice for studying punishment has been the
Public Goods Game (PGG). In a typical PGG, several
players are given, say, 20 dollars each. The players may con-
tribute part or all of their money to a common pool. The
experimenter then triples the common pool and divides it
equally among the players, irrespective of the amount of
their individual contribution. A self-interested player
should contribute nothing to the common pool while
hoping to beneﬁt from the contribution of others. Only a
fraction of players, however, follow this selﬁsh strategy.
When the PGG is played for several rounds (the players
being informed in advance of the number of rounds to be
played), players typically begin by contributing on average
about half of their endowment to the common pool. The
level of contributions, however, decreases with each
round, until, in the ﬁnal rounds, most players are behaving
in a self-interested manner (Ledyard 1994/1995). When
the PGG is played repeatedly with the same partners, the
level of contribution declines towards zero, with most
players ending up refusing to contribute to the common
pool (Andreoni 1995; Fehr & Gächter 2002). Further
experiments have shown that, given the opportunity, par-
ticipants are disposed to punish others (i.e., to ﬁne them)
at a cost to themselves (Yamagishi 1986). When such
costly punishment is permitted, cooperation does not
deteriorate.
Punishment is often seen as a fundamental way to sustain
cooperation. In a mutualistic framework, however, the
competition among partners for participation in coopera-
tive ventures is supposed to be strong enough to select
cooperative and indeed moral dispositions (Barclay 2004
2006; Barclay & Willer 2007; Chiang 2010; Coricelli et al.
2004; Ehrhart & Keser 1999; Hardy & Van Vugt 2006;
Page et al. 2005; Sheldon et al. 2000; Sylwester &
Roberts 2010). Uncooperative individuals are not made to
cooperate by being punished. Rather, they are excluded
from cooperative ventures (an exclusion that is harming
to them, and in that sense, can be seen a form of “punish-
ment,” but that is not aimed at, and does not have the func-
tion of, forcing them to cooperate).
Still, even in mutualistic interactions, punishment may
be appropriate, but for other reasons. First, although a
PGG involves more than two individuals, the number of
players is small, and each player may have an interest in
incurring a cost to deter cheating. On average, revengeful
individuals may end up being in more cooperative groups
(McCullough et al. 2010). Second, as noted by Guala
(2012), inﬂicting a cost is usually the only way for the par-
ticipants to manifest their disappointment, and it is clearly
in their interest to warn their future partners that they are
not going to accept further cheating. These self-serving
motives can very well be combined with more moral
motives. As we noted in section 2.2.3, it may indeed be
morally required to help one another to ﬁght against injus-
tice (or, to put it differently, to refuse to be the accomplice
of an immoral act). That is the reason why people feel com-
pelled to support uprisings in dictatorships or to give
money to human rights organization. Of course, this duty
to punish is limited, exactly as is the duty to help others.
Thus, most of us feel that we have a duty to contribute
money to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but
not to take up arms and risk our life to liberate a people.
In economic games, however, the cost of punishing
others is quite small (a couple of dollars), and punishers
are usually involved in the interaction (they are thus not
really third party and may have an interest in inﬂicting a
cost to the cheater). Participants may thus feel that they
have to spend their money to put an end to unfair situations
and to restore a fair balance among participants.
In such a perspective, punishment can be seen as a nega-
tive distribution aiming at correcting an earlier unfair posi-
tive distribution. If such is the goal of punishment, it should
occur also in situations where there is no cooperation to
sustain but where there has been an unfair distribution to
redress.
Dawes et al. (2007) use a simple experimental design to
examine whether individuals reduce or increase others’
incomes when there is no cooperation to sustain. They
call these behaviors “taking” and “giving” instead of “pun-
ishment” and “reward” to indicate that income alteration
cannot change the behavior of the target and that none of
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the players did something wrong. Participants are divided
into groups of four anonymous members each. Each
player receives a sum of money randomly generated by a
computer; the distribution is thus arbitrary and to that
extent unfair since lucky players do not deserve a larger
amount of money than do unlucky players. Players are
shown the payoffs of other group members for that
round and are then provided an opportunity to give “nega-
tive” or “positive” tokens to other players. Each negative
token reduces the purchaser’s payoff by one monetary
unit (MU) and decreases the payoff of a targeted individual
by three MUs; positive tokens decrease the purchaser’s
payoff by one MU and increase the targeted individual’s
payoff by three MUs. Groups are randomized after each
round to prevent reputation from inﬂuencing decisions
and to maintain strict anonymity.
The results show that players incurred costs in order to
reduce or augment the income of other players even
though this behavior plainly had no effect on what would
happen in the subsequent rounds. Analyses show that par-
ticipants were mainly motivated by considerations of fair-
ness and impartiality, trying to achieve an equal division
of wealth13: 68% of the players reduced another player’s
income at least once, 28% did so ﬁve times or more, and
6% did so ten times or more (out of ﬁfteen possible
times). Also, 74% of the players increased another
player’s income at least once, 33% did so ﬁve times or
more, and 10% did so ten times or more.
Most negative tokens (71%) were given to above-average
earners in each group, whereas most positive tokens (62%)
were targeted at below-average earners in each group. Par-
ticipants who earned tenMUs more than the group average
received a mean of 8.9 negative tokens compared to 1.6 for
those who earned at least ten MUs less than the group
average. In contrast, participants who earned at least ten
MUs less than the group average received a mean of 11.1
positive tokens (compared to 4 for those who earned ten
MUs more than the group average). Overall, the distri-
bution of punishment displays the logic of fairness: The
more a participant received money, the more others
would “tax” her. Conversely, the less she received, the
more she would get “compensated.”
In an additional experiment, subjects were presented
with hypothetical scenarios in which they encountered
group members who obtained higher payoffs than they
did. Subjects were asked to indicate on a seven-point
scale whether they felt annoyed or angry (1 = “not at all”;
7 = “very”) by the other individual. In the “high inequality”
scenario, subjects were told they encountered an individual
whose payoff was considerably greater than their own. This
scenario generated much annoyance: 75% of the subjects
claimed to be at least somewhat annoyed, and 41% indi-
cated to be angry. In the “low-inequality” scenario, differ-
ences between subjects’ incomes were smaller, and there
was signiﬁcantly less anger: Only 46% indicated they
were annoyed and 27% indicated they were angry. Individ-
uals apparently feel negative emotions towards high
earners, and the intensity of these emotions increases
with income inequality. Moreover, these emotions seem
to inﬂuence behavior. Subjects who said they were at
least somewhat annoyed or angry at the top earner in the
high-inequality scenario spent 26% more to reduce
above-average earners’ incomes than subjects who said
they were not annoyed or angry. These subjects also
spent 70% more to increase below-average earners’
incomes.
In another study, the same team examined the relation
between the random inequality game and the PGG
(Johnson et al. 2009). Participants played two games: a
random income game measuring inequality aversion and
a modiﬁed PGG with punishment. Johnson et al.’s results
suggest that those who exhibit stronger preferences for
equality are more willing to punish free-riders in the
PGG. The same subjects who assign negative tokens to
high earners in the random income experiment also
spend signiﬁcantly more on punishment of low contributors
in the PGG,14 suggesting that even in this game punish-
ment may well be not only about sustaining cooperation
but about inequality.
In a replication (see supplementary material of Johnson
et al. 2009), participants also had the opportunity to pay in
order to help others and the results were nearly identical.
Participants who, in the random income game, reduced
the income of high earners or increased that of low
earners were more likely to punish low contributors in
the PGG. These two studies are consistent with the fairness
interpretation of punishment. At least some cases of pun-
ishment in PGGs are better explained in terms of retribu-
tion than in terms of support to cooperation. (See also
Leibbrandt & López-Pérez [2008], who show that third
parties punish socially efﬁcient but unfair allocations.)
It could be granted that these results contribute to
showing that equalitarianism is or can be a motivation in
economic games, but they leave open the question as to
whether a preference for equality follows from a prefer-
ence for fairness. After all, the notion of a fair distribution
is open to a variety of interpretations. It might be argued
that an unequal random distribution is not in itself unfair
(since everybody’s chances are the same), and therefore a
preference for equality of resources may be seen as based
on an equalitarian motivation more speciﬁc than, and inde-
pendent from, a general preference for fairness. If,
however, humans’ evolved sense of fairness is a proximal
mechanism for social selection of desirable partners, then
it can be given a more precise content that directly
implies or at least favors equalitarianism in speciﬁc con-
ditions. Given the choice to participate in a game with
either an equal distribution of initial resources, or a
random unequal distribution, most people being rationally
risk-adverse, would, everything else being equal, choose
the game with an equal distribution (except in special cir-
cumstances; for instance, if this initial inequality provided
a few of the partners with the means to invest important
resources in a way that would end up being beneﬁcial to
all). Forced to play a game with an unequal and random
allocation of initial resources but given the opportunity to
choose their partners, most people would prefer partners
whose behavior would diminish the inequality of the
initial distribution. Being disposed to reduce inequality in
such conditions is a desirable trait in cooperation partners.
Hence, fairness deﬁned in terms of mutual advantage or
impartiality may, in appropriate conditions, directly favor
equalitarianism.
3.4.2. Explaining “antisocial” punishment. So-called anti-
social punishment, that is, the punishment of people who
are particularly cooperative, has been observed in many
studies and remains highly puzzling: Why do some
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participants punish those who give more than others to the
common pool? In a recent study, Herrmann et al. (2008)
ran a PGG with punishment in 16 comparable participant
pools around the world. They observed huge cross-societal
variations. In some pools, participants punished high con-
tributors as much as they punished low contributors,
whereas in other pools, participants punished only low con-
tributors. In some pools, antisocial punishment was strong
enough to remove the cooperation-enhancing effect of
punishment. Such behavior completely contradicts the
view that the purpose of punishment is to sustain
cooperation. Self-interested participants should neither
contribute nor punish. Participants motivated to act so as
to sustain cooperation should contribute and punish those
who contribute less than average. By contrast, a mutualistic
approach suggests a possible explanation for antisocial
punishment.
Under what conditions might players consider that it is
fair to punish high contributors? In the PGG, participants
have to decide the amount of money they want to donate
to the common pool. Let’s assume that they want to con-
tribute in a fair way. If so, by contributing to the
common pool, they not only contribute to the common
pool but also indicate what they take to be a fair contri-
bution. For the same reasons, they may view the contri-
butions of others not just as money that will eventually be
shared (and the more the better) but also as an indication
of what others see as a fair contribution, and here they
may disagree. When they ﬁnd that a contribution smaller
than their own was unfairly low, they may blame the low
contributor. Conversely, when they ﬁnd that a contribution
was unnecessarily high and much larger than their own,
they may feel unfairly blamed, at least implicitly, by the
high contributor. Moreover, if they are being punished by
other players (and unless they are themselves high contri-
butors), they have good reason to suspect that they are pun-
ished by people who contributed more than they did. If
they feel that this punishment was unfair and deserves
counter-punishment, then the obvious targets are the
high contributors.
Herrmann et al.’s extensive study supports this interpret-
ation. First, they observe, it is in groups where contri-
butions are low that participants punish high contributors:
The lower the mean contributions in a pool, the higher
the level of antisocial punishment. Second, the participants
who punish high contributors are those who gave small
amounts in the ﬁrst rounds, indicating thereby that they
had low standards of cooperation from the start. Third,
Herrmann et al. found that antisocial punishment increases
as a function of the amount of punishment received,
suggesting that, in such cases, it was indeed a reaction to
what was felt to have been an unfair punishment for a
low but fair contribution. That they saw their low contri-
bution as nevertheless fair and hence unfairly punished is
evidenced by the fact that antisocial punishers did not
increase their own level of contribution when they were
punished for it. All these observations support an interpret-
ation of antisocial punishment as guided by considerations
of fairness (however misguided they may be).
Finally, Herrmann et al. found that norms of civic
cooperation are negatively correlated with antisocial pun-
ishment. They constructed an index of civic cooperation
from data taken from the World Values Survey and in par-
ticular from answers to questions on how justiﬁed people
think tax evasion, beneﬁt fraud, or dodging fares on
public transport are. The more objectionable these beha-
viors are in the eyes of the average citizen, the higher the
society’s position in the index of civic cooperation. What
they found is that antisocial punishment is harsher in
societies with weak norms of civic cooperation. In these
societies, people feel unfairly looked down upon by high
contributors who expect too much from others. This obser-
vation ﬁts nicely with qualitative research ﬁndings. For
instance, in a recent article Gambetta and Origgi (2009)
have described how Italian academics tacitly agree to
deliver and receive low contributions in their collaborations
and regard high contributors as cheaters who treat others
unfairly by requiring too much of them.
To conclude, punishment may occur for a variety of
reasons. Enforcement of cooperation is not the only poss-
ible reason and need not be the main one. Even when
the goal is to cause the other players to cooperate, this
may be for selﬁsh strategic reasons – thinking, for instance,
that, in a repeated PGG with only four participants, it is a
good short-term investment to punish low cooperators
and thereby incite them to contribute to the common
good (but see Falk et al. 2005). There is evidence, too,
that some participants punish both high and low contribu-
tors in order to increase their own relative payoff, thus
acting out of “spite” (Cinyabuguma et al. 2004; Falk et al.
2005; Saijo & Nakamura 1995). Still, what we hope to
have shown is that, contrary to what is commonly supposed,
a mutualistic approach can contribute to the interpretation
of punishment and provide parsimonious ﬁne-grained
explanations of quite speciﬁc observations.
3.5. Rethinking experimental games
Experimental games are often seen as the hallmark of altru-
ism. These games were originally invented by economists to
debunk the assumption of selﬁsh preferences in economic
models. Since then, the debate has revolved around the
opposition between cooperation and selﬁshness rather
than focusing on the logic of cooperation itself. Every
game has been interpreted as evidence of cooperation or
selﬁshness, and since altruism is the most obvious alterna-
tive to selﬁshness, cooperative games have been taken to
favor altruistic theories (Gintis et al. 2003; Henrich et al.
2005). In this article, we have explored another alternative
to selﬁshness (mutualism) and looked more closely at the
way participants depart from selﬁshness (through the
moral parameters that impact on their decisions to transfer
resources). Our hunch is thus that participants in economic
games, despite their apparent altruism, are actually follow-
ing a mutualistic strategy. When participants transfer
resources, we argue, they do not give money (contrary to
the appearances), they rather refrain from stealing money
over which others have rights (which would amount of
favoring one’s side).
Because they were invented to study people’s departure
from selﬁshness rather than cooperation itself, classic
experimental games, however, may not be the best tool
for studying the logic of human cooperation and testing
various evolutionary theories. Their very simple design,
which was originally a virtue, turns out to be a problem
(Guala & Mittone 2010; Krupp et al. 2005; Kurzban
2001; E. A. Smith 2005; V. L. Smith 2005; Sosis 2005). Par-
ticipants do not have enough information about the rights
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of each player over the money; they are blind to the rights,
claims, and entitlements that form the basis of cooperative
decisions and need to ﬁll in the blanks themselves, making
the experiment very sensitive to all kinds of irrelevant cues
and the results at odds with cooperative behaviors in real
life (Chibnik 2005; Gurven & Winking 2008; Wiessner
2009). These problems are not without solutions. As we
have seen, the experimenter can ﬁll in the blanks (by
using a production phase or a real-life story), making the
interpretation of the game more straightforward, and
allowing very precise hypotheses about contributions, prop-
erty, gifts, etc., to be tested. The future may lie in these
more contextualized experiments, which take into
account that humans don’t just cooperate but cooperate
in quite speciﬁc ways.
4. Conclusion
The mutualistic theory of morality we propose is based on
the idea that the evolution of human cooperation favored,
at the evolutionary level, mutually advantageous inter-
actions that are sustained, at the psychological level, by a
mutualistic morality. In this theory, we claim, the evol-
utionary mechanism (partner choice) leads precisely to
the kind of behavior (fairness-based) that is observed in
humans. This can be explained by the fact that the distri-
bution of beneﬁts in each interaction is constrained by the
existence of outside opportunities determined by the
market of potential partners. In this market, individuals
should never consent to enter into an interaction in
which the marginal beneﬁt of their investment is lower
than the average beneﬁt they could receive elsewhere. If
two individuals have the same average outside opportu-
nities, they should both receive the same marginal
beneﬁt from each resource unit they invest in a joint coop-
erative venture. In the long run, we argue, such an evol-
utionary process should have led to the selection of a
sense of fairness, a psychological device to treat each
other in a fair way.
Although individual selection is often thought to lead to
a very narrow kind of morality, we have suggested that
partner selection can also lead to the emergence of a
full-ﬂedged moral sense that drives humans to be genu-
inely moral, to help one another, and to demand the pun-
ishment of wrongdoers. This full-ﬂedged moral sense may
explain the kind of cooperative behavior observed in econ-
omic games such as the Ultimatum Game, the Dictator
Game, and the Public Goods Game. Indeed, in economic
games, participants’ behavior seems to aim at treating
others in a fair way, distributing the beneﬁt of cooperation
according to individuals’ contribution, taking others’
claims to the resources into account, compensating them
for previous misallocations, or sharing the costs of
mutual help. In all these situations, participants act as if
they had agreed on a contract or, as we claim, as if mor-
ality had evolved in a cooperative yet very competitive
environment.
Of course, human cooperation is not exclusively guided
by mutualistic norms. There are forms of cooperation
where kin is favored over non-kin and in-group over out-
group well beyond what considerations of fairness might
sanction. As we have pointed out, utilitarians favor acting
for the greatest good of the greatest number even at the
price of imposing unfair costs on speciﬁc individuals.
While it is dubious that any human society has ever been
governed by such utilitarian principles, individuals and
groups have tried to live up to them. Various religious obli-
gations that play an important role in human cooperation
are not aimed at fairness and often conﬂict with it. Legal
norms are commonly intended to be fair. Still, from a
legal point of view, legal norms should be obeyed, even
when they happen to be unfair. This variety of norms, obli-
gations, or preferences raises a terminological and two sub-
stantial issues.
The terminological issue has to do with the deﬁnition of
morality. We have deﬁned morality in terms of fairness
(following a common tradition in ethics). It is possible,
of course, to extend the notion of morality to a wider
range of socially shared preferences that guide
cooperation, but the price for this is giving up the intuition
that an individual’s moral norms should be consistent.
More compelling and more substantial is the argument
developed throughout this article that a speciﬁc and
non-instrumental preference for fairness evolved as a dis-
tinct “moral sense.” If you favor a more extensive deﬁ-
nition of morality, call this a “fairness sense.” Even so,
recognizing its very existence, whatever you call it, raises
two substantial issues: First, how much human cooperative
behavior is best explained in terms of this preference for
fairness and impartiality rather than in terms of other bio-
logically or culturally evolved preferences? Regarding this
ﬁrst issue, we have made the case that considerations of
fairness provide uniquely ﬁne-grained explanations of a
great variety of experimental results and anthropological
observations. In the future, experiments can and should
be devised that test and possibly falsify predictions that
are speciﬁc to the mutualistic approach, in particular
when they differ from predictions entailed by other
approaches. The second issue raised by the recognition
of an evolved sense of fairness has to do with the way fair-
ness norms and other norms of cooperation interact in
biological and cultural evolution, in cognitive develop-
ment, and in behavior. Addressing this issue –which
goes well beyond the scope of this article – cannot but
be an interdisciplinary effort recruiting evolutionary mod-
eling, anthropological observations, and several branches
of experimental psychology.
NOTES
1. Note that, from an evolutionary perspective, costs and
beneﬁts should be measured over a lifetime. Hence, behavior
that might seem altruistic when considered in the short run may
bring later beneﬁts to the actor and be mutualistic.
2. Of course, there is no generally agreed-upon deﬁnition of
morality, and it may be argued that morality does not necessarily
imply fairness and may include a greater variety of forms of inter-
action that nevertheless have relevant commonalities (e.g., Haidt
et al. 1993; Shweder et al. 1987). Here, we usemorality in a sense
that implies fairness, on the assumption that such a sense picks out
a set of phenomena worthy of scientiﬁc inquiry, in particular from
an evolutionary point of view. Baumard and Sperber (2012)
discuss the relation of morality so understood to wider systems
of cultural norms.
3. There are in principle other possibilities such as by-product
mutualism (e.g., group enhancement, pseudo-reciprocity; see
Clutton-Brock 2009), but they are usually not considered in the
explanation of human moral behavior.
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4. Trivers described his own model of mutually beneﬁcial reci-
procal interactions as “reciprocal altruism,” but this has been a
source of confusion since what is involved is a form of mutualism
and hence not of altruism as ordinarily understood.
5. Note that Trivers shortly discusses this possibility in his
foundational article (Trivers 1971) but does not pursue it.
6. This difference is similar to Hirschman’s inﬂuential con-
trast between “voice” and “exit” as the two possible responses
available to dissatisﬁed social or economic actors (Hirschman
1970).
7. We do not deny that a concern for one’s reputation plays an
important role not just in moral behavior, but in all forms of be-
havior where our reputation may be at stake; for example, in
matters of skills, intelligence, strength, or sex-appeal (see
Sperber & Baumard 2012).
8. Incidentally, this analysis explains why someone who always
reciprocates can still be morally condemned. Indeed, being moral
is not about strict reciprocity but about mutual advantage. Let’s
say that John always pay his debts, keeps note of every penny
lent by friends, and reciprocates every glass of wine shared in a
bar, but never helps someone he does not know and will not
meet again, even when it is almost costless to him. We would
not like to have John as our friend. Reciprocating on a strict act
basis is evidence of a lack of a cooperative disposition. The true
moral behavior is to help others when they need it, and they (or
others) will help you when you need it.
9. Punishment proper is much more important in large
societies (Black 2000), but it is carried through specialized insti-
tutions that reward people for the job of punishing (via gratiﬁca-
tion or policing; Ostrom 1990).
10. Some contractualist philosophers, such as David Gauthier
(1986), explain the contractualist logic of moral decisions in
terms of rational choice. Although this approach offers an ulti-
mate explanation of our moral judgments, its proximal counter-
part remains at odds with what we know about moral
cognition: Humans do not behave in a fair way because they
have calculated that doing so is the most rational solution. In a
way, however, the mutualistic theory can be seen as a translation
of Gauthier’s rationalistic theory into evolutionary and psycho-
logical terms.
11. Some participants may also think that there is no actual
recipient. Therefore, it is not immoral to keep everything (see,
e.g., Frohlich et al. 2004).
12. The fear of incurring a debt does not explain all refusals of
very high offers. In other situations, the refusals seem to be motiv-
ated by the view that very high offers are unfair for the proposer
(Bahry & Wilson 2006; Hennig-Schmidt et al. 2008; Lesorogol,
forthcoming).
13. To make sure that reciprocation was not a motivation, the
authors conducted additional analyses. Results show that the
number of negative tokens sent was not signiﬁcantly affected by
the negative tokens received in the previous round, nor were
the number of positive tokens sent signiﬁcantly affected by that
of positive tokens received.
14. To be sure that envy was not a motivation, Johnson et al.
(2009) compare the willingness to punish high earners in the
random game when high earners are above the participants’
income (envy) and when they are above the group’s average
income (fairness). Analyses show that fairness does a much
better job predicting punishment in the PGG. In particular,
when the participant’s own income is taken as a reference point,
the relation between the willingness to punish high earners
in the random game and the willingness to punish high earners
in the PGGs ceases to be signiﬁcant.
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Abstract: To the extent that acting fairly is in an individual’s long-term
interest, short-term impulses to cheat present a self-control problem.
The only effective solution is to interpret the problem as a variant of
repeated prisoner’s dilemma, with each choice as a test case predicting
future choices. Moral choice appears to be the product of a contract
because it comes from self-enforcing intertemporal cooperation.
The target article by Baumard et al. argues that an intrinsic motive
for fairness has been socially selected and has thus evolved as one
of the “mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judg-
ments and interactions” (Abstract). Alternatively (it seems), the
authors suggest that people may feel like selﬁshly free-riding,
but are restrained by “a prudence which . . . is built into our
evolved moral disposition” (sect. 2.2.2, para. 3). Either way, an
innate moral preference is said to account for three otherwise
anomalous kinds of self-depriving behavior: where a subject (1)
helps strangers without expectation of return, (2) cooperates in
anonymous, one-shot games, and (3) pays to punish others for
their moves in public goods games (sect. 2.2). The argument for
social selection is well thought out. However, before we add
either special motive to the long list of elementary needs,
drives, and other incentives that have been discerned in human
choice (e.g., Atkinson & Raynor 1975), we should examine
whether known properties of reward might not explain a prefer-
ence for fairness, or for the very similar traits of inequity aversion
(Frohlich et al. 2004) and game-theoretic choreography (Gintis
2009, pp. 41–44).
Much of the target article discusses how people arrive at cogni-
tive judgments of fairness, but the tough problem is motivational.
It may be that “competition among cooperative partners leads to
the selection of a disposition to be intrinsically motivated to be
fair” (sect. 2.2.1, para. 12), but people continue to have a disposi-
tion to be selﬁsh as well, and perhaps also a disposition to be
altruistic and leave themselves open to exploitation. Among
these dispositions, morality does not compete like just another
taste, but leads people to “behave as if they had passed a contract”
(sect. 3.2.2, para 1, italics in the original; see also sects. 1 and
2.2.2). The article’s central problem is, “since [people] didn’t,
why should it be so?” (sect. 1, para. 2). The authors’ proposal of
an innate moral preference to solve this “puzzle of the missing
contract” (sect. 1, para. 3) just names the phenomenon, rather
than supplying a proximate mechanism for the contract-like
faculty.
Rather, we should look at the purpose of the contract. The
payoffs for selﬁsh choices are almost always faster than the
payoffs for moral ones. If I fake fairness like an intelligent socio-
path, I may eventually be found out, but I will reap rewards in
the short run; and the likelihood that I will get away with any
given deception increases my temptation to try it. Thus, even if
I realize that fairness serves my own long-term interests, I face
ongoing pressure from my short-term interests to cheat. There
is still controversy over whether people overvalue imminent
rewards generally (hyperbolic discounting; see Ainslie 2010;
2012) or only when we are emotionally aroused (hyperboloid
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discounting; see McClure et al. 2007), but in either case I will
often have the impulse to cheat when it is against my long-term
interest. Since faking my motives is an entirely intrapsychic
process, the only way I can commit myself not to do it is to inter-
pret my current choice as a test case for how I am apt to choose in
the future: “If I am hypocritical [or biased, or selﬁsh . . .] this time,
why wouldn’t I expect to be next time?” Thus bundled together, a
series of impulses loses leverage against a series of better, later
alternatives – greatly if the discounting is hyperbolic, less so but
still possibly if the discounting is hyperboloid (Ainslie 2012).
Then, to the extent that I am aware of my temptation problem,
I will have an incentive to make personal rules against deciding
unfairly – that is, to interpret each choice where I might be
unfair as a test case of whether I can expect to resist this kind
of temptation in the future. I draw the line between fair and
unfair by the kind of reasoning that Baumard et al. describe,
and then face reward contingencies that will be similar to those
of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Whatever my reputation is
with other people, I will have a reputation with myself that is at
stake in each choice, and which, like my social reputation, is dis-
proportionately vulnerable to lapses (Monterosso et al. 2002).
This dynamic can account for two of the three phenomena that
the authors highlight as seeming anomalies for mutualism:
1. Although helping strangers without expectation of return
can be rewarding in its own right, I may also help them because
of a personal rule for fairness at times when I would rather
cheat and could do so without social consequences. Then I do
behave as if I had made a social contract. The contract is real,
but exists between my present self and my expected future
selves. Like the oral contracts among traders that Baumard
et al. list (sect. 2.1.3, para. 1), my contract is self-enforcing. I
may still get away with cheating, by means of the casuistry with
personal rules called rationalization; or I may instead become
hyper-moral, if I am especially fearful of giving myself an unfavor-
able self-signal (Bodner & Prelec 2001). Either deviation moves
me away from optimal social desirability, but my central anchor
is just where Baumard et al. say it should be.
2. To the extent that my reputation with myself feels vulner-
able, I may reject an experimenter’s instruction to maximize my
personal payoff in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma or Dictator
game, and instead regard the game as another test case of my
character (Ainslie 2005). Such an interpretation makes it “not
that easy . . . to shed one’s intuitive social and moral dispositions
when participating in such a game” (sect. 3.3.2, para. 1).
3. No further explanation seems necessary for the punishment
phenomenon. It is not remarkable that subjects become angry at
either cheating or moralizing stances by other subjects, and pay to
indulge this anger. As with problem (2), the seeming anomaly
arises from experimenters’ assumptions that the reward contin-
gencies they set up for a game are the only ones in subjects’minds.
As for the cognitive criteria for partners’ value, talent, and
effort probably do not exhaust the qualities that are rationally
weighed in social choice. Wealth or status conveyed by inheri-
tance or the happenstance of history have always been factors,
and transparency itself – how easy it is to be evaluated –must
be one. But the authors’ proposal of social selection will work
perfectly well with other criteria for estimation. The hard part
of their goal (“to contribute . . . proximate and ultimate expla-
nations of human morality”; target article, Abstract) has been
to explain the semblance of bargaining when counterparties are
apparently absent. This can be accomplished by the logic of
internal intertemporal bargaining, without positing a specially
evolved motive.
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Abstract: Any evolved disposition for fairness and cooperation would not
replace but merely compete with selﬁsh and other antisocial impulses.
Therefore, we propose that human cooperation and fairness depend on
self-regulation. Evidence shows reductions in fairness and other
prosocial tendencies when self-regulation fails.
The message of this commentary is that self-regulation plays a
decisive role in social cooperation. Baumard et al. have proposed
that cooperation and other moral behavior reﬂect an evolved dis-
position toward fairness. They elaborate that humans cooperate
when the beneﬁts of doing so outweigh the costs – as they often
do, because the beneﬁts include social acceptance. Humans
depend on belonging to social groups in order to survive and
reproduce, so natural selection favored traits such as a disposition
toward fairness that facilitate groups.
We agree, but with some reservations. Selﬁshness is natural in
the animal kingdom, and humans have presumably not shed these
selﬁsh impulses. Therefore, fairness impulses must compete in
the psyche against selﬁsh impulses. Self-regulation is the executive
capacity to adjudicate among competing motivations, especially in
favor of socially and culturally valued ones (e.g., Baumeister &
Vohs 2007). Self-regulation may often be needed in order that
the relatively new and fragile impulse toward fairness can
prevail over hunger, greed, lust, anger, and other uncooperative
impulses.
The cost–beneﬁt calculation described by Baumard et al. is
further complicated by the fact that the costs of cooperation are
often immediate, whereas the beneﬁts are anticipated in the
future. Most animals live in the present (Roberts 2002), and so
the capacity to forego immediate gains for the sake of possible
future beneﬁts probably depends on the evolutionarily recent
expansion of self-regulatory powers. Indeed, much of today’s
work on self-regulation is descended from Mischel’s (e.g., 1974)
studies on the capacity to delay gratiﬁcation.
Empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm the role of self-regulation in ensur-
ing fairness and cooperation. This work has proceeded by
exploiting the ﬁnding that the capacity for self-regulation func-
tions like a limited energy resource akin to the folk notion of will-
power: After self-regulating, performance suffers on other,
seemingly unrelated self-regulation tasks, suggesting that some
energy has been depleted (e.g., Baumeister & Tierney 2011).
The state of diminished self-regulatory capacity is called ego
depletion.
Recent work has shown that fairness and helpfulness diminish
when people have depleted their willpower. Banker et al. (in
preparation) show that ego depletion causes people to
become less fair in allocating rewards between self and
others. Speciﬁcally, after exerting self-control in one context
and then going to a different situation, people selﬁshly keep a
larger portion of the cash stake for themselves instead of
sharing it fairly. Outright dishonest behavior has also been
shown to occur among ego-depleted participants. Mead et al.
(2009) let participants grade their own tests and claim cash
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rewards based on their scores. Participants who had exerted
self-control earlier claimed implausibly more correct answers
and took home more cash than those who had not depleted
their self-regulatory strength.
Moreover, many prosocial tendencies diminish when self-regu-
lation has been compromised. Willingness to help others is lower
during ego depletion than at other times (DeWall et al. 2008). The
only exception is willingness to help kin, and that is unaffected by
depletion, which suggests that the impulse to treat kin favorably
may have a different and stronger biological root than any
impulse to be kind to non-relatives. Although moral judgments
seem largely unaffected by ego depletion, moral behavior is
highly sensitive to self-regulatory powers. Self-control has been
called the “moral muscle” (Baumeister & Exline 1999) because
it constitutes the capacity to override selﬁsh impulses and to do
what is morally right instead. Sexual and aggressive misbehavior
likewise increases when self-regulatory powers have been wea-
kened (DeWall et al. 2007; Gailliot & Baumeister 2007). Conver-
sely, a highly inﬂuential theory of criminal behavior treats poor or
low self-control as the central, decisive trait in criminality (Gott-
fredson & Hirschi 1990).
We ﬁnd much to admire in the work by Baumard et al.
reﬂected in the target article. It is highly conducive to our
general view of human nature, which is that the distinctively
human traits were mostly selected by nature to facilitate
culture, which is understood as a new form of social life and
the means by which humans survive and reproduce (Baumeister
2005). Fairness in social relationships and economic trade offers
great advantages to human cultural systems. Our commentary
simply adds the point that an impulse toward fairness could
not by itself be enough to prevail widely over selﬁsh and other
motivated impulses. The human capacity for self-regulation has
been vital toward enabling human culture to ﬂourish, and one
of its key uses is enabling fairness to prevail as often as it does.
When self-regulation fails, fairness and cooperation diminish
sharply.








Abstract: The process of partner selection reﬂects ethnographic realities
where cooperative rewards obtain that would otherwise be lost to loners.
Baumard et al. neglect frequency-dependent processes exempliﬁed by
games of coordination. Such games can produce multiple equilibria that
may or may not include fair outcomes. Additional, group-selection
processes are required to produce the outcomes predicted by the models.
The target article’s focus on mutualism is a welcome one. Recog-
nizing that actors assort via partner choice, and that this can have a
large impact on the evolution of cooperation, are good ideas. It is
step away from the simple dyadic structure and Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD)–centric worldview that has dominated theory for
so long (Trivers 2006). This new understanding allows reasonably
sized groups of potential partners.
The sorts of partnerships described ethnographically in the
target article are not limited to hunter-gatherers. At bayside in
the artisanal ﬁshing village where I work in the Caribbean, on a
daily basis men team up in cooperative partnerships in order to
go ﬁshing (Alvard, n.d.). These relationships are inherently mutua-
listic in the sense that the rewards obtained would otherwise be
lost to those who go it alone. Baumard et al. say that people
choose partners who are more cooperative and offer more in
exchange. This is part of the story, but there is also more to it.
In some cases, partner preference might be less about how gener-
ous or impartial a partner is and more about the extent to which
the potential partner’s understanding of how costs and beneﬁts
are allocated matches one’s own understanding. Outcomes may
be locally optimal but require a process of equilibrium (or
group) selection to obtain the degree of morality discussed in
the target article. For example, the standard distribution rule
among ﬁshers in Dominica ﬁrst allocates the proceeds from the
sale of ﬁsh to pay the cost of motor fuel. The balance is then
divided with one share each for the owner of the boat, the
owner of the motor, and each crew member. Fishers who do
not follow these rules are no one’s partners. The distribution
norms appear to be designed to facilitate partitioning of resources
in a way that reduces transaction costs (Allen 1991; Ensminger
1997; Young 2003). Whether or not the rewards are proportional
to the share owners’ contribution to the hunt’s success is an
empirical question. I am not yet convinced that social selection
via partner choice alone will always favor these sorts of pro-
portional outcomes. Theoretical work shows that multiple, local
optima outcomes often result in the context of frequency depen-
dence (Boyd & Richerson 1990). Social selection may result in
local optima that might not be fair – just common. To the extent
that partner choices are constrained by frequency-dependent pro-
cesses, these processes may not be as immune from the folk
theorem as the authors suggest, and a process of group or equili-
brium selection may be required to produce the outcomes pre-
dicted by the models (Bergstrom 2002; Boyd & Richerson 1990;
Henrich 2004; Wilson & Sober 1994).
I have written elsewhere that cooperative systems are often use-
fully examined as coordination games (Alvard 2001; Alvard &
Nolin 2002). Baumard et al. refer to old views of mutualism,
partner control, and PD, but surprisingly do not relate their
views to games of coordination. Unlike the PD, where there is
no cooperative Nash equilibrium, coordination games can have
multiple equilibria (Boyd & Richerson 1990). I suspect that the
cooperative solutions produced by partner selection are similar.
In a coordination game, being uncooperative brings lower
returns, but is often less risky and this is a key difference with
the PD (Skyrms 2004). The stag hunt parable is the classic
example where partner choice might facilitate cooperative out-
comes. Stag hunting is a cooperative effort that requires a group
of hunters because no one can take a stag alone. Hares,
however, can be taken alone. The per capita returns from stag
hunting are greater than those from hare hunting, and, of
course, killing a hare is better than obtaining nothing –which is
what one will get if one’s partner goes for a hare. Hunters
might be expected to select partners who will follow the one
basic rule: Go for the stag, do not be tempted by the hare –
unless of course, hare hunting is the norm. Solutions are fre-
quency dependent. The best choice depends on the frequency
of the strategies among potential partners, and it does not pay
to hunt stag if it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a stag hunting partner, just as
it is not best to go for hare if most folks are hunting stag. In
such cases, the outcome may be less about how fair the rule is
than it is about ﬁnding a partner who shares the rule.
Such rules are not enforced by a state but are usefully viewed as
institutions deﬁned as “locally stable, widely shared rules that
regulate social interaction” (McElreath 2008). Institutions can
be large, complex, and imposed from the top down in the form
of governmental regulations, or be locally generated and smaller
scale. Among the Lamalera whale hunters, the rule describing
the butchering and distribution of a whale is an institution.
Rules are not negotiated each day on the beach, but rather are
inherited culturally; clearly at some time in the past, however,
agreements were made. Participants have expectations about
how their partners will behave, and these expectations are so
often met that an observer might assume they are implicit.
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Converging lines of theoretical research make the key prediction
that social structure (i.e., nonrandom, assortative interactions) is
fundamental to the evolution of cooperation (Boyd & Richerson
2002; Fletcher & Doebeli 2006; 2009; Nowak et al. 2010;
Pepper & Smuts 2002; Rankin & Taborsky 2009; Sober &
Wilson 1998). Assortment or partner choice brings together
players who are more likely to share institutional norms like, for
example, how to butcher a whale. Since there are many possible
solutions, if one equilibrium has lower extinction rates or produces
more migrants, the variants that characterize that equilibrium can
spread to the population as a whole (Boyd & Richerson 2010). I
would encourage Baumard et al. to go even further and place
their analysis within a larger context where groups are competing
with other similar groups of partners (Wilson & Dugatkin 1997).
From mutualism to moral transcendence
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Abstract: Baumard et al. attribute morality to a naturally selected
propensity to share costs and beneﬁts of cooperation fairly. But how
does mundane mutualism relate to transcendent notions of morality
critical to creating cultures and civilizations? Humans often make their
greatest exertions for an idea they form of their group. Primary social
identity is bounded by sacred values, which drive individuals to promote
their group through non-rational commitment to actions independently
of likely risks and rewards.
Humans deﬁne the groups to which they belong in abstract terms.
Often they strive for lasting intellectual and emotional bonding
with anonymous others, and make their greatest exertions in
killing and dying not to preserve their own lives or to defend
their families and friends, but for the sake of an idea – the trans-
cendent moral conception they form of themselves, of “who we
are” (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes 2012). This is “the privilege of
absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only”
of which Hobbes wrote in Leviathan (Hobbes 1651/1982, Pt. 1,
Ch. 5). In The Descent of Man, Darwin cast it as the virtue of
“morality … the spirit of patriotism, ﬁdelity, obedience,
courage, and sympathy” (Darwin 1871, p. 66) with which
winning groups are better endowed in history’s spiraling compe-
tition for survival and dominance. Across cultures, primary
group identity is bounded by sacred values, often in the form of
religious beliefs or transcendental ideologies, which lead some
groups to triumph over others because of non-rational commit-
ment from at least some of its members to actions that drive
success independent, or all out of proportion, from expected
rational outcomes (Atran & Ginges 2012).
Here, I would like to raise the issue of whether mutualistic cal-
culations of costs and beneﬁts may account for this transcendent
sense of morality, which likely got us out of the caves, made civi-
lizations possible, and propelled competition and cooperation
among larger and larger groups of genetically unrelated strangers.
Baumard et al. deﬁne morality in terms of a naturally selected
propensity for fairness. They elaborate on an evolutionary ration-
ale along Golden Rule lines of quid pro quo, fairly standard since
the pioneering works of Trivers (1971), Axelrod and Hamilton
(1981), and Alexander (1987). For the authors, morality stems
from an environmental adaptation that leads individuals to share
costs and beneﬁts of cooperation equally, developing into a
“speciﬁc and non-instrumental preference for fairness … as a dis-
tinct ‘moral sense’” (sect. 4, para. 4). They argue that this “mutua-
listic” model of morality provides insight and unity in
understanding now classic problems in the cross-cultural
development of human morality, including unselﬁsh behavior in
economic games, cooperation with anonymous strangers, and
taboo trade-offs that defy short-term utilitarian interests.
The authors’ prodigious synthesis goes well beyond oversold
ﬁndings from trolleyology and even economic gaming in
welding cognitive, social, and evolutionary insights into a compre-
hensive framework for understanding mundane moral reasoning
across cultural settings. In a variety of situations (distributive
justice, retributive justice, duty to help, moral dilemmas, econ-
omic games), a moral sense grounded in the logic of mutualism
seems more parsimonious and persuasive than the logic of altru-
ism and sacriﬁce proffered by theories of biological or cultural
group selection.
But the issue here is whether the author’s arguments about
people’s everyday moral sense of equality and mutual advantage
can illuminate those transcendent moral percepts critical to the
competitive creation of cultures. For Darwin himself, moral
virtue was most clearly associated not with universally mundane
intuitions, beliefs, and behaviors about fairness and reciprocity,
emotionally supported by empathy and consolation, but with an
unevenly distributed propensity to what we nowadays call “paro-
chial altruism” (Choi & Bowles 2007): especially extreme self-
sacriﬁce in war and other intense forms of human conﬂict,
where likely prospects for individual and even group survival
had very low initial probability (Darwin 1871). Heroism, martyr-
dom, and other forms of self-sacriﬁce for the group appear to
go beyond the mutualistic principles of fairness and reciprocity.
Indeed, core cultural values and norms associated with sanctity
and ingroup loyalty appear to have distinct neuro-cognitive signa-
tures, and may be activated while suppressing care-based values
and norms of fairness and do no harm (e.g., in cases of systematic
violence, Blair et al. 2006).
Of course, Darwin acknowledged that the brave warrior may
gain more power, wealth, status, or mates, and so improve
chances for producing healthy and successful offspring in
greater numbers. But if risk of death is very high and the
material prospects for victory low, or if odds for success are
too difﬁcult to calculate, then gain could not reasonably out-
weigh loss. Indeed, cross-cultural studies show that prospects
of crippling economic burdens and many deaths do not necess-
arily sway people from their positions on whether going to war,
or opting for revolution or resistance, is the right or wrong
choice (Ginges & Atran 2011). Because of outsize commitment,
revolutionary underdogs often prevail against far more powerful
foes (Arreguín-Toft 2001). For example, regardless of the prac-
tical reasoning of terror-sponsoring organizations, suicide
bombers appear to act as devoted actors, willing to make
extreme sacriﬁces that use a logic of appropriateness rather
than a cost–beneﬁt calculus (Atran 2010). The results of brain-
imaging studies suggest that people tend to neurally process
sacred values as rules to be implemented regardless of conse-
quences, rather than through utilitarian calculation (Berns
et al. 2012).
As groups naturally expand into resource-rich environments,
competition and conﬂict tend to increase. To galvanize group soli-
darity and common defense, which includes blinding group
members to possible avenues of defection to other groups,
hitherto material interests and preferences become sacralized
(Dehghani et al. 2010, Sheikh et al. 2012). Sacralization, which
often involves attachment to unquestionable and inviolable reli-
gious or ideological beliefs, is usually proprietary to the group in
the sense that symbolic markers are displayed by, and used to,
identify cooperators, (who alone learn how to properly interpret
otherwise ineffable and even absurd beliefs, avoid taboo behaviors
and trade-offs; Atran &Henrich 2010; Atran & Ginges 2012). This
increases in-group cooperation, but also disbelief and distrust
towards other groups, thus further increasing competition and
potential conﬂict.
Further ratcheting fosters larger and larger groups of coopera-
tors, with greater potential to fracture (Roes & Raymond 2003).
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To keep these groups intact, transcendental belief systems
emerged, including high moral gods (Norenzayan & Shariff
2008) and quasi-religious -isms (Atran 2010), with unassailable
rules for regulating social and material transactions, and beliefs
compelling enough for self-monitoring and punishment of taboo
transgressions. By contrast, fully reasoned social contracts operat-
ing on mutualistic principles that regulate individual interests to
share costs and beneﬁts of cooperation can be more liable to col-
lapse: with awareness that more advantageous distributions of
risks and rewards may be available down the line, then (by back-
ward induction) defection is always justiﬁable and possible. Thus,
even ostensibly secular national ideologies and transnational
movements usually contain important quasi-religious rituals and
beliefs (Anderson 1991): from sacred ceremonies, anthems, and
ﬂags (Carter et al. 2011), to postulations that Providence or
Nature make people equal and endow them with inalienable
rights and liberties (although, except for the last 250 years or
so – about one-tenth of a percent of our species’ existence – infan-
ticide, slavery, cannibalism, subordination of minorities, and sup-
pression of women predominated) (Atran & Axelrod 2008; Hunt
2007).
Baumard et al. acknowledge that “[v]arious religious obligations
that play an important role in human cooperation are not aimed
at fairness and often conﬂict with it” (sect. 4, para. 3); and
that it is, at least in part, a matter of terminology as to whether
one wishes to include such religious obligations as “moral.”
But I suspect that even if the authors were to grant that religious
devotees or revolutionaries were more conscientious, or at least
consciously aware, in following some moral sense, still they have
the same mutualistic rather than altruistic moral intuitions. In
any event, how, from mutualism, do we get to the sense of
moral transcendence that binds and divides the cultures of our
species?
Modeling justice as a natural phenomenon
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000933
Ken Binmore
Economics Department, University College London, London WC1E 6BT,
United Kingdom.
k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk
Abstract: Among other things, Baumard et al.’s “A Mutualistic Approach
to Morality” considers the enforcement and establishment of moral norms,
the interpersonal comparison of welfare, and the structure of fairness
norms. This commentary draws attention to the relevance of the game
theory literature to the ﬁrst and second topic, and the social psychology
literature to the third topic.
Juggling. Discussing a theory in which morality appears as a
natural phenomenon is like juggling with a large number of slip-
pery balls while being pelted with rotten fruit. In my own work,
I have given up trying to convert the traditional moral philoso-
phers in the audience who label themselves as rationalists, objec-
tivists, and realists while simultaneously denying that science has
anything to contribute to their subject (Binmore 2005, p. 37;
Mackie 1977). Even more hopeless are the naive empiricists at
the other end of the scale who generalize very freely from
limited and sometimes doubtful experimental data (Binmore
2006; Binmore & Shaked 2010).
Baumard et al. are adept at evading such throwers of rotten
fruit, but they would ﬁnd it easier to juggle if they took account
of some work from the economics and psychology literature,
which I describe here using the traditional personiﬁcation of
Justice as a blindfolded matron bearing a sword and a pair of
scales.
Blindfold. Aristotle observed that “what is just … is what is pro-
portional.” Baumard et al. highlight some experimental evidence
that supports Aristotle’s insight, but much more is to be found
in what psychologists call “modern equity theory” (Adams 1963;
1965; Adams & Freedman 1976; Austin & Hatﬁeld 1980; Austin
& Walster 1974; Baron 1993; Cohen & Greenberg 1982; Furby
1986; Homans 1961; Mellers 1982; Mellers & Baron 1993;
Messick & Cook 1983; Pritchard 1969; Wagstaff 1994; 2001; Wag-
staff & Perfect 1992; Wagstaff et al. 1996; Walster & Walster
1975; Walster et al. 1973; 1978).
The economics literature complements this work by offering
axiom systems that characterize the “proportional bargaining
solution” of cooperative game theory. My own book Natural
Justice studies the circumstances under which the proportional
bargaining solution follows from applying an evolutionary adap-
tation of John Rawls’ famous original position (Binmore 2005,
p. 165).
Sword. Philosophers commonly neglect the question of how
fairness norms are enforced, but the issue is central to an evol-
utionary account of their origin. Baumard et al. are doubtless
right in arguing that cooperatively inclined folk somehow came
together in groups, and maintained their cooperative integrity
by expelling asocial individuals. However, a story in which nice
folk meet in the forest and set up house together is impossibly
naive. The literature is full of more plausible stories appealing
to assortative mating and kin selection. My own favorite involves
a group selection argument that is immune to the standard criti-
cism (Binmore 2005, p. 12).
As for expelling asocial individuals, it is frustrating to a game
theorist that such matters are so often discussed without any
mention of the folk theorem of repeated game theory (Binmore
2005, p. 79), which was proved some twenty years before
Robert Trivers wrote on reciprocal altruism. Quoting Axelrod
(1984) will not sufﬁce, because the claims Axelrod makes for
the strategy tit-for-tat are almost absurdly inﬂated (Binmore
1998b). The strategy Baumard et al. needed is called the grim
strategy.
Scales. Justice bears a pair of scales to make welfare compari-
sons without which fairness judgments would not make sense.
Tooby et al. (2008) discuss this issue in terms of a welfare trade-
off ratio (WRT), but Baumard et al. argue that choices based on
WRT considerations will typically be unfair.
The work of John Harsanyi (1977) on the interpersonal com-
parison of utility is needed here. Harsanyi considers what I call
empathetic preferences. You express such a preference when
saying that you think Adam would be better off in situation X
than Eve in situation Y, without necessarily having anything to
gain personally either way. With standard rationality assumptions,
Harsanyi shows that expressing such an empathetic preference
reduces to specifying a number s, which is a ﬁxed rate at
which you trade off Adam’s units of utility against Eve’s units
of utility. I refer to s as a social index in my own work and
argue that cultural evolution will lead everyone in a society to
the same value of s (Binmore 1998a) It is this value of s that
determines the coefﬁcient of proportionality in the proportional
bargaining solution in my theory.
A social index is not the same thing as a WRT, because the
latter applies to sympathetic preferences, as exempliﬁed by
Hamilton’s (1963) notion of inclusive ﬁtness. However, one
can speculate that our species may have graduated from using
Hamilton’s rule within the family to using social indices more
generally via the expedient of resolving sharing problems by
treating strangers as though they were relatives, with the
degree of relationship determined by the context in which the
sharing problem arises.
Conclusion. Trying to make sense of the origins of human soci-
ality without game theory is rather like trying to cut paper with
half a pair of scissors. It is true that the early game theorists
made their work inaccessible to biologists of the time by stating
their results mathematically, but nowadays evolutionary biologists
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are mostly numerate and game theorists sometimes write books
with no equations at all (Binmore 2005; 2007).
Can mutualistic morality predict how
individuals deal with beneﬁts they did not
deserve?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000726
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Abstract: An individual obtains an unfair beneﬁt and faces the dilemma of
either hiding it (to avoid being excluded from future interactions) or
disclosing it (to avoid being discovered as a deceiver). In line with the
target article, we expect that this dilemma will be solved by a ﬁxed
individual strategy rather than a case-by-case rational calculation.
The mutualistic approach to morality chieﬂy explains the choices
that people make in order to avoid unfair distributions of beneﬁts,
and the choices that people make when they realize that another
agent has received unfair beneﬁts. We propose to extend these
considerations to the choices made by the very individual who
received an unfair beneﬁt, once this beneﬁt is acquired.
Imagine an individual who came into the possession of goods that
shedidnot deserve, not necessarily throughher ownactions.Shemay
or may not agree about the claim that she did not deserve what she
got, but she knows for a fact that other people will think so … if
they ﬁnd out about the beneﬁts. The critical point is indeed that
people do not know yet about the unfair beneﬁts she obtained. It is
entirely up to her to disclose the unfair beneﬁts, or to hide them.
This individual is in a tough spot, according to authors Baumard
et al. If people select interaction partners based on their repu-
tation for not acquiring goods in an unfair manner, then the indi-
vidual faces the bleak prospect of losing future interaction
partners (even if she did nothing wrong, but simply got more
than she deserved). It could thus appear safer to just conceal
the unfair beneﬁts, so that no one will know about them. This
is, however, a dangerous choice. Someone could discover the
deception, and the individual concealing the unfair beneﬁts
would then incur high costs, either in terms of blackmail or repu-
tation (as she would then be considered a cheater and a deceiver).
Baumard et al. chieﬂy consider how individuals avoid being put
in such a situation by eschewing the unfair acquisition of
resources. Mutualistic morality arguably drives down the fre-
quency with which unfair beneﬁts are acquired, but it cannot
eliminate them entirely. For example, there are situations in
which a beneﬁt is almost automatically collected, while its deserv-
edness is disputable: Think of academics who accumulate fre-
quent ﬂyer miles for personal use when they travel to
professional conferences at the expense of their institution.
We believe that the key elements of Baumard et al.’s analysis
apply to the dilemma that occurs when unfair beneﬁts are
received (i.e., is it better to hide or to disclose these beneﬁts?).
More precisely, we believe that individuals faced with this
dilemma will be guided by moral considerations rather than just
self-serving motivations, precisely as they are when making
decisions aimed at avoiding this dilemma in the ﬁrst place, and
for the reasons laid bare by Baumard et al.
What would Economic Man do when confronted by the
dilemma? At its simplest core, solving the dilemma implies com-
paring the sure costs associated with the disclosure of beneﬁts to
the probable costs of being discovered hiding the beneﬁts. Econ-
omic Man would therefore make this comparison for every
instance of the dilemma, and decide to hide or to disclose
unfair beneﬁts as per the result of the calculation.
There are several problems with this approach, though, some of
which are identiﬁed by Baumard et al. Critically, an individual who
would consistently apply this self-serving calculation would end up
sending inconsistent signals to her community. Successfully hiding
her undeserved beneﬁts would increase the chances of earning or
maintaining a reputation for fairness, but this reputation would be
hurt every time she decides to disclose a given beneﬁt. Further-
more, a single instance of being discovered would greatly increase
the chances of earning or maintaining a reputation for deceitful-
ness. The risk of being discovered would thus need to be assessed
very precisely, but that seems to be hardly achievable. For
example, the risk of being discovered would typically be negligible
in one-shot interactions, but the very fact that an interaction is one-
shot is itself tricky to assess (Delton et al. 2011).
Overall, the difﬁculty in achieving an accurate assessment of the
probabilities and utilities of the potential outcomes, together with
the inefﬁciency of sending mixed signals to other agents, would
favor a decision mode based on moral rules rather than cost–
beneﬁt analysis (Bennis et al. 2010). That is, the decision would
be made based on a single moral criterion – namely, whether or
not the individual adopts transparency as a moral value in her
dealings with others. Now, as pointed out by Baumard et al.,
the proximal mechanism involved in, and evolved for, this kind
of situation might arguably be a genuine moral sense, insulated
from contingent costs and beneﬁts considerations.
This last statement points to a strong prediction. If individuals
solve the dilemma based on their moral sense of transparency,
rather than on a cost–beneﬁt analysis, then their strategy should
be ﬁxed and independent of local incentives to hide or to disclose
beneﬁts. In other words, a given individual would be no more
inclined to disclose, if she had to pay for secrecy, and no more
inclined to hide, if she had to pay for disclosure. One would then
expect that the proportions of individuals opting for secrecy and
disclosure would remain stable, whatever the incentives offered
to sway people in one direction or the other. The authors of the
present commentary are currently testing this prediction.
Note that individuals would exhibit the predicted tendency as if
transparency (applied to the acquisition of undeserved beneﬁts)
were a protected value, which would be resistant to monetary trade-
offs (Baron& Spranca 1997). Note also that, in such a case, transgres-
sions of transparencywould hurt an individual’s self-image, andwould
presumably have to be justiﬁed through self-deception (Dana et al.
2007). The dilemma faced by individuals acquiring undeserved
beneﬁts would then offer promising grounds for integrating the
mutualistic approach to morality with the rich literature on taboo
trade-offs, sacred values, and self-deception in economic interactions.
“Fair” outcomes without morality in cleaner
wrasse mutualism
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000738
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Abstract: Baumard et al. propose a functional explanation for the
evolution of a sense of fairness in humans: Fairness preferences are
advantageous in an environment where individuals are in strong
competition to be chosen for social interactions. Such conditions also
exist in nonhuman animals. Therefore, it remains unclear why fairness
(equated with morality) appears to be properly present only in humans.
Baumard et al. propose that strong social selection based on
partner choice in an environment in which mutual helping is
highly advantageous led to the evolution of a self-serving sense
of fairness in humans. Importantly, fairness preferences do not
necessarily lead to equal outcomes but, instead, to payoffs that
are distributed according to relative input, where rare abilities
may yield particularly high shares. This view supports the
market law of supply and demand: Fair payoff distributions
mean that switching to another partner will not yield an average
higher payoff. An individual with a sense of fairness is both an
attractive and a vigilant partner: sharing with cooperating individ-
uals but responding aversively to cheating individuals. While we
thoroughly enjoyed the target article, we would like to raise two
issues for further discussion.
Our ﬁrst comment concerns social prestige. The authors argue
that their functional approach to morality explains human coopera-
tive behaviours, such as punishment and resource sharing, as a way
of securing a good reputation as a cooperator. The underlying
psychological mechanism is supposedly a genuine moral sense
where cooperative behaviour is seen as intrinsically good rather
than as a selﬁsh concern for one’s reputation. But how does the
vast literature on image scoring and indirect reciprocity ﬁt with
this view? Humans are more cooperative if they can gain social
prestige (Milinski et al. 2002; Wedekind & Milinski 2000) and
may even respond cooperatively to the presence of eyes
(Bateson et al. 2006; Haley & Fessler 2005; but see Fehr & Schnei-
der 2010). These ﬁndings suggest that human cooperative behav-
iour is at least partly motivated by strategic concerns about
reputation, rather than based solely on a genuine moral sense.
Our second concern is that Baumard et al. do not explicitly
address whether a sense of fairness or morality should be
unique to humans. Maybe they think that humans are not
unique in this respect? At least on the level of outcomes of
social interactions we would agree. Animals may indeed achieve
rather uniform cooperative and seemingly fair outcomes based
on partner selection in repeated games. However, we argue that
seemingly fair outcomes need not be based on fairness prefer-
ences. While fairness preferences imply that individuals monitor
and respond to the relative payoffs accruing to themselves and
to a partner, a simpler alternative is that individuals have an
internal expectation about payoffs from an interaction and
adjust their behaviour (e.g., by switching partners) if these expec-
tations are violated (Chen & Santos 2006). Crucially, responses
based on fairness preferences and responses based on self-refer-
ent loss aversion can both lead to cooperative and fair outcomes.
We illustrate this point with our study system, the marine cleaning
mutualism between cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus and
their reef-ﬁsh “clients.” (Apropos, please note that the biological
ecological literature uses the term “mutualism” for cooperation
between species, which makes the terminology proposed by the
authors confusing when linked to biology.)
In contrast to great ape societies, our cleaning mutualism fulﬁls
the criteria that Baumard et al. stipulate are conducive to the evol-
ution of morality. In brief, the territorial cleaner wrasses are
visited by clients at their “cleaning stations.” Both partners
strongly beneﬁt from interactions as cleaning is the wrasses’
only mode of foraging and parasite removal translates into major
health and growth beneﬁts for clients (Ros et al. 2011; Waldie
et al. 2011). Conﬂict arises because cleaners prefer to eat the
clients’ protective mucus layer over ectoparasites (Grutter &
Bshary 2003). As individual clients visit cleaners several times
per day, the game is clearly repeated. This makes partner switch-
ing an efﬁcient partner control mechanism for “visitor” client
species, which have access to several cleaning stations: cheating
cleaners gain within an interaction but are excluded from future
interactions (Bshary & Schäffer 2002). Due to their territoriality,
individual cleaners can only win the competition with other clea-
ners by outbidding rather than by active interference, ﬁtting the
assumptions of biological market theory (Noë 2001). As a conse-
quence, there is very strong convergence between cleaners with
respect to the service quality they give to visitors: At 12 observed
cleaning stations, visitors jolted on average either 2 or 3 times per
100 sec interaction (Bshary 2002, Fig. 1). Thus, the outcome looks
as if based on a hidden contract regarding acceptable levels of
cheating, but we consider it most likely that the outcome is due
to individual learned optimization of own payoffs by both cleaners
and clients.
Another interesting aspect of the cleaner wrasse mutualism is
that cleaners often inspect clients jointly in established male-
female couples, where the two cleaners face an iterated prisoner’s
dilemma-like game (Bshary et al. 2008). Couples ﬁnd a coopera-
tive solution which is based on asymmetric punishment. The
larger, dominant males punish females for cheating, whereas
females never punish males (Raihani et al. 2010). Although the
pattern ﬁts the deﬁnition of third-party punishment (the male
punishes the female for biting a client), the punishment is
obviously self-serving as it promotes future cooperation and
males even ﬁne-tune levels of punishment to their losses
(Raihani et al. 2012). Intra-speciﬁc punishment in cleaner ﬁsh
serves to restore “fair” outcomes during pairwise cleaning inspec-
tions, just as Baumard et al. have suggested that human punish-
ment might. However, male cleaner ﬁsh need not attend to
females’ payoffs to know when to punish. Instead, they could
use client departure and the associated reduction in payoffs (rela-
tive to expectations) as a cue to punish cheating females. Thus,
punishment may be motivated by loss aversion rather than fairness
preferences.
In conclusion, we have presented evidence for similarity in the
importance of partner choice and punishment as control mechan-
isms, and similarity in outcomes between cleaning mutualism and
human cooperation. Nevertheless, we would not assume a similarity
in underlying mechanisms. More generally, there is little evidence
that nonhuman animals have evolved fairness preferences, even
though other-regarding behaviour is common across a diverse
range of taxa (Burkart et al. 2009). The precise ecological conditions
that favoured the evolution of a sense of morality which appears to
be unique to humans therefore remain to be determined.
Heterogeneity in fairness views: A challenge
to the mutualistic approach?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X1200074X
Alexander W. Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden







Abstract: This commentary argues that the observed heterogeneity in
fairness views, documented in many economic experiments, poses a
challenge to the partner choice theory developed by Baumard et al. It
also discusses the extent to which their theory can explain how people
consider inequalities due to pure luck.
In their fascinating target article, Baumard et al. develop an
approach to morality in which morality is seen as a result of adap-
tion to an environment where people compete for partners in
mutually advantageous interactions. The core idea is that when
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there is an efﬁcient market for partners, cooperation between
partners takes place only when partners are given the marginal
value of their contribution. The authors argue that the observed
prominence in many distributive situations of the meritocratic
fairness view, where individuals share the beneﬁts from
cooperation in proportion to the effort and talent they invest in
the interaction, is the result of adaption to such a process of
partner choice. An important part of the authors’ argument is
based on results from economic experiments such as the Dictator
Game, and in this commentary we question some of the con-
clusions they draw on the basis of these results. In particular we
shall argue that the observed heterogeneity in fairness views,
documented in a number of experiments, poses a challenge to
the partner choice theory they develop.
Many of the experiments discussed by Baumard et al. are dic-
tator games where the distribution phase is preceded by a pro-
duction phase such that the money to be distributed is earned
(Cappelen et al. 2007; Cherry et al. 2002; Konow 2000). A key
feature of these experiments is that they allow the researchers
to study how the participants respond to different types of
inequalities in earnings. To illustrate, in Almås et al. (2010) we
report the results from a dictator game where each participant’s
earnings in the production phase is determined by how many
points she or he produces and by a randomly determined price.
By studying the behavior in the distribution phase, where the dic-
tator distributes the total earnings between herself or himself and
the other participant, we are able to estimate the prevalence of
three distinct fairness views: egalitarians (who always ﬁnd it fair
to distribute equally), meritocrats (who ﬁnd it fair to distribute
in proportion to production), and libertarians (who ﬁnd it fair to
distribute in proportion to earnings). An important result from
this experiment, and numerous other experiments we have con-
ducted with coauthors (Cappelen et al. 2007; 2010; 2011; forth-
coming), is that there is considerable pluralism in the fairness
views that motivate the participants; we consistently ﬁnd a non-
trivial share of participants who choose in accordance with each
of the three fairness views. There appears, in other words, to be
considerable disagreement about what are legitimate sources of
inequality in distributive situations.
In contrast, the mutualistic hypothesis posits that humans are all
equipped with the same sense of fairness. Baumard et al. argue
that people may still distribute resources differently for two
reasons: First, people do not necessarily have the same beliefs
about the source of an inequality; second, people do not necess-
arily face the same distributive situations (and a fairness view
may have different implications in different situations). We
agree that these two reasons potentially can explain much inter-
individual and cross-cultural variability in distributive behavior,
but they cannot explain the behavioral variability observed in
the economic experiments described above. These experiments
are designed so that all participants have the same, and correct,
beliefs about the sources of inequalities in earnings and all partici-
pants face the same distributive situations. More work is therefore
needed to explain how the mutualistic approach can accommo-
date heterogeneity in distributive behavior even in such situations.
Another important insight from these dictator games with a
production phase is that there is a substantial share of the partici-
pants who follow a libertarian fairness view, that is, who consider
fair even inequalities due to pure luck. In our work we have con-
sistently found that 20−30 percent of the participants hold this
fairness view. This result seems to conﬂict with the claim made
by the authors that we all share the same common logic of reward-
ing people according to their effort and abilities, but not according
to luck.
As a ﬁnal comment we would like to encourage Baumard et al.
to address in more detail what they think their model of partner
choice implies with respect to inequalities due to pure luck.
The authors take great care in explaining why adaption to an
environment where people compete for partners in mutually
advantageous interactions results in a fairness view that rewards
individual effort and talent. They do not, however, explain why
the same process does not result in a fairness view that also
rewards pure luck. The basic mechanism underlying their
partner choice model is that potential partners must be rewarded
with the marginal value of their contribution to the interaction as
long as partners are mobile. Given this mechanism, it seems to
follow that partners should also be rewarded for contributions
that reﬂect pure luck. In other words, it seems that a truly mutua-
listic process should make us all libertarians.
A strange(r) analysis of morality: A
consideration of relational context and the
broader literature is needed
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000751
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Abstract: Baumard et al.’s deﬁnition of morality is narrow and their review
of empirical work on human cooperation is limited, focusing only on
economic games, almost always involving strangers. We suggest that
theorizing about mutualisms will beneﬁt from considering extant
empirical behavioral research far more broadly and especially from
taking relational context into account.
Baumard et al. ask, “What makes humans moral beings?” (target
article, Abstract). They propose an answer that involves people
adapting to their social environment by sharing the costs and
beneﬁts of cooperation fairly and suggest a moral sense evolved
to guide the distribution of gains resulting from cooperation.
But their so-called moral sense is actually what most people
would refer to instead as a fairness sense (a point the authors
acknowledge at the end of the article). By redeﬁning the term
“morality” to mean fairness – and, indeed, fairness narrowly con-
ceived as involving balancing inputs into and outcomes from inter-
actions amongst strangers – they turn a blind eye to the rich and
complex relational contexts in which we normally interact with
other people and in which most of our moral concerns naturally
arise. (They also sidestep using the termmoral to refer to our rela-
tionally dependent normative obligations to beneﬁt and not to
harm our fellow humans, which is more in concert with the lay
use of the term and with our own sense of it as well.)
We challenge the assumption Baumard et al. make that
humans have just one general moral strategy they follow in inter-
acting with other people. Psychological research in the relation-
ships ﬁeld (including years’ worth of research by one of us, but
that of many others as well) indicates clearly that people do
not follow the same type of cooperative norm in all their relation-
ships. Instead, they utilize different norms in different relation-
ships and at different relationship stages (Clark & Beck 2011;
Clark & Mills 1979; 1993; 2012; Clark et al. 1986; 1989). In
some (“communal”) relationships people keep track of partner
needs and beneﬁt partners non-contingently in response to
their needs, desires, and goals. In other (“exchange”) relation-
ships, people follow a tit-for-tat strategy. Adhering to either
norm can be considered moral, depending on the type of
relationship. For instance, it is wrong for a parent to neglect to
feed his child but not equivalently bad to neglect to feed a stran-
ger. It is also wrong for a person not to pay a grocer for an
orange but not wrong for a child not to repay his parent for
the orange. Relational context clearly matters.
Moral theories based solely on empirical research involving
interactions between strangers (e.g., most of the economic game
research on which Baumard et al. rely) oversimplify the answers
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to “how” and “why” people behave morally, because they fail to
include observations of people who have or desire a variety of
types of relationships with others. Since most moral behavior
occurs in the context of our relationships with people whom we
know personally and/or about whomwe care deeply, psychological
accounts of morality relying on studies of interactions between
strangers fail to account for the majority of contexts in which
moral issues actually arise and matter. We recognize that econ-
omic games are a current favorite among economists, researchers
in business schools, and some psychologists. They are neat,
straightforward, and easily modeled mathematically. However,
the literature on human cooperation extends far beyond the litera-
ture on behavior in these games (see, e.g. for instance, Clark &
Lemay 2010; Tyler 2010; and the now burgeoning literature in
relationship science generally).
Berscheid and others have argued, eloquently and convincingly,
that we cannot truly understand human behavior if we remove it
from relational context (Berscheid 1999; Reis et al. 2000). Bugen-
tal has argued that social algorithms vary by social function
(Bugental 2000). We agree with both. The prospect of future
interactions, the varying nature and function of those interactions,
and individuals’ personal relationship histories make a huge differ-
ence to people’s behavior, impacting people’s motivations,
emotions, and decisions and, most relevant to this commentary,
the very nature of their cooperation with one another.
Baumard et al. do brieﬂy review how performance on economic
games is inﬂuenced by relationship histories (see their discussion
of the impact of participants’ prior interactions and of ﬁndings
reported by Cronk [2007] and Cronk & Wasielewski [2008]).
Yet they fail to embrace the implications of these observations
and to incorporate them into their theorizing.
The vast extant social-psychological literature relevant to
cooperation could inform Baumard et al.’s theory. Here are just
four of many lessons to be garnered from that literature. First,
as already noted, there is more than one ﬂavor of mutualism sup-
porting human cooperation. Sometimes people set forth explicit
contracts with one another that specify their roles and duties.
Sometimes (as Baumard et al. suggest) people form more implicit
cooperative relationships in which they expect to beneﬁt in direct
proportion to their contributions. Sometimes people implicitly
agree to assume a degree of responsibility for one another’s
welfare and they non-contingently provide beneﬁts in response
to needs and desires as those needs and desires arise (and, to
make matters more complicated, the degree of assumed respon-
sibility varies by relationship and can be symmetrical or asymme-
trical; Mills et al. 2004). Second, the actions we take to form,
strengthen, or repair mutualistic relationships differ by relation-
ship stage (Clark & Beck 2011). To win people over to a coopera-
tive communal relationship, for instance, we begin by offering
more beneﬁts than we request, but, if a commitment to a relation-
ship is made, offers and requests even out if needs are even (Beck
& Clark 2009). Third, individual differences matter – a lot. We enter
new relationships with the baggage of our relationship histories in
tow. These histories impact our conﬁdence that forming mutualistic
relationships with others will work out and, consequently, our will-
ingness to enter various forms of such relationships in the ﬁrst
place. If trust in others is very low, we may prefer very explicit
rather than implicit agreements to exchange this for that. If trust
is high, we can risk adding some truly need-based communal
relationships to our mix of mutualistic relationships (cf. Murray
et al. 2006). Fourth, it appears that the procedures or relational pro-
cesses involved in determining how beneﬁts are allocated in relation-
ships often matter more to our judgments of whether behavior is
moral and our willingness to remain in interactions than the does
the nature of actual allocations (Tyler 2010).
In sum, any complete account of morality must take into con-
sideration all of our varied relationships and the literature on
cooperation broadly conceived. Studying only strangers and pos-
tulating just one type of mutualism will result in an incomplete
theory of mutualisms.
The emotional shape of our moral life: Anger-
related emotions and mutualistic anthropology
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000763
Florian Cova, Julien Deonna, and David Sander







Abstract: The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes
precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our
moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to “avoidance”
emotions (like contempt and disgust) than to “punitive” emotions (like
anger). Here, we argue that these predictions run contrary to most
psychological evidence.
Baumard et al. propose that our morality has evolved mainly
through “partner choice” (and that individuals choose to avoid
and not to cooperate with defectors), rather than “partner
control” (with individuals retaliating and imposing costs on defec-
tors). From this evolutionary hypothesis, a certain number of
psychological predictions can be drawn, and these predictions
can be compared to available psychological data. Here, we want
to focus on implications of Baumard et al.’s hypothesis they do
not discuss – implications regarding the role and the place of
emotions in our moral lives. As emotions are closely linked with
moral evaluations and play a determinant role in moral motivation,
it is no surprise that a hypothesis about our moral psychology has
implications for the psychology of emotions.
Given that Baumard et al. consider that morality evolved
through “partner choice” rather than “partner control,” they
should predict that the key role in morality (and cooperation)
will be played by emotions whose action tendency is avoidance
(avoid immoral cooperators), rather than by emotions whose
action tendency is punishment (punish immoral cooperators).
Contempt and disgust belong to the ﬁrst category – they lead us
to avoid certain people –whereas anger and anger-related
emotions (indignation, irritation, outrage, and righteous anger)
belong to the second category – they lead us to seek revenge or
make the transgressor “pay” for what he did (Dubreuil 2010b).
For example, studies show that, in economic games, anger and irri-
tation are emotions that are strongly correlated with the inﬂiction
of punishment (Bosman et al. 2005; Reuben & van Winden 2008;
for third-party punishment, see: Fehr & Fischbacher 2004). Ques-
tionnaire methods yield a similar result, with the emotional
response of “outrage” being an excellent predictor of punishment
(Darley & Pittman 2003). Consequently, the mutualistic hypoth-
esis should predict that contempt and disgust play a greater role
than anger-related emotions in our moral lives, particularly in the
contexts of cooperation and right infringement. Is this plausible?
The ﬁrst observation to make is that this prediction goes against
a widespread conception of anger as the emotion that is the more
directly triggered by moral and cooperation transgressions. This is
how anger was understood by Aristotle (1982), for example, and
how it continues to be viewed in most contemporary philosophy
(e.g., Roberts 2003, pp. 202–22). The recent protests in Spain
against economic injustice and political corruption that have gath-
ered in the “Indignant Movement” (Los indignados) – a name
inspired by Stéphane Hessel’s book entitled Time for Outrage!
(Indignez-vous! [2011]) – precisely hook on this relation
between reaction to injustice and anger-related emotions.
This link between sensitivity to injustice and anger-related
emotions can also be observed in laboratory settings. Rozin
et al. (1999) have asked Japanese and American participants to
associate moral violations with facial expressions typical of the
emotion that would be triggered by the spectacle of such
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violations. For moral violations involving the infringement of
other persons’ rights (e.g., a person stealing a purse from a
blind person or a drunk man beating his wife), anger was the
most associated emotion. In line with these results, studies with
economic games reveal anger and irritation to be the most
reported emotions when a cooperation norm is broken (Reuben
& van Winden 2008).
These observations spell trouble for mutualistic anthropology,
for it is hard to understand why breaches of morality and
cooperation tend mainly to elicit a punitive emotion if morality
evolved mainly through partner choice and not through partner
control and the enforcement of social norms by punishment.
Nevertheless, Baumard et al. succeeded in making room for pun-
ishment in their mutualistic anthropology: punishment, they say,
is about restoring fairness. Thus, mutualistic anthropology can
explain the role of anger in our moral life by making the hypoth-
esis that anger, in its moral manifestations, has evolved to motivate
us to restore fairness.
This hypothesis also leads to precise predictions: If anger is
really about motivating us to restore fairness, then anger should
be more concerned with the consequences of an action (i.e.,
whether someone’s rights were infringed), than about the
mental states of the agent (i.e., whether he wronged his victim
accidentally or on purpose). But, once again, this prediction is at
odds with empirical results. First, punishment does not vary
uniquely according to the consequences of one’s action and the
magnitude of the wrong: though it is sensitive to consequences,
it is also sensible to the agent’s intentions (Cushman 2008;
Cushman et al. 2009; Falk et al. 2003). This is consistent with
most legal systems, in which punishment varies not only according
to the actus reus (what the agent did), but also according to the
mens rea (what the agent’s intentions were). If punishment is
driven by anger-related emotion, then it is plausible that anger is
sensible not only to consequences, but also to the agent’s intention.
Additional support for this inference can be found in Darley
and Pittman (2003): while keeping consequences constant, they
varied the agent’s intentions and found that the sentiment of
“moral outrage” varied with the agent’s intention. Finally, using
a similar method (Cova 2012), we gave participants scenarios
that vary along two factors: intention (the agent had the intention
to harm someone or not) and consequences (the action had bad
consequences or not). We found that the agent’s intention, but
not consequences, had a signiﬁcant impact on the anger people
felt towards the agent. In fact, participants reported more anger
(and desire to punish) about an ill-intentioned agent whose
action had no consequences than about a well-intentioned agent
whose action had terrible consequences. This strongly suggests
that anger is more concerned with the agent’s mental states
than with the wrong he actually inﬂicted, whereas the mutualistic
view of anger should predict the contrary.
To sum up, anger and anger-related emotions play a crucial role
in our moral lives. The fact that these emotions are about retalia-
tion and inﬂicting punishment suggests that punishment might
have played a greater role in our evolutionary past than the one
suggested by mutualistic anthropology.
Does market competition explain fairness?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000775
Peter DeScioli
Departments of Psychology and Economics, Brandeis University, Waltham,
MA 02453.
pdescioli@gmail.com www.pdescioli.com
Abstract: The target article by Baumard et al. uses their previous model of
bargaining with outside options to explain fairness and other features of
human sociality. This theory implies that fairness judgments are
determined by supply and demand but humans often perceive prices
(divisions of surplus) in competitive markets to be unfair.
The target article’s core argument (sect. 2.1.4) reiterates the basic
economic principle that an individual’s bargaining power is
improved by outside options. Baumard et al. rely on their previous
bargaining model (André & Baumard 2011a) in which simulated
agents played a modiﬁed Ultimatum Game. When responders
rejected an offer, they did not get zero, as usual, but instead inter-
acted with a new partner. Further, they had a 50% chance of
being the proposer in the new interaction. Offers depended on
the costs of switching partners and approached 50% as the costs
approached zero. The authors concluded that this ﬁnding explains
the evolution of fairness. The most straightforward prediction of
this model is that people’s offers (and fairness judgments) will
be sensitive to the costs of switching but the authors did not
offer evidence about this prediction.
The importance of outside options is well known from previous
research in economics, game theory, biology, political science, and
social psychology. This research includes classic economic models
of monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, and competition (Holt 2007);
market experiments (Smith 1962; 1982); and multi-player bar-
gaining models and experiments (Mesterton-Gibbons et al.
2011; Murnighan 1978; Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944).
Particularly relevant to the authors’ model, previous experiments
showed that proposer competition increases offers in ultimatum
games, but also, importantly, responder competition decreases
offers (Fischbacher et al. 2009).
Baumard et al. further argue that outside options are necessary
for even splits: “Quite generally, in the absence of outside options,
there is no particular reason why an interaction should be gov-
erned by fairness considerations” (sect. 2.1.4, para. 2). Contradict-
ing this claim, Nash showed for a two-player game (no outside
option) that “the solution has each bargainer getting the same
money proﬁt” (Nash 1950, p. 162). Schelling (1960) showed
how conspicuous division points, including (but not limited to)
equality, can be stable solutions. Also, offers of half (and even
more) can be promoted by additional bargaining stages (Goeree
& Holt 2000) and reputation (Nowak et al. 2000).
Does market competition explain fairness? It might help to
examine a classic model of outside options. Consider the following
scenario. Annie, Betty, and Cathy (A, B, and C) ﬁnd a cave full of
treasure. It takes exactly two people to carry a treasure chest.
Annie is stronger than Betty, and Cathy is the weakest. Together,
Annie and Betty can carry $8 million (M) of treasure, Annie and
Cathy can carry $6M, and Betty and Cathy can carry only $4M.
Any two individuals can agree to any possible division of cash, but
the third individual receives $0. Which pairs might work together
to carry treasure, and how might each pair divide the cash?
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, p. 227) found that the
division of surplus depends on outside options – the surplus each
individual could generate with the third player. They showed that
all pairings are equally likely, including the least productive pair
(so much for the invisible hand). Each pair has a unique stable div-
ision: Annie $5M and Betty $3M, Annie $5M and Cathy $1M, and
Betty $3M and Cathy $1M. More generally, for pairs AB, AC, and
BC with group payoffs x, y, and z, respectively, each individual’s
payoffs are A = (x + y – z)/2, B = (x – y + z)/2, and C = (–x + y + z)/
2, for both groups each person could join. This implies that if
Betty were stronger, then Cathy would get a better deal from
Annie. For example, if AB generated $10M, AC generated $6M
(same as before), and BC generated $6M, then Annie and
Cathy would split more evenly: $4M and $2M rather than $5M
and $1M. Also, the Annie-Betty split would now be equal: $5M
and $5M.
Outside options inﬂuence bargaining but it is not clear that they
explain people’s fairness judgments. Was Annie’s original 5:1 div-
ision with Cathy “fair”? Is it “fair” that Cathy’s split with Annie
depends not only on their respective talents, but also on Betty’s
talents?
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Humans do not seem to equate fairness with market price. For
example, people think it is unfair to raise the price of snow shovels
when demand increases after a snow storm (Kahneman et al.
1986b). People were outraged when hotels increased prices
after the 9/11 attacks (New York State Attorney General, 2001).
The idea that prices – divisions of surplus – depend on supply
and demand is notoriously difﬁcult for people to accept. That’s
why humans experience the diamond–water paradox, confusion
about why luxuries can be priced higher than necessities (Smith
1776/1904). People represent goods as having intrinsic prices,
and they expect current prices to match previous prices – pre-
cedents. This ﬁts with Schelling’s (1960) focal point model of bar-
gaining because precedents can increase the conspicuousness of
division points, independent of supply and demand.
The target article’s model seems to predict that humans will
perceive free-market capitalism as maximally fair. Instead,
popular culture includes anti-globalization, the “99 percent,”
opposition to organ markets, and complaints about the earnings
of CEOs, actors, and athletes – despite their rare talents. This
might be because partner competition can increase wealth dispar-
ities. Consider a simple market with three buyers who value a
good X at $9, $6, and $3, respectively, and three sellers whose
costs for producing X are $7, $4, and $1, respectively. It is possible
for the higher-value buyers to trade with higher-cost sellers, gen-
erating $2 surplus per buyer-seller pair to yield $1 per player. But,
the competitive equilibrium price is $5, yielding the unequal
payoffs of $4, $1, and $0, symmetrically to buyers and sellers, in
order of descending values and ascending costs (with a greater
total surplus of $10). Competitive markets can exacerbate inequal-
ity and people often perceive this as unfair.
Market competition is a critical feature of human social life
and much remains to be learned about the underlying cog-
nitive systems. However, the target article seems to be over-
extending its bargaining model by applying it to fairness,
impartiality, cooperation, mutualism, and morality. Future work
should develop more speciﬁc models of strategic behavior to
provide closer ﬁts with the nuanced structure of human social
computations.
Evidence for partner choice in toddlers:
Considering the breadth of other-oriented
behaviours
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000787
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Abstract: When do humans become moral beings? This commentary
draws on developmental psychology theory to expand the understanding
of early moral behaviours. We argue that by looking at a broader range
of other-oriented acts than what has been considered by Baumard et al.,
we can ﬁnd support for the mutualistic approach to morality even in
early instances of other-oriented behaviours.
As Baumard et al. state in the target article, humans “don’t just
cooperate but cooperate in quite speciﬁc ways” (sect. 3.5, para. 2).
The observation that humans appear uniquely motivated to act
on behalf of others, in a variety of contexts, in response to a diver-
sity of needs, and very early in development (e.g., Dunﬁeld et al.
2010; Svetlova et al. 2010; Warneken & Tomasello 2006; Zahn-
Waxler et al. 1992), has motivated much interest in explaining
this distinctive human tendency (e.g., the target article; see also
Tomasello 2009). To this end, there have been a number of
attempts to categorize and clarify the varieties of other-oriented
behaviours that children engage in (e.g., Dunﬁeld et al. 2010;
Hay & Cook 2007; Warneken & Tomasello 2009), with the goal
of providing a more comprehensive, uniﬁed account of early
other-oriented behaviours. Importantly, in light of recent
advances in understanding the many ways in which humans act
on behalf of others, any comprehensive account of the origins of
the human moral sense must consider all varieties of other-
oriented behaviours, not simply a select few.
Although the target article presents a cogent, mutualistic theory
of morality, we believe that there are two important issues that
have not been adequately addressed: (1) The present proposal is
almost exclusively based on economic behaviour (speciﬁcally
sharing), despite the fact that humans engage in a wide variety
of other-oriented behaviours; and, relatedly, (2) by limiting the
examination of morality to economic behaviour, the target
article has failed to address a growing body of supportive literature
from developmental psychology. In this commentary, we brieﬂy
present some insights from the ﬁeld of developmental psychology
that we feel broaden and enrich the authors’ present argument.
It is rather indisputable that human adults readily track and
evaluate others based on their previous behaviour and modify
interactions based on these evaluations. Moreover, as the
authors note, economic games are a particularly good measure
of human prosocial tendencies because the individual’s moral
motivation is clearly quantiﬁable (in regard to the amount of
money given), allowing for ﬁne-grained analysis of the effects of
various manipulations on other-oriented motivations. Yet, giving
up a desired resource (such as money) is only one of the forms
that other-oriented behaviour can take.
Humans are thought to respond to at least three negative states
(material desire, instrumental need, and emotional distress) with
three varieties of prosocial behaviours: sharing, helping, and com-
forting, respectively (Dunﬁeld et al. 2010). Each of these various
prosocial behaviours are hypothesized to rely on a unique suite of
social cognitive skills (Dunﬁeld & Kuhlmeier, in press). Impor-
tantly, unlike sharing, the unique characteristics of responding
to instrumental need and emotional distress can make it difﬁcult
to determine the “value” of helping and comforting acts, making
it harder to determine if an act has been fairly reciprocated.
Indeed, no model can claim to truly account for the breadth of
human morality without consideration of all the other-oriented
behaviours that humans engage in.
Baumard et al. discuss children’s failures to show selective
sharing (e.g., Bernhard et al. 2006; Blake & Rand 2010);
however, it is necessary to consider that sharing is one of the
last prosocial behaviours to develop (e.g., Dunﬁeld & Kuhlmeier,
in press). Moreover, early sharing behaviours are often less spon-
taneous than other prosocial measures, relying heavily on the reci-
pient’s vocalization of their desire (Brownell et al. 2009),
suggesting that they may not be the best measure to assess chil-
dren’s moral motivations. Indeed, if we look at earlier emerging
prosocial behaviours, such as helping or comforting, we can
observe nuanced interactions earlier in development, which
suggests that Baumard et al.’s proposed proximate mechanisms
for a mutualistic morality may motivate some of the earliest
examples of other-oriented behaviour.
Support for the existence of proximal mechanisms necessary to
engage in mutualistic morality can be found when looking at chil-
dren’s helping behaviour. Children begin to reliably help others in
response to the observation of need early in the second year of life
(e.g., 18 months; Warneken & Tomasello 2006). Yet, prior to the
ability to produce helping behaviours, children are already able to
differentiate between helpers and hinderers (Hamlin et al. 2007)
and make predictions about future interactions based on their
observations of previous helping and hindering acts (Kuhlmeier
et al. 2003). Thus, even before children are actively helping,
they are already tracking the quality of others’ moral acts.
Further, very shortly after children start helping others, their
helpful acts are produced selectively based on the recipient’s
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previous behaviour; children have been shown to avoid helping
individuals who have demonstrated negative intentions, across a
variety of contexts (Dunﬁeld & Kuhlmeier 2010; Vaish et al.
2010). Taken together, recent research supports the idea that,
under certain circumstances (e.g., instrumental need as opposed
to material desire), early prosocial behaviours conform to the pre-
dictions of the presented mutualistic approach to morality. More-
over, it suggests an important role for future research in clarifying
the particular task demands that affect the production of nuanced
moral acts in early development.
In sum, the target article presents an exciting new approach to
understanding the proximate and ultimate explanations for human
morality. We believe that an integration of recent research in the
area of social cognitive development both supports and enriches
the understanding of “morality as an adaptation to an environment
in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and
recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions”
(target article, Abstract). Indeed, by considering the full breadth
of human other-oriented behaviours, we can ﬁnd support for
the proposed mechanisms in the earliest instances of children’s
moral behaviour and gain better insight into the evolution, main-
tenance, and production of these unique human tendencies.
Baumard et al.’s moral markets lack market
dynamics
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000945
Daniel M. T. Fessler and Colin Holbrook
Center for Behavior, Evolution, & Culture, and Department of Anthropology,




Abstract: Market models are indeed indispensable to understanding the
evolution of cooperation and its emotional substrates. Unfortunately,
Baumard et al. eschew market thinking in stressing the supposed
invariance of moral/cooperative behavior across circumstances. To the
contrary, humans display contingent morality/cooperation, and these
shifts are best accounted for by market models of partner choice for
mutually beneﬁcial collaboration.
We applaud the conceptual clarity that Baumard et al. bring to the
subject of cooperation, and endorse their focus on mutualism – as
opposed to both true altruism and reciprocity – as a form of
cooperation likely favored under a wide range of evolutionary
scenarios. Moreover, the authors’ model of a market for mutualis-
tic cooperators driven by partner choice provides a plausible
account of the evolution of mental mechanisms that generate,
and act on, concepts of fairness. However, they do not carry the
premises of their market model to their logical conclusions.
Baumard et al. endorse and build on prior positions that hold
that selection has favored a moral compass that leads individuals
to “do the right thing” in a relatively invariant fashion. Such invar-
iance was ostensibly selected for because an inﬂexible moral
compass is thought to preclude both erroneously trading the
larger long-term gains of mutualism for the smaller short-term
gains of defection, and erroneously underestimating the likelihood
of getting caught in the act. Baumard et al. bolster prior argu-
ments to this effect by stating that people are fairly accurate
when inferring others’ intentions in situations involving such
temptations, and hence that the odds are stacked against cost-
free defection. While we share with Baumard et al. a market
model of mutualism, we challenge the notion of an invariant
moral compass on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
Empirically, we submit that, with the exception of the (infre-
quent) types occupying the respective tails of the moral
distribution (psychopaths and saints, respectively), most people
appear somewhat ﬂexible in their moral behavior in general,
and in their mutualistic behavior in particular. True, many
people behave in what is locally construed as a moral manner
much of the time, but this is not the same as being invariantly
moral or invariantly fair. Moreover, it is not simply the case that
people engage in some ﬁxed level of moral behavior most of
the time, and occasionally fall below this level, as might be
expected if an evolved moral compass were merely imperfect
due to constraints on optimality. Rather, most people are plastic
in both directions. Inspired by others’ virtuous acts, people episo-
dically rise above their baseline levels of prosociality (Haidt 2000;
2003; Schnall et al. 2010). Likewise, rendered cynical by others’
self-interested behavior, people episodically fall below their
baseline levels of prosociality (see Keizer et al. 2008; Raihani &
Hart 2010).
From a theoretical perspective, the situational plasticity of indi-
vidual moral behavior is not surprising – indeed, we contend that
it is exactly what is predicted by market models of partner choice
for mutualism. As Baumard et al.’s own analogies with biological
markets indicate, the behavior of individual actors in a market
reﬂects the effects of supply and demand on pricing. Consider
ﬁrst the simplest case, in which all mutualism is dyadic, and coop-
erativeness is a binary trait. Here, market dynamics do not
operate, as all (or virtually all) prospective cooperators eventually
ﬁnd partners. However, if prospective partners vary in quality,
then market dynamics arise: Vying to pair with the best partners,
prospective cooperators will escalate their prosociality in order to
compete with their rivals for limited slots. This situation is exacer-
bated if some or all of the most proﬁtable mutualisms involve
groups of actors rather than dyads, as this means that large
numbers of unattached actors can accumulate (rather than
simply pairing off, as occurs under dyadic scenarios). When the
supply of prospective cooperators is greater than the number of
open slots in cooperative ventures, the prospective cooperators
can be expected to advertise that they have lowered their expected
wages by displaying a willingness to engage in more costly proso-
cial behavior. Conversely, when the supply of prospective coop-
erators is lower than the number of open slots in cooperative
ventures, the prospective cooperators can be expected to display
a reduced willingness to engage in costly prosociality. Following
Fessler and Haley (2003), we argue that such facultative adjust-
ment of prosocial inclinations is mediated by genuine moral
emotions, themselves the products of adaptations that evolved
to regulate behavior in exactly this market context. When individ-
uals are surrounded by prosocial actors, they are genuinely motiv-
ated to “match others’ bids,” while the converse is true when they
ﬁnd themselves surrounded by self-interested others. The result is
that there are multiple stable equilibria with regard to prevailing
levels of cooperation, a pattern evident even on relatively small
geographical scales (e.g., Wilson et al. 2009). While some such
heterogeneity is undoubtedly due to self-selection of the type
described by Baumard et al. in their discussion of mobility in
small-scale societies, we argue that much of this heterogeneity
reﬂects the fundamental plasticity of people’s moral inclinations –
the same actor will feel and behave differently in different social
contexts.
In keeping with the above perspective, we also take issue with
Baumard et al.’s position that there has been little selection for
psychological mechanisms that motivate altruistic punishment
aimed at deterrence. Because it is impossible to forecast others’
behavior with complete accuracy, and because the moral
compass is not invariant, cooperative groups beneﬁt from policing
both in the short term and over the long term as deterrent effects
accrue. As punishment constitutes a public good for such groups,
advertising one’s willingness to punish norm violators makes the
actor more attractive as a prospective partner (Fessler & Haley
2003). As in the case of escalating feedback loops of prosociality
motivated by genuine emotions, this can lead to bid-matching be-
havior wherein one actor expresses moral outrage at a norm
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violation, leading other actors to express similar – or higher –
levels of outrage.
In sum, market models of morality are indeed powerful –more
powerful even than Baumard et al. recognize, for such models can
not only explain the evolution of mutualistic cooperation and the
emotions that support it, but, importantly, they can also explain
the vicissitudes of morality both within and between individuals,
groups, and societies.
More to morality than mutualism: Consistent
contributors exist and they can inspire costly
generosity in others
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000799
Michael J. Gill,a Dominic J. Packer,a and Jay Van Bavelb
aDepartment of Psychology, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015;





Abstract: Studies of economic decision-making have revealed the
existence of consistent contributors, who always make contributions to
the collective good. It is difﬁcult to understand such behavior in terms
of mutualistic motives. Furthermore, consistent contributors can elicit
apparently altruistic behavior from others. Therefore, although
mutualistic motives are likely an important contributor to moral action,
there is more to morality than mutualism.
We applaud the effort of Baumard et al. to move beyond the ques-
tion of whether people cooperate (they do, often) to examine why
people cooperate. We do not dispute their arguments that
cooperation sometimes stems from either selﬁsh or fairness
motives. Nevertheless, studies of economic decision-making
reveal phenomena that are not easily understood in terms of the
mutualism framework’s notion that interactants aim to “share
the costs and beneﬁts of cooperation equally” (target article,
Abstract), behaving “as if they had passed a contract” (sect.
3.2.2, para. 1, italics in original).
Particularly problematic is the existence of consistent contribu-
tors (CCs; Weber & Murnighan 2008). CCs are individuals who
always contribute to the group in the context of a Public Goods
Game (PGG), regardless of others’ behavior. CCs have been
shown to emerge in non-trivial numbers in economic games.
Because their generosity is not dependent on cooperation by
others, they place themselves at great of risk incurring more
costs and deriving fewer beneﬁts than others in their group. If
CCs were motivated by fairness, one would expect that over
time they would reduce their contributions to match those of
others. Yet, they do not. Thus, their existence poses a problem
for Baumard et al.’s argument that fairness considerations domi-
nate in environments that afford cooperative opportunities. CCs
do not give the impression that they have passed a contract with
the other parties. It would be a strange contract indeed that stipu-
lates: “I will contribute to the group regardless of what you do.”
Importantly, CCs can increase cooperation by others (Weber &
Murnighan 2008). Recent research in our labs supports a dynamic
“person X situation” model of how this happens (Packer & Gill
2011). According to our model, individual differences in moral
values interact with the situationally triggered salience of moral
concerns to guide cognition and behavior. A key facet of our
model is the notion that people can approach a decision-making
task in distinct mindsets (e.g., Tetlock 2002): For example, a
moral mind-set in which they focus on what is the morally
correct choice, or a pragmatic mind-set in which they focus on
what are the practical costs and beneﬁts of each choice (Van
Bavel et al. 2012). We suggest that, perhaps because costly gener-
osity epitomizes lay conceptions of moral action (Olivola & Shaﬁr,
in press), CCs activate a moral mind-set in participants. Once this
mind-set is activated, cognition and decision-making are guided
by the individual’s moral values, and thus those with strong altruis-
tic values show a robust pattern of cooperation.
We have tested this model using a PGG in which human partici-
pants interact with computer-simulated players. Results support
our model, such that the presence of a CC increases cooperation
only among individuals with preexisting altruistic moral values.
Interestingly, such individuals are not more cooperative than
others in the absence of a CC (despite the fact that overall rates
of cooperation are held constant across CC and non-CC con-
ditions). Ongoing work is exploring the motivational basis of the
cooperation elicited by CCs. Preliminary evidence suggests that
the motives might be altruistic rather than fairness-based. In par-
ticular, CCs increase cooperation among those with altruistic
values even when other group members continue to defect with
regularity. Thus, those with altruistic values, like the CCs who
activate those values, end up bearing more costs and deriving
fewer beneﬁts than those who continue to defect. This raises
questions about whether their behavior can be understood in
terms of mutualistic concerns.
Consistent contributors and their tendency to elicit cooperation
from (at least some) others suggests that a general disposition to
cooperate can evolve. Baumard et al. propose a two-step model
for the evolution of morality in environments where people can
choose their interaction partners: A selﬁshly motivated and calcu-
lative reciprocity ﬁrst emerges, which is subsequently replaced by
a “disposition to be intrinsically motivated to be fair” (sect. 2.2.1,
para. 12). Importantly, even if one fully accepts this model, when a
sufﬁcient proportion of a population reaches the second step, it
may set the stage for a third in which a more general or altruistic
disposition to cooperate can evolve. Among a population con-
cerned about fairness, a mutant who consistently cooperates is
less likely to be exploited, but instead can trigger increased
cooperation. That is, an evolved disposition to cooperate fairly
creates an environment within which a more general disposition
to cooperate may be adaptive. Indeed, to the extent that consist-
ently contributing individuals are popular choices as interaction
partners, a selection pressure in favor of consistent contribution
might emerge. Following the authors’ reasoning, the more
genuine this disposition, the better; hence, we would suggest
that a true preference for sharing resources with others is likely
to evolve among some members of the population.
Although their motivation is substantially altruistic (i.e., they are
willing to bear more costs and derive fewer beneﬁts than others),
we suspect that individuals with a general or altruistic disposition
to cooperate are likely to exhibit some behaviors that are consist-
ent with the mutualistic framework. First, we hypothesize that
although these individuals often tend to cooperate regardless of
others’ decisions during speciﬁc interactions, they are still likely
to pay close attention to others’ responses and choose to interact
with people they trust to respond fairly or altruistically. Second,
these individuals are also likely to be sensitive to cooperative
environmental affordances; that is, they may tend to cooperate
only in contexts where cooperation is possible (e.g., contributions
have a reasonable chance of being reciprocated) and likely to
increase beneﬁts. Weber and Murnighan (2008) observed this
type of strategic cooperation, such that rates of consistent contri-
bution in a PGG increased as the potential payoffs for cooperating
increased (although there were still a non-trivial number of con-
sistent contributors when potential payoffs were low).
To sum up, consistent contributors exist, and it is difﬁcult to
understand their behavior in terms of mutualistic motives.
Further, consistent contributors often elicit cooperation from
others, and that elicited cooperation might also have an altruistic
basis. We would, therefore, suggest that Baumard et al.’s mutual-
ism framework is a very useful but not complete approach to
human morality.
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Mutualism is only a part of human morality
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000805
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Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, and Department of Economics,
Central European University, 1051 Budapest, Hungary.
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Abstract: Baumard et al. mischaracterize our model of individual and
social choice behavior. We model individuals who maximize preferences
given their beliefs, and subject to their informational and material
constraints (Fehr & Gintis 2007). Individuals thus must make trade-offs
among self-regarding, other-regarding, and character virtue goals. Two
genetic predispositions are particularly crucial. The ﬁrst is strong
reciprocity. The second is the capacity to internalize norms through the
socialization process. Our model includes the authors’ model as a subset.
Baumard et al. claim that I and my coauthors, in our work on
human strategic choice behavior, hold that “human morality is
ﬁrst and foremost altruistic” (sect. 2.1.1, para. 4). This is not the
case. In various publications (see Boehm 2011; Bowles & Gintis
2011; Fehr & Gintis 2007; Gintis et al. 2005; Henrich et al.
2005; and references therein), we offer the following account of
human social behavior: The human agent can be modeled as
having a preference function that he maximizes subject to material
and informational constraints, subject to his beliefs concerning the
effect of his actions on social and personal outcomes. We call this
the Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints (BPC) model. The BPC
model is a version of the rational actor model (Savage 1972),
except that beliefs may be constituted by the agent’s position in
a network of minds with distributed cognition, rather than being
simply a personal subjective prior. Agents are genetically predis-
posed to value certain social and personal outcomes and devalue
others, although this predisposition can be ampliﬁed and/or atte-
nuated through social experience. Human preferences are
conditioned by personal biological, welfare-related, and ﬁtness-
related needs (we call these self-regarding interests), but they gen-
erally have important elements that relate to the well-being of
others (other-regarding preferences), and still others that are
purely of a moral nature (such character virtues as honesty,
loyalty, courage, considerateness, and worthiness of esteem).
In this framework, individuals are constantly faced with making
trade-offs, not only among self-regarding goals (such as consump-
tion and leisure), but also among self-regarding, other-regarding,
and character virtue goals. Note that, in this model, individuals get
pleasure from satisfying not only their self-regarding preferences,
but also their social preferences, by which we mean their other-
regarding preferences and their valued character virtues.
We suggest that two human genetic predispositions are particu-
larly crucial. The ﬁrst is the combination of conditional altruistic
cooperation and conditional altruistic punishment, or strong reci-
procity, according to which humans are predisposed to cooperate
with unrelated others towards achieving collective goals, to punish
those who free ride on the sacriﬁces of others, without an expec-
tation of being repaid in the future for one’s efforts. Both
cooperation and punishment are conditional, in the sense that a
sufﬁciently high level of defection leads agents to abandon
cooperation, and in many situations individuals will participate
in altruistic punishment only if there is a sufﬁcient number of
punishers (Boyd et al. 2010). Thus, individuals with strong
other-regarding preferences will generally be on guard to detect
cheating and self-serving activity of others.
The second crucial human predisposition is the capacity to inter-
nalize norms through the socialization process (Boehm 2011; Gintis
2003). The norms that are internalized appear as arguments in the
individual’s preference function, and include self-regarding
elements (such as personal hygiene, ability to defer gratiﬁcation),
other-regarding elements (such as showing empathy for others),
and character virtues (such as honesty and courage). In fact, most
humans (sociopaths aside) have a conscience which they constantly
deploy to evaluate their own behavior, and often curb immediate
impulses to conform to the behavioral standards (self-regarding
and social) to which they subscribe.
The background condition for the evolution of these human
predispositions is our hunter-gatherer past, in which humans
carved out a niche involving extremely high levels of cooperation
among large numbers of non-kin, under rapidly varying environ-
mental conditions requiring ﬂexible adjustment of social practices
to novel environmental challenges (Richerson & Boyd 2000).
This, of course, is exactly the sort of “mutualistic cooperation”
stressed by Baumard et al. Not surprisingly, all of the human
behaviors afﬁrmed by the authors ﬁt nicely into the BPC model,
and are in no way in conﬂict with our stress on altruistic
cooperation and punishment. Since we are in broad agreement,
I will simply suggest some amendments to their arguments.
The authors argue that moral values must be “real” rather than
opportunistically feigned because people are not very good simu-
lators and will eventually be unmasked unless their values are
genuine. However, if there were a ﬁtness beneﬁt from dissimula-
tion of morality, humans would have doubtless evolved the ability
to dissimulate morality. My explanation in Gintis (2003) is that
morality is important for ﬁtness maximization (including personal
hygiene, deferred gratiﬁcation, commitment to skill acquisition),
and once humans evolved the capacity to internalize self-regard-
ing virtues, the same psychological mechanisms could be
“hijacked” for other purposes, including inculcating social prefer-
ences. Moreover, because humans generally suffer from exces-
sively short time horizons (often called “weakness of will”),
agents will behave inappropriately when the gains to moral behav-
ior lie in the future, unless there is an immediate beneﬁt from
acting morally. Conscience supplies that immediate beneﬁt for
moral behavior (Durkheim 1915, cf. Boehm 2011).
The authors’ critique of our stress on altruistic punishment is not
well founded. As Bingham (1999) and Boyd et al. (2010) have
stressed, the ability of inﬂicting low-cost punishment on violators
of social norms is the very deﬁning feature of our species, and
has no counterpart in other species. Of course, lethal punishment
is rare, but it is universal in hunter-gather societies (Boehm 1999;
2011; Wiessner 2005). Moreover, even ostracism and shunning
involve strictly positive costs for those who participate. It is for
this reason that other species do not include shunning and ostra-
cism in their repertoire of behaviors. There is no good reason, of
course, for Baumard et al. to question these well-established
facts, as their thesis is not affected one way or another thereby.
Beyond economic games: A mutualistic
approach to the rest of moral life
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000817
Jesse Graham
Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles,
CA 90089.
jesse.graham@usc.edu www.usc.edu/grahamlab
Abstract: Mutualism provides a compelling account of the fairness
intuitions on display in economic games. However, it is not yet clear
how well the approach holds up as an explanation of all human morality.
The theory needs to be tested outside the methodological neighborhood
it was born in; such testing has the potential to greatly improve our
understanding of morality in general.
Many parsimonious theories of human morality never get to leave
their birthplace. Born out of a particular set of observations in a par-
ticular methodological context (e.g., justice dilemmas, trolley pro-
blems), the theories are developed to explain a particular type of
judgment or behavior, then expanded and offered as the expla-
nation for why humans are not just selﬁsh utility-maximizers – but
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then tested in the exact same methodological context they came
from.
This is the pattern followed by the target article’s mutualistic
approach to morality, born and tested in economic games. As
the authors Baumard et al. acknowledge, economic games lack
ecological validity with regard to most instances of everyday
moral judgments, intuitions, and behaviors (sect. 3.5, para. 2),
and human morality (or the “moral sense”) may encompass
more than just these fairness intuitions (sect. 4, para. 4). Never-
theless, predictions of the theory are tested in the very limited
realm of three economic games based on anonymous interactions
between strangers. This is a good ﬁrst step; the theory’s predictions
should now be tested in other domains, using other methods, to
determine how well mutualism can explain the moral sense in all
its instances. In this commentary, I propose three moral phenom-
ena that the mutualistic approach could help explain: disgust, indi-
vidual differences in moral judgment, and gossip.
Testing the mutualistic approach in a wider variety of moral
situations might reveal areas where predictions either lack
support or simply do not derive. For instance, the theory seems
to have little to say about why incidental disgust can increase
the severity of moral judgments (Schnall et al. 2008). However,
although the authors suggest that purity intuitions may be evolu-
tionarily distinct from fairness intuitions (sect. 2.2.1, para. 9), it
could be beneﬁcial to examine whether mutualism could inform
this puzzle. Perhaps disgust acts as a cue – for some people, in
some situations – of partner untrustworthiness. This is anecdotally
supported by participants hypnotically primed with disgust saying,
“It just seems like he’s up to something” in response to an innoc-
uous story (Wheatley & Haidt 2005).
Why is disgust treated as morally relevant to partner choice for
some people, but not others? Individual differences in moral con-
cerns and judgments have been shown across gender, culture, and
political ideology (Graham et al. 2011). At ﬁrst blush, this is
another phenomenon the mutualistic approach seems unlikely
to illuminate, but it is worth pushing the theory to see how far
it can go, beyond economic games and beyond judgments strictly
about fairness. Perhaps moral intuitions are moderated by the
qualities of the surrounding social structures, and group-focused
moral concerns (about group loyalty, respect for traditions, and
maintaining purity) are more relevant to partner choice decisions
in “tight” cultures relative to “loose” cultures (Gelfand et al. 2011).
This would suggest that rather than one single evolved moral
intuition, what has been selected for is a ﬂexibility in moral
responsiveness across situational and cultural contexts (see, e.g.,
Richerson & Boyd 2005; Wood & Eagly, in press).
The authors posit that “humans are all equipped with the same
sense of fairness” (sect. 3.1.2, para. 7) and suggest that if enough
information were presented so that the situation were construed
the same way, then this universal sense would lead to similar
decisions for all people (see also Baumard & Sperber 2010).
This could be tested in the context of political arguments in
which concerns about procedural and distributive justice (or
micro- and macro-justice; Brickman et al. 1981) conﬂict, as in
issues like afﬁrmative action where both sides are arguing based
on different notions of fairness. The mutualistic approach seems
to predict that if enough information was presented and situations
were construed the same way, political opponents would see eye
to eye. This is an empirical question in need of an answer.
Finally, the authors recognize the importance of reputation and
gossip in social selection, yet treat this as a selection “for a disposi-
tion to be fair rather than for a disposition to sacriﬁce oneself or
for virtues such as purity or piety that are orthogonal to one’s
value as a partner in most cooperative ventures” (sect. 2.2.1,
para. 9). However, evidence shows that moral gossip is not rele-
gated to fairness, but to a wider variety of virtues and vices, includ-
ing how good a cooperator the person is, but also how good a
family/group/congregation member they are, how well they
adhere to moral and cultural norms, and whether they have the
“right” upbringing, beliefs, and personality characteristics
(Baumeister et al. 2004; Wert & Salovey 2004). It is an empirical
question as to what degree and in what situations reputation and
gossip concern cooperation to the exclusion of other moral con-
cerns (treating them as orthogonal to the crucial question of
partner choice), or whether the other concerns are treated as
valid indicators of cooperation likelihood. Here again, ﬂexibility
may be the key: a wider range of moral gossip may provide valid
information about cooperation in tight cultural contexts, but not
in loose ones. Like disgust and individual differences, gossip is a
fertile topic for which the mutualistic approach can provide
novel predictions and explanations.
In conclusion, Baumard et al. have provided a commendable and
convincing case for mutually beneﬁcial cooperation as the distal
mechanism for the fairness sense seen in economic games. But
themutualistic approachmay have far greater beneﬁts tomoral psy-
chology than explaining this particular set of behaviors.
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Abstract: Mutualistic theory explains convincingly the prevalence of
fairness norms in small societies of foragers and in large contemporary
democratic societies. However, it cannot explain the U-shaped curve of
egalitarianism in human history. A theory based on bargaining power is
able to provide a more general account and to explain mutualism as a
special case. According to this approach, social norms may be more
variable and malleable than Baumard et al. suggest.
Baumard et al. discuss two alternative accounts of the emergence
of fairness norms, which they label the “partner-control” and the
“partner-choice” model, respectively. The partner-choice model,
which they favour, is a market setting where each individual can
shop around for the best partner, and her payoff (the return of
her labour) is determined by her relative contribution to total
output. The partner-control model instead represents a situation
where each individual is stuck in a long-term dyadic relation and
can only protect herself from exploitation by withdrawing her
contribution in case her partner is cheating. Baumard et al. ﬁnd
two faults with partner-control models: (1) They are notoriously
underdetermined – there are too many equilibria of long-term
cooperation; and (2) in some equilibria the distribution of resources
is unfair (payoffs ratios may not reﬂect contribution ratios).
Notice, however, that, strictly speaking, bargaining theory
offers a unifying account of partner-choice and partner-control
models under the general principle that negotiated distributions
of resources reﬂect relative bargaining power. Power, in turn, is
measured by the difference between individuals’ negotiated
payoffs and the payoff they would obtain if bargaining broke
down (their outside options). The general theory helps one
appreciate that effort and talent are only two factors among
those that determine an individual’s bargaining power. The avail-
ability of alternative partners is another factor, but so are physical
strength (the capacity to offend or coerce), accumulated wealth,
membership in a coalition, and so forth. Baumard et al.’s
market for partners effectively abstracts away from such factors
and focuses on effort and talent only. This may be a good approxi-
mation to the ancestral environment where fairness norms initially
evolved, but need not be true of many other ecological and social
niches created by homo sapiens since then.
The ethnography of small societies emphasises hunter-gath-
erers’ relative freedom to change partners and their highly egali-
tarian, anti-hierarchical ethos. This literature strikes a chord in our
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post-enlightenment democratic culture, but at the same time
invites over-generalization from an unrepresentative sample. If
we plot the inﬂuence of egalitarian mutualism on human social
organization throughout history, we obtain a peculiar U-shaped
curve (Boehm 1999). Starting approximately from 10,000 BC, ega-
litarian nomadic societies were progressively displaced by seden-
tary agriculturalists. Agriculture co-evolved with a new social
organization based on caste systems, centralized power, and mon-
opoly of violence – in short, the birth of the state (Dubreuil 2010a).
This step is not inconsistent with Baumard et al.’s explanatory fra-
mework: The new states capitalized on intensive production and
food storage. Interestingly, they emerged in highly fertile areas
surrounded by arid land, which reduced mobility and the range
of outside options. The necessity to defend fertile land and
stored food encouraged the creation of a warrior class, which in
turn facilitated the maintenance of social order. Demographic
growth and low mobility, moreover, created massive coordination
problems that were best solved by centralized monarchies.
Couldmutualism survive in this new social environment? In hier-
archical societies egalitarian mutualism can regulate, at best, hori-
zontal relations among the members of the same caste. Vertical
relations, however, must be governed by entirely different norms.
Moral theories and political ideologies must justify a stratiﬁed
system of privileges, rights, and duties that stem from a central
authority endowed with absolute power of life and death over its
people. Myths and religions typically provide a touch of superna-
tural legitimacy to these massive asymmetries of bargaining power.
The upshot of all this is not that pursuing an evolutionary expla-
nation of fairness norms is futile. It is, rather, that an exclusive
focus on mutualism may lead to an overly narrow account of the
evolution of human morality. Clearly humans have evolved the
capacity to create and follow fairness norms. But we have little evi-
dence that this capacity is a distinctive module in the sense of evol-
utionary psychology – a set of mechanisms that calls for a separate,
dedicated evolutionary explanation. Humans may have evolved a
much more general capacity to normativize behaviour – that is, to
create and follow social norms. The content of such norms probably
varies across epochs and cultures, and partly co-varies with the
underlying socio-economic structure. From a mutualistic perspec-
tive, the social and moral systems that different groups of homo
sapiens have endorsed at different points in time range from the
very fair to the extremely unfair. (Baumard et al. conveniently
limit their survey to small groups of hunter-gatherers and to large
contemporary societies imbued with democratic ethos. Elevating
mutualism to the evolved ethos of homo sapiens, however, ignores
ten millennia of very non-mutualistic, un-fair morality and politics.)
Notice that seen in this light the alleged weakness of partner-
control models – their underdetermination –may turn out to be
a strength: Repeated interactions can give rise to very different
social institutions, depending on the underlying asymmetries of
bargaining power (Binmore 2005). Such a perspective may be dis-
turbing for those who believe in a core of evolved, stable, universal
moral dispositions. On the other hand, it works as a recipe against
complacency, and as an invitation to vigilance, for all those who
endorse mutualistic fairness while recognizing its historical contin-
gency, cultural relativity, and inherent fragility.
The paradox of the missing function: How
similar is moral mutualism to biofunctional
understanding?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000957
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Abstract: We explain here how the natural selection theory of people’s
mutualistic sense of fairness and the biofunctional theory of human
understanding are made for each other. We welcome the stage that the
target article has already set for this convergence, and invite the authors
to consider moving the two independently developed approaches a step
closer to the natural selection level of biofunctional understanding.
We applaud Baumard et al. for their timely and far-reaching treat-
ment of human morality: timely, because today’s crisis of conﬁ-
dence in moral values is widespread; far-reaching, because their
treatment promises to enable scientists to go after the monumen-
tal challenge of discovering a solution to what the authors call the
“puzzle of the missing contract” (sect. 1, para. 3). In this commen-
tary, we argue that the puzzle is a special case of the “paradox of
the missing function” applicable widely to biological systems. In
our related research, the paradox is about a sharp distinction
between biofunctional understanding and biofunctional cognition,
and arises because biofunctional understanding is something evol-
ution knows how to do but people don’t, including today’s scien-
tists – at least not yet. By contrast, biofunctional cognition deﬁnes
the sphere and the limits of what people are able to know how to
do, at least in principle. The gist of the paradox is that people have
conﬂicting intuitions about their own understanding. They know,
by means of biofunctional cognition, that they understand; but
they also know that they know nothing else (their undeniable
ability to understand notwithstanding) about the nature of how
that understanding takes place (in the nervous system).
Biofunctional theory began in the late 1970s when understand-
ing was discovered to be different from the knowing capability of
people. Accordingly, understanding was deﬁned as the special
function of the nervous system, designed and ﬁeld-tested by evol-
ution, about which the understanders themselves knew nothing
(Iran-Nejad 1978; 2000; Iran-Nejad et al. 1992). The special func-
tion of understanding was analogous to the special function of the
human immune system, also designed and ﬁeld-tested by evol-
ution to recover patients from infectious diseases, without the
patients themselves knowing anything about the function by
which recovery takes place or even having any idea that there
exists such a system as the immune system whose special function
is to take care of the recovery process.
Over the years, biofunctional theory has evolved in our work
into a new perspective on understanding, knowing, and their
relation encompassing the following four areas of focus: (a) a
growing distinction between understanding and knowing (Iran-
Nejad & Stewart 2010b; 2011), (b) two different kinds of under-
standing, (c) two different kinds of knowing, and, overall, (d)
what has emerged to be two distinguishable realms of biofunc-
tional understanding and biofunctional cognition (Iran-Nejad &
Gregg 2011). For example, there is convincing intuitive, observa-
tional, and scientiﬁc evidence to suggest that understanding may
very well be the special function of the nervous system, just as
breathing is the special function of the respiratory system (Iran-
Nejad & Stewart 2010a). This implies that immediate and effort-
less biofunctional understanding may be contrasted with psycho-
logical understanding or the understanding that may result from
effortful mental reﬂection (Iran-Nejad 2000; Iran-Nejad &
Gregg 2001; Prawat 2000). Similarly, biofunctional science
makes a similar kind of distinction between two types of
knowing, namely, (a) personal biofunctional knowing (i.e., bio-
functional cognition), and (b) social knowing or the knowing
that results from information exchange with other people (Iran-
Nejad & Stewart 2010a). Speciﬁcally, biofunctional cognition is
the special function, sculpted by evolution, by which biology pro-
duces knowledge effortlessly out of the immediate ground of bio-
functional understanding in the form of ﬁrst-person revelations,
insights, or clicks of understanding (Iran-Nejad 1978; 1990;
2000; Iran-Nejad & Gregg 2011; Stewart et al. 2008). Social cog-
nition, then, occurs in the global coherence context provided by
the ground of biofunctional understanding (Iran-Nejad 1994).
It is possible, we believe, to demonstrate that the target article’s
“puzzle of the missing contract” is a special case of biofunctional
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science’s “paradox of the missing function” ﬁrst discovered, to our
knowledge, in the 1970s and reﬁned in our work during the
decades since (Prawat 2000; Rosch 2000). According to the
target article, humans possess inordinately stable intuitions
about the existence of a tacit contract that commits them to
behave morally – for example, to help those in need and desire
punishment for those in guilt. Paradoxically, people also know
that there exists (within the sphere and limits of their biofunc-
tional cognition) no moral contract that they have signed or to
which they have agreed by choice or otherwise. The authors
argue, ingeniously, that the puzzle of the missing contract is ana-
logous to the puzzle of the missing designer; and they suggest that
the answer to both puzzles is evolution. We agree, and add that
the puzzle of the missing contract is a special case of the
paradox of the missing function, the answer to which is, by evol-
utionary design, biofunctional understanding, which is itself the
special function of the nervous system and the (currently
missing) link in the realm of biofunctional cognition. Therefore,
it follows that the answer to the puzzle of the missing contract is
also biofunctional understanding.
The striking similarity between the paradox of the missing func-
tion and the puzzle of the missing contract may be explained as
follows (see, e.g., Iran-Nejad 2000; Prawat 2000). People seem
to report fact-like (or self-evident) intuitions acknowledging an
internal capability for understanding the world and the people
around them. This is analogous to the selective mutualistic
pressure to be fair or to help, for example, a fellow human
being in need in order to be a fellow human being in deed. Para-
doxically, people also report that similar intuitions tell them that
they know nothing else about this internal capability (or missing
function) and how it might work. For example, they know they
do not have to choose to understand someone else (the choice
is already made for them by the function missing in biofunctional
cognition), and, if they did have to make the choice, they would
hardly know enough about the missing function to make it
work, certainly not by their own volition. This, we believe, is the
same as being compelled (freely) to help someone without
having already signed a (marriage) contract to compel one to
the selective desire or the behavior of helping. For example,
people strongly agree that discovering new ideas causes excite-
ment in them, but they seem to be equally willing to acknowledge
that they have no clues about where those ideas or the related
excitement come from (Iran-Nejad & Chissom 1992).
In closing, the paradox of the missing function leads to some
immediate questions beyond the target article’s puzzle of the
missing contract. Intuitive, observational, and scientiﬁc evidence
is uncanny in the direction of some natural function – some func-
tion more than a human-drawn contract, something systemic not
yet discovered by humans, something that is artiﬁcially unmanu-
factured up to this day – but puts selective pressure on people
to want to engage in mutualistic fairness. Is this function similar
enough to be included in biofunctional understanding and still
be different from understanding in the biofunctional cognition
sense of the term?
Your theory of the evolution of morality
depends upon your theory of morality
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000830
David Kirkby,a Wolfram Hinzen,a and John Mikhailb
aDepartment of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham DH1 3HN, United





Abstract: Baumard et al. attribute to humans a sense of fairness.
However, the properties of this sense are so underspeciﬁed that the
evolutionary account offered is not well-motivated. We contrast this with
the framework of Universal Moral Grammar, which has sought a
descriptively adequate account of the structure of the moral domain as a
precondition for understanding the evolution of morality.
According to Baumard et al., cooperative behaviour is often
impartial and fair. In particular, it exhibits a “common logic” of
proportionality. This is most extensively discussed in relation to
economic games. The authors argue that the behaviour elicited
by such games is neither selﬁsh nor altruistic, but governed by
fairness. The initial suggestion is that the fair distribution of
resources is proportional to the participants’ contribution,
where contribution is a relatively quantiﬁable function of effort
and talent. However, this notion of contribution is replaced
with that of “entitlement” or “right.” Dictators will give money
to the extent that the recipient is deemed to be entitled to it.
For example, children may exhibit miserly behaviour in econ-
omic games because they see themselves as fully entitled to
whatever resource they are given. Similarly, cross-cultural varia-
bility in dictator allocation is attributed to different ways of
understanding the respective rights or entitlements of the
agent and recipient.
We are convinced by Baumard et al.’s basic account of the par-
ticipants’ behaviour; our concern is that nothing signiﬁcant about
fairness follows from this. Crucially, since what people consider
to be a right or entitlement can vary (no principled limit or
restriction on what can fall under this category is offered), the
claim that a fair distribution will be proportional to the rights
of participants is empty. It has no real predictive force since in
any given scenario subjects can take radically different views of
the rights in question. Of course, it may well be correct to say
that what a particular person deems fair will be proportional to
what rights she accords to relevant persons. However, since
the mere idea of a right or entitlement implies that certain
responses are fair or morally ﬁtting, this sounds more like a
virtual truism than a claim of any empirical signiﬁcance. This is
the core of our worry: that, far from being a surprising fact
about human cooperation, the logic of proportionality turns out
to be very meagre indeed, possibly deriving simply from the
idea of fairness. It hardly seems like a problem to which an
evolved sense of fairness is an adequate and illuminating
solution.
Consequently, the existence of impartial proportionality does
not appear to be a sufﬁcient reason to postulate an evolved
sense of fairness. Because it cannot explain or predict the behav-
iour that most people consider to be fair in particular circum-
stances, it fails the test of descriptive adequacy. Moreover, this
account leaves open the possibility that people simply have differ-
ent, culturally determined, and perhaps even mutually incompati-
ble senses of fairness. In this case, there would be nothing much to
say about how the mechanism for acquiring a sense of fairness
evolved.
One way to circumvent this conclusion would be to show that
the domain of fairness, manifest not only in peoples’ behaviour
but also in their considered moral judgements, is inherently struc-
tured and governed by non-trivial, substantive principles, the
acquisition of which cannot be easily explained by appealing to
individual experience. It is the search for such principles, the chal-
lenge of descriptive adequacy in the moral domain, which has
underpinned the framework of Universal Moral Grammar. One
basic insight is that human moral intuitions extend well beyond
what can be derived from a mere proportionality principle or
other similar formal principles of moral judgement, insofar as
there appear to be signiﬁcant generalisations about rights,
duties, fairness, and morally acceptable conduct that these prin-
ciples cannot predict. For example, most natural human moral
systems appear to be deontic in their basic structure and to
depend on distinctions such as act versus omission, mistake of
norm versus mistake of fact, and intended versus foreseen
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effects, which appear to emerge early and reliably in child moral
development (Mikhail 2011). None of this is to deny the existence
of substantial cross-cultural variation, only to suggest that this vari-
ation may be sharply limited. It is this kind of principled limitation
to the domain – something hostage to further empirical inquiry –
which can justify postulating an evolved sense of morality. Only
in this context does it seem appropriate to ask the “ultimate how
question”: How did morality evolve in the species, and what selec-
tive forces or other causes were responsible for this evolution?
Prioritising a structural account of the moral domain in this way
would mirror the way inquiry has unfolded in the linguistic domain,
where decades of research on the structural richness of languages
aiming at descriptive adequacy have preceded the current claim
that Universal Grammar “primarily constrains the ‘language of
thought’” (Chomsky 2007, p. 22; cf. Hinzen, in press; Kirkby &
Mikhail, in preparation). This claim now also feeds into and
constrains evolutionary theorizing in unforeseen ways, which
presuppose 50 years of descriptive work in linguistic theory. It
seems doubtful that research into the moral sense can bypass this
stage.
You can’t have it both ways: What is the
relation between morality and fairness?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000908
Edouard Macherya and Stephen Stichb
aDepartment of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh,




Abstract: Baumard and colleagues put forward a new hypothesis about
the nature and evolution of fairness. In this commentary, we discuss the
relation between morality and their views about fairness.
Baumard et al. put forward a threefold hypothesis about fairness:
1. Fairness: People’s social behavior is often guided by con-
siderations of fairness.
2. Contractualism: People ﬁnd fair any outcome or action that
they would agree upon if they were to enter into a contract with
others.
3. Mutualism: Fairness evolved because fair individuals were
more likely to be recruited in ﬁtness-enhancing cooperative
ventures.
In this commentary, we overlook the merits and shortcomings
of this hypothesis, and focus instead on the curious way it is
described throughout the target article: Instead of referring to
the nature and evolution of fairness, Baumard and colleagues
refer to the nature and evolution of morality. A casual reader
could easily come to believe that they propose a new theory
about morality, but this would be a mistake, for Baumard
et al. stipulate in their Note 2 that by “moral” they just mean
“fair”:
There is no generally agreed-upon deﬁnition of morality, and it may be
argued that morality does not necessarily imply fairness and may include
a greater variety of forms of interaction that nevertheless have relevant
commonalities (. . .). Here, we use morality in a sense that implies fair-
ness, on the assumption that such a sense picks out a set of phenomena
worthy of scientiﬁc inquiry, in particular from an evolutionary point of
view. (target article, Note 2, italics in original)
While Baumard and colleagues are free to use “moral” in any way
they want, we ﬁnd their terminological stipulation perplexing: If
by “moral” they really just mean “fair,” why don’t they just use
that word? What could be simpler than using “fair” and “fairness”
throughout their article?
But do Baumard et al. really just mean “fair” when they use
“moral”? We think not. Several claims made in the target
article are a matter of controversy only if they are understood
to be about morality, not just fairness. Consider Baumard
et al.’s claim that “[t]he evolution of morality is appropriately
approached within the wider framework of the evolution of
cooperation” (sect. 2.1.1, para. 4, our emphasis). So formulated,
this is a (somewhat) controversial claim, but who would deny that
the evolution of fairness is to be understood in the context of the
evolution of cooperation? In what other context could it be
understood?
So, the situation is this: Because Baumard et al. stipulate that
they mean “fair” when they use “moral,” they can counter the
charge that they ignore the complexity of morality; because they
refer to morality, some of their claims appear more provocative
than they really are.
On the other hand, Baumard et al. are certainly right that
there is little consensus among philosophers, psychologists,
anthropologists, and evolutionary biologists about what morality
consists in. In fact, our continuing ignorance of the proper deﬁ-
nition of morality is an egregious shortcoming of the recent lit-
erature about the nature and evolution of morality since
numerous provocative claims in this area cannot be assessed
until a consensus on the proper deﬁnition of morality is
reached. Consider, for instance, Haidt’s claim that “politically
liberal researchers” are “inappropriately narrowing the moral
domain to issues of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity/justice”
while “morality in most cultures (and for social conservatives
in Western cultures), is in fact much broader, including issues
of ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity”
(Haidt & Joseph 2007, p. 367). Haidt is not accusing liberal
moral psychologists of ignoring that people care about different
things and embrace different norms in different cultures; he is
accusing them of failing to see that these values and norms fall
in the moral domain, and to assess this criticism requires
knowing what really distinguishes the moral domain from
other domains.
One way to establish the proper deﬁnition of morality is to
determine how lay people in Western cultures and in other cul-
tures delineate the moral domain: Do Westerners distinguish
moral norms from other norms? If they do (as seems likely),
what distinguishes moral norms from other norms? Do people
in other cultures also draw this distinction? In collaboration with
colleagues, we have begun addressing these questions.
In our current work, we present participants with sentences
describing a norm in foreign cultures. For each sentence, partici-
pants are ﬁrst asked whether they think that people in their
culture should also comply with the norm described, and are
then asked whether they think that the judgment they just
made is a moral judgment. In effect, we ask people to decide
whether the concept MORAL is applicable to their own judgment.
By comparing the answers elicited by our 20 stimuli, we will be
able to identify which norms are treated similarly and which
norms are treated differently. Thus, we will be able to identify
what kinds of norms lay people distinguish – in particular
whether they distinguish moral from non-moral norms. We can
then examine whether demographic variables, including political
orientation, religious afﬁliation, and membership in different cul-
tures, inﬂuence the distinctions between norms drawn by lay
people.
This experimental approach to the deﬁnition of morality has the
potential to remedy the egregious shortcoming of the literature on
morality noted by Baumard and colleagues: the lack of consensus
about the proper deﬁnition of morality. Further, this experimental
approach could cast doubts on a common assumption in this lit-
erature (one that Baumard et al. seem to embrace): It is a live
possibility that some cultures do not distinguish moral from
non-moral norms and thus that the moral domain fails to be a
psychological universal whose evolution calls for explanation
(see also Machery & Mallon 2010).
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Biological evolution and behavioral evolution:
Two approaches to altruism
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000842
Howard Rachlin, Matthew L. Locey, and Vasiliy Saﬁn






Abstract: Altruism may be learned (behavioral evolution) in a way similar
to that proposed in the target article for its biological evolution. Altruism
(over social space) corresponds to self-control (over time). In both cases,
one must learn to ignore the rewards to a particular (person or moment)
and behave to maximize the rewards to a group (of people or moments).
The target article by Baumard et al., like almost all current research
and theory on how altruismdevelops fromoriginally selﬁshmotives,
treats the acquisition of altruism solely as an evolutionary process
occurring over the history of the species (biological evolution).
According to these theories, people are born with altruistic ten-
dencies or with the propensity to value fairness. However, if learn-
ing over a person’s lifetime (behavioral evolution) were analogous to
evolution over the history of the species (Baum 1994; Staddon &
Simmelhag 1971), selﬁsh people might learn to be altruistic by ana-
logous mechanisms. Behavioral evolution would act on groups (or
patterns) of an individual’s actions over time just as biological evol-
ution acts on groups of individuals over social space.
The relation of biological evolution of altruism to behavioral
evolution of altruism becomes clear if a person’s altruism is
thought of not in terms of any act alone, but rather in terms of
the act in the context of a pattern of altruistic acts extended over
time. Outside of such a pattern, an individual altruistic act might
be accidental or part of a pattern of calculated or manipulative
selﬁsh behavior. Only in the context of a consistent pattern of
altruistic behavior should an individual act be considered altruistic.
(The apparent one-shot games of laboratory experiments should
be seen in the context of the stream of everyday-life situations
that the games are intended to model.) Even though every individ-
ual act of altruism is by deﬁnition costly to the actor, an overall
altruistic pattern may be highly valuable (Rachlin 2002). What
we inherit through biological evolution would be the capacity to
highly value (and repeat) such patterns. This sort of situation – a
high-valued pattern consisting of individually low-valued or costly
acts – is exactly that of most self-control problems in everyday
life (Rachlin 2000). For example, most alcoholics prefer to be
sober, healthy, socially accepted, and to perform well at their
jobs rather than to be drunk all the time, unhealthy, socially
rejected, and perform poorly at their jobs. But, over the next
few minutes, they prefer to have a drink than to not have one.
If, over successive brief intervals, an alcoholic always does what
she prefers at the moment, she will always be drinking.
An individual altruistic act is by deﬁnition costly to the actor, yet
a pattern of altruistic acts may be highly valuable. The difﬁculty of
putting together a pattern of self-controlled acts is like the difﬁ-
culty of always following the golden rule. Indeed there is a signiﬁ-
cant (though small) correlation, across people, between the slopes
of delay discount functions (measures of self-control) and the
slopes of social discount functions (measures of altruism)
(Rachlin & Jones 2008). We are not saying that altruism is
merely a form of self-control. The reverse may well be the case.
It just seems to us that one evolutionary mechanism can explain
both types of situations.
What must be acquired for both altruism and self-control is the
ability to ignore the case-by-case (low) value of individual (altruis-
tic or self-controlled) acts and to string together a pattern of acts
which, if they were isolated, would not be performed. Such learn-
ing is not simple or easy. Cultural evolution within a society may
create institutions that place restrictions on adults as well as chil-
dren’s choices as a sort of scaffold or crutch to bring behavior into
line with valuable patterns. As we get older, we learn to string
together wider and wider patterns. These become “functionally
autonomous” not because they are simply repeated, not because
they are extrinsically reinforced (although they may be), but
because they are intrinsically reinforcing. We inherit their ten-
dency to be so. Learning to behave morally is like learning to
enjoy reading stories rather than jokes, or listening to symphonies
rather than tunes. Plato, in The Republic, said that music and gym-
nastics were the two most important components of a child’s edu-
cation. Perhaps his high esteem for both was due to their common
emphasis on temporal patterning.
Reduction of the range of possible partners in social groups by
expulsion of defectors, the target article’s proposed mechanism
underlying altruism, has a parallel in self-control – the reduction
of choice opportunities by means of pre-commitment; commit-
ment eliminates impulsive acts from an upcoming pattern of
acts. Recent experiments on self-control in our laboratory
(Locey & Rachlin, in press) show that people will pay to avoid
future “tempting” small immediate rewards, thereby committing
themselves to, and obtaining, a higher reward rate overall.
We have no criticism of the mutualism mechanism presented in
the target article (although the argument would have been clearer
if the role of group selection in the proposed evolutionary model
were discussed). But we do criticize the article’s tendency,
common in much modern evolutionary as well as cognitive psychol-
ogy, to reify and internalize behavioral patterns. In the target article,
the crucial second step in the evolution of morality is said to be: “the
selection of a disposition to be intrinsically motivated to be fair” (sect.
2.2.1, para. 12). But what is the difference between intrinsic motiv-
ation to be fair and a consistent pattern of fairness? If they were
different (a person with the requisite intrinsic motivation might
not have the requisite understanding of the needs and desires of
others and thus inadvertently act unfairly), then who would the
social group reject – the consistently fair person or the one with
the intrinsic motivation to be fair (whatever that might mean) but
who nevertheless sometimes or perhaps often acted unfairly?
Consistent cooperation may arise from rule following (which in
turn requires behavior that seems at the moment to be foolish or
costly). And, the tendency to follow a rule in such cases (rather than
make decisions based on momentary inclinations) may come in turn
from understanding one’s own limitations (i.e., from a history of
reinforcement for rule-following and punishment for case-by-case,
seat-of-the pants decision making). Such a learning model would
apply to moral rules as well as to personal rules of self-control.
Sense of fairness: Not by itself a moral sense
and not a foundation of a lot of morality
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000921
Nalini Ramlakhan and Andrew Brook
Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, Ottawa K1S 5B6, Canada.
nalinielisa.r@gmail.com andrew_brook@carleton.ca
www.carleton.ca/∼abrook
Abstract: Baumard et al. make a good case that a sense of fairness evolved
and that showing this requires reciprocity games with choice of partner.
However, they oversimplify both morality and the evolution of morality.
Where fairness is involved in morality, other things are, too, and fairness
is often not involved. In the evolution of morality, other things played a
role. Plus, the motive for being fair originally was self-interest, not
anything moral.
Baumard et al. make a good case that parts of our sense of fairness
are a product of natural selection, an evolutionarily successful
response to an environment in which individual human beings
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competed with others to be chosen. Their argument that how this
could have happened is not revealed by typical reciprocity games
in which the players do not control who they are playing with, is
also plausible. Games with partner choice are more like the
environment that selected for a sense of fairness. However, a
sense of fairness need not be a moral sense. The authors treat
this as a matter of how we choose to deﬁne the word “morality”
(see sect. 4, para. 4). We think that they inﬂate the role of fairness
in both morality and its evolutionary roots.
First, the motives for being fair originally had nothing to do with
doing what is right or good, and often still do not. Often we are fair
to avoid being exploited or to keep a partner. Originally, fairness
maximized self-beneﬁt. The marginal beneﬁt of their investment
[in fairness] was higher than the average beneﬁt they could
receive anywhere else (sect. 4, para. 1). This motive is pure self-
interest and has nothing to do with being moral. The target
article never clariﬁes how a moral motive, treating people fairly
as a good in itself, could have evolved out of being-fair-because-
it-pays.
Second, even where behaving morally requires fairness
(marking exams, for example) and the motive is right, morality
requires further things. An obligation to be fair must be recog-
nized as over-riding almost everything else, so that not meeting
the obligation justiﬁes signiﬁcant sanctions. Could fairness becom-
ing an obligation be a result of natural selection? The article does
not address the issue.
Third, fairness is never more than part of morality. For
example, prohibitions on inﬂicting harm without justiﬁcation are
at least as central to morality as an obligation to be fair. Even if
an evolutionary account of how we came to have harm norms
could be given, it would be quite different from any account
that would explain how an obligation to be fair evolved.
Fourth, a lot of morality does not involve fairness at all. Behav-
ing virtuously – being courageous, being true to oneself, and the
like – are part of many people’s morality, yet fairness plays no
role in them.
In short, Baumard et al. inﬂate the role of fairness in morality in
at least four ways. Their picture of the evolutionary roots of mor-
ality displays the same weakness, in at least three ways:
First, the growth of a good proportion of the content of current
morality was related to emotional reactions. As Nichols (2004)
argues, if we ﬁnd something disgusting, for example, we will be
disposed to ﬁnd it immoral, too. Why do many consider it
immoral to spit into a glass of water at the dinner table but not
into a paper handkerchief? It is at least plausible to say that the
ﬁrst action being disgusting to us is related to the difference.
Another example is purity norms, a feature of many systems of
morality. Purity norms are often related to reactions of disgust –
and, notoriously, fairness plays little or no role in how they are
applied. In short, emotions have played a role in the evolution
of morality, at least as large a role as fairness-because-it-pays.
Also, emotion would have been involved in fairness-because-it-
pays evolving into fairness-as-a-good-in-itself. If being cheated in
reciprocity games did not make people angry, would fairness have
become a good in itself? Not likely. With no anger, surely our
ancestors would simply have shrugged their shoulders and
moved on.
Second, moral judgments with regard to what we consider fair
are context-dependent, even apparently inconsistent, in a way that
the mutual advantages of fairness cannot explain. For example, it
is part of many people’s concept of fairness that individuals who
do not cooperate and contribute should not receive the same
share as individuals who do. However, our actual judgments
depend on the context. Think, for example, of the physically or
cognitively disabled. Almost no one holds that fairness requires
that we not distribute goods equally to them. How could fair-
ness-because-it-pays have evolved into this?
Third, thinking through exactly what fairness requires in such
situations is difﬁcult and calls for a sophisticated, domain-
general capacity for moral reasoning. Could such a capacity for
moral reasoning have evolved from people being fair because it
paid? It is not easy to see how. Yet moral reasoning is at the
heart of morality, so much so that it is a main interest of many
moral philosophers, Rawls (1971) being a famous example.
In short, fairness-because-it-pays could be at most part of the
evolutionary story for morality of any kind, and it is hard to see
how it could be even part of the evolutionary story about the
role of emotions or about norms of purity – or norms of virtue
or harm – evolving as they did. It is equally hard to see how fair-
ness-because-it-pays could have played a role in the evolution of
the context-sensitivity of our morality or of our capacity for
moral reasoning.
Finally, something that we have not mentioned, there is the
diversity of moral principles across cultures. It poses an additional
problem for Baumard et al. On their account, why would norms of
purity, harm, virtue, punishment, and the like take such divergent
forms from culture to culture?
To conclude: Fairness-because-it-pays can explain the origins of
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Abstract: Baumard et al. argue that partner choice leads to fairness and
mutualism, which then form the basis for morality. I comment that
mutualism takes us only so far, and I apply the theory of competitive
altruism in arguing how strategic investment in behaviours which make
one a desirable partner may drive moral conduct.
Baumard et al. argue that partner choice leads to fairness and
mutualism, and that these form the basis for morality. While I
very much agree with the focus on partner choice as a key
driving force, I believe that mutualism takes us only so far, and
that moral behaviour is better viewed in a signalling context.
Through competitive signalling, evolution may lead to individuals
displaying traits that are more generous than others, not just
acting in a way that is the equal of others. Strategic investment
in behaviours that beneﬁt others so that actors can be seen as
desirable partners may at least partly explain what we see as
moral behaviour.
The basis for my argument lies in the theory of “competitive
altruism” (Roberts 1998) or reputation-based partner choice.
Baumard et al. do refer to this work, and to the evidence for com-
petitive altruism. Indeed, the hypothesis that “individuals may
compete for the most altruistic partners and non-altruists may
become ostracized” (Roberts 1998, p.427) is very close to the
arguments they develop (with altruism here implying a short-
term cost, in common with usage in the term “reciprocal altruism”
and with usage in the ﬁelds of psychology and behavioural econ-
omics). However, I believe they miss a crucial distinction. A deﬁn-
ing feature of competitive altruism is that it explicitly envisages a
two-stage process, whereby individuals ﬁrst build up cooperative
reputations and then choose partners for further interactions.
The rationale is that if individuals beneﬁt by attracting a co-
operative partner for the second stage, then it may pay to
display generosity in the ﬁrst stage. This two-stage structure is
important because it means that generosity can go beyond mutu-
alism. This contrasts with Baumard et al.’s assumed structure in
which there are envisaged to be two-way exchanges with fair
outcomes.
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For any non-kin cooperation, there must be a correlation such
that cooperators receive more cooperation in return. In reciprocal
altruism, this relationship is supplied by discrimination such that
we only give to those who give to us (direct reciprocity) or to
others (indirect reciprocity). It is these types of matching relation-
ships on which Baumard et al. focus, but competitive altruism
goes beyond reciprocity. In contrast, giving in competitive altru-
ism can be unconditional.
Competitive altruism is based on three assumptions: (1) that
individuals differ in quality as potential partners; (2) that public
behaviour provides a reliable guide to another individual’s
future behaviour; and (3) that individuals pair up through
mutual partner choice. From these assumptions, the theory
infers that assortative partner choice will drive competition to
be seen as a desirable partner. The framework combines theoreti-
cal work on the correlation between generosity and choosiness
(Sherratt & Roberts 1998) with models of mutual partner
choice (Johnstone 1997). Honest signalling (Maynard Smith &
Harper 2003) and market effects (Noë & Hammerstein 1994)
may also play a role. Evidence now shows that a strategy of invest-
ing in a cooperative reputation can indeed reap rewards, in that
the highest contributors to a public goods game obtain the most
proﬁtable subsequent partnerships (Sylwester & Roberts 2010).
While competitive altruism is a theory of costly, cooperative be-
haviour, it has been developed in relation to morality (Van Vugt
et al. 2007). As Baumard et al. say, humans don’t just cooperate,
they have a sense that this is the right thing to do. This is what
lies behind our use of the term “moral altruism” (Van Vugt et al.
2007): we don’t just cooperate but reward altruists and punish
non-altruists. “Moralistic” punishment of defectors is itself a be-
haviour which contributes to reputation (Barclay 2006; Kurzban
et al. 2007). Like altruism itself, moral altruism is costly, and as
with other costly displays, sexual selection may well play a role
in driving the evolution of morality through partner choice for
traits that honestly indicate underlying quality (Miller 2007).
Indirect reciprocity has also been developed in the context
of morality, and indeed Alexander’s thesis on this (Alexander
1987) is notable by its absence from Baumard et al.’s discussion.
The “moral rules” (Sigmund 2012) which emerge from models
essentially specify how we should treat others. They specify who
is deserving of our cooperation, as opposed to how we ourselves
beneﬁt from cooperating. In consequence, questions remain
about when such rules will be evolutionarily stable, given the
tension between the need for discrimination rules (otherwise
defectors receive as much as cooperators) and what rules best
increase an actor’s own reputation (which in the case of image
scoring may be indiscriminate giving; Leimar & Hammerstein
2001; Milinski et al. 2001; Nowak & Sigmund 2005). Further-
more, there are questions about how well a theory based on scen-
arios in which donors never meet recipients again can be applied
to human societies based on group living (Roberts 2008).
An evolutionary explanation for morality must explain why
moral traits are favoured by selection. To some extent a rule of
doing unto others as one would do for oneself could be partly
explained by one’s own welfare being linked to that of others.
In other words, there may be an element of direct self-interest
due to the stake we have in others’ welfare (Roberts 2005).
However, conﬂicts of interest are widespread, so this can take
us only so far. Mutualism, as championed by Baumard et al.,
takes us further, and could form the basis for a sense of fairness.
However, being moral can go beyond mutualism and fairness and
may be more proﬁtably viewed as a display. As such, those who
behave in a more moral way may be reaping rewards through
being selected as desirable partners. It doesn’t have to be fair, pro-
vided they are making a strategic investment in future beneﬁts.
Consider charitable donations. These may be moral, but they
have more to do with signalling (Bereczkei et al. 2007; Lyle
et al. 2009) than fairness. As long as moral individuals are in
demand, moral conduct can pay –which is surely a hopeful
message.
Ego function of morality and developing
tensions that are “within”
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Abstract:We applaud Baumard et al.’s mutualistic account of morality but
detect circularity in their articulation of how morality emerged. Contra the
authors, we propose that mutualism might account for a sensitivity to
convention (the ways things are done within a group) rather than for a
sense of fairness. An ontogenetic perspective better captures the
complexity of what it means to be moral.
What does fairness mean and what is the meaning of being fair?
Baumard et al. explain the how and why of human morality
through an appeal to mutualism, the theory that social selection
led to a moral disposition for fair-minded behavior. We applaud
the work for its careful consideration of cross-cultural research
and its recognition that reputation, entitlement, and ownership
are important factors in individuals’ distributive acts. However,
it is questionable whether the essence of morality can be captured
by an evolutionary account, regardless of the degree of its simu-
lation ﬁtness.
The naturalistic account proposed by the authors equates fair-
ness to a “genuine moral sense” (sect. 2.2.1, para. 8) that is essen-
tially reduced to proportionally based resource distribution,
which itself appears to presuppose a “missing contract” (i.e.,
acting as if there is a pre-established agreement). Let us ﬁrst
say that it is hard here not to smell circularity since a contract,
whether implicit, explicit, or based on pretense (i.e., as if agree-
ment), does seem to presuppose some sense of fairness. Any
market in which reputation and partner choice would be relevant
does indeed presuppose the kinds of moral intuitions about fair-
ness that the authors aim to explain. So we are left with the ques-
tion of which comes ﬁrst and what might be the causal
connection.
In addition, and even if one overlooks the circularity problem,
this reduction does not do justice to the domain of morality that
is much more than fairness in resource distribution. Morality
encompasses also the basic issues of moral identity, the relation-
ship between moral judgment and action, perspective-taking, and
empathy, as well as potential intuitions about purity, hierarchy,
and harm (Haidt 2007). Therefore, the interchangeable use of
morality as fairness is too narrow. Most of what pertains to mor-
ality is in essence not exchangeable and, at least at ﬁrst glance,
cannot simply be derived from the market dynamic metaphor
proposed by the authors. As Prinz (2007) observes, the
“essence of morality” does not follow directly from its origins.
To account for the likely process by which humans became
moral does not account for what being moral actually means
and entails. The naturalist account still begs the question. So
how do we escape such limitations? As developmental psycholo-
gists, we propose that this can be done by looking at morality as it
unfolds in ontogeny.
In truth, to address the basic question raised by the target
article (“What makes humans moral beings?”) is to resolve the
problem of how one transcends mere conventionality. Indeed,
one could argue that mutualism does not either derive from, or
give rise to, morality. Instead, it might simply derive from, or
give rise to, a sense of convention. In this “conventionalist”
account, it is not morality proper that would be linked to mutual-
ism but conventionality or the sense, perception, and ultimately
submission of individuals to the recognition of collective ways of
being. The product of natural selection would be conformists
rather than moralists. In this account, moral values would derive
from conventions, and this is evident by looking at children in
their development.
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Abundant research shows that children are born ﬁrst conven-
tional and slowly develop to become autonomous moral agents
(see the studies done by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg).
What infants are born with is a sensitivity for how things appear
to be done in their social surroundings. Very early on, infants
detect patterns in the way people behave with one another and
react with surprise when these patterns are transgressed. For
example, young infants detect when a protagonist hinders rather
than helps another, or deﬁes expected physical dominance
(Hamlin et al. 2007; Thomsen et al. 2011). This, we would
argue, can all be derived from majority patterns of social inter-
actions, eventually becoming perceived norms that can be uncan-
nily transgressed. We would be hard pressed to equate such
responses with morality or fairness proper. To become moral,
such responses and implicit norms need to be re-described by
each child in his or her development.
As a case in point, in a series of experiments we showed that it
is only by 5 years that children adopt what we coined an “ethical”
or principled stance toward unfair others. They start inhibiting
their inclination to self-maximize resources, resist conforming
to a partner’s way of sharing, and engage in costly punishment,
what can be equated to strong reciprocity (Robbins & Rochat
2011). Prior to 5 years, children are relatively insensitive to pro-
portional distribution and do not seem to factor this in their
determinations about which acts are fair or nice (McCrink
et al. 2010, but see Hook & Cook [1979] for an early review).
Such ﬁndings, among many others, demonstrate that the
essence of morality is revealed in the development that is instan-
tiated by each child and made of complex tensions that are of
internal and external origins.
Furthermore, children become explicitly moral not only to
resolve conﬂicts of ownership and entitlements over resources,
but also – and one could argue primarily – to resolve internal
tensions between immediate gratiﬁcation or self-maximizing
greed, and to maintain one’s moral identity and reputation
that is painstakingly managed and projected to the outside
world. We want to insist that there is a fundamental ego func-
tion underlying morality that cannot be overlooked when think-
ing about the proximate mechanism of its emergence and
formation. Morality could as well arise from self-consciousness,
the need for internal consistency (self-regard, integrity, or moral
reconciliation and centrality; see Frimer & Walker 2008), and/or
the adoption of a particular perspective in moral space (Taylor
1989).
To conclude, universal and arguably unique to our species is the
fact that individuals work hard at constructing their own moral
identity. They may change values and develop new ones in ways
that vary within and between groups. These important dimensions
of morality tend to be blurred at the scale of evolution and popu-
lation selection and cannot be overlooked. Children in their devel-
opment reveal that much more complex mechanisms underlie
morality, and thereby illuminate the basic question of what
makes humans moral beings.
Non-mutualistic morality
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000866
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Abstract: Although mutually advantageous cooperative strategies might
be an apt account of some societies, other moral systems might be
needed among certain groups and contexts. In particular, in a duty-
based moral system, people do not behave morally with an expectation
for proportional reward, but rather, as a fulﬁllment of debt owed to
others. In such systems, mutualistic motivations are not necessarily a key
component of morality.
The system of mutualistic cooperation described in Baumard et al.
may be a convincing portrayal of many modern, mobile, and
largely individualistic societies. However, in describing the evol-
ution of morality in more traditional and hierarchically structured
cultural groups, a system that relies on equitable distribution of
rewards based on individual effort and investment seems less
plausible. Throughout the course of human history, societies
have often been structured hierarchically where those at the
bottom give considerably more to those on the top without
reaping the reward of their contribution. These kinds of societal
systems are often based on a shared sense of duty and obligation,
resulting in a culturally evolved norm of fairness which has very
little to do with mutual gain (Miller 1994; Moghaddam et al.
2000). Instead, a notion of fulﬁlling one’s role or position may
be an important motivator. A similar sense of duty can be
observed in cultural institutions today (e.g., military groups and
feudal societies). We propose that in such cultures, sacriﬁce, or
something akin to what the authorsmight call altruistic cooperation,
becomes a culturally held moral value (Sachdeva 2010).
Previous work has revealed systematic cultural differences in
the prevalence of duty-based moral codes which might embody
ideals of sacriﬁce versus rights-based moral codes where equality
and mutual reciprocation might be idealized. For example, collec-
tivistic cultures or those where the self is deﬁned interdepen-
dently (e.g., groups with low socioeconomic status [SES], East
Asians) are more likely to emphasize duties and obligations
(Oyserman et al. 2002). Duties in these contexts tend to be hier-
archical, deeply contextualized, and set in relations between
persons. They are also obligatory, making personal preferences
and motivations less meaningful. In these societal systems, the
sense of morality is not based in ideals of fairness and equality
but develops as the result of certain types of duties being
impressed onto individuals – and an accompanying sense of
responsibility (Shweder 1996).
One implication of a duty-based system is that give-and-take,
contrary to Baumard et al.’s suggestion, is not proportional.
Often, transactions transpire such that one side gives disproportio-
nately more to the other, usually more powerful, side (Moghaddam
et al. 2000). Feudal systems or other explicitly hierarchical social
systems are a good example of asymmetric exchange (Anderson
1974). Members of duty-based societies are also expected to
fulﬁll a wider range of moralized social obligations ranging from
the minor (e.g., giving a friend an aspirin) to the extreme (e.g.,
saving someone’s life). In one study, for example, Miller and
Bersoff (1992) showed that Indian participants, thought to hold
duty-based moral codes, believed it was morally obligatory to
deliver a friend’s wedding ring, even if it meant risking jail time
by stealing the necessary resources to do so. In all of these situ-
ations, the role of the individual is minimized and the maintenance
of societal norms and conventions is primary (Shweder et al. 1987).
It seems plausible, then, that the type of self-effacing behavior
observed in duty-based moral codes would acquire a moral nature.
Sacriﬁce, altruistic cooperation, or prosocial behavior performed
at great cost to the self would come to be seen as an unequivocal
moral good. To investigate cultural beliefs surrounding duties and
sacriﬁce, we coded over a hundred Indian and American folktales.
As a rich repository of cultural values, folktales and other similar
cultural products serve an important function of diffusing and
maintaining some level of homogeneity within a cultural group.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that folktales and fables were
an especially important medium of transferring a system of
duties through generations in Indian villages (O’Flaherty &
Derrett 1978). We found that duties or themes surrounding obli-
gations were more prevalent in Indian stories than in American
stories. But, more signiﬁcantly, the presence of duties in a story
was a signiﬁcant predictor of whether the story discussed acts of
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sacriﬁce or altruistic cooperation (Sachdeva 2010). The more a
story mentioned upholding one’s obligations, the more likely it
was that it also contained an act of self-sacriﬁce. This relationship
between duties and sacriﬁce was stronger in Indian folktales than
in American ones.
In ﬁeld studies, we have asked rural and urban Indians about
their ideas of sacriﬁce. We have consistently found that rural
Indians prefer sacriﬁce as a means to a prosocial outcome, even
when it comes at a disproportionately great cost to the self.
Urban Indians and Americans show no such preference. In one
scenario, rural Indian participants were willing to give up even
their lives to save a highly valued police commissioner, whereas
urban Indians and Americans would accept only a relatively
minor cost to themselves to save the commissioner’s life (Sach-
deva 2010). Urban Indians and American participants were sensi-
tive to the cost of a moral action, but rural participants were not.
In a second study, we asked participants to jointly evaluate two
prosocial outcomes (e.g., saving the life of an innocent child). The
scenarios were presented side by side as newspaper articles. The
only difference was that in one article, the child’s life was saved at
a great cost to the actor, whereas the other made no mention of
this. Again, rural Indian participants showed a preference for
sacriﬁcial acts and thought the actor who suffered was more prai-
seworthy. The other two groups did not differentiate between the
two actors. The urban Indian and American responses are consist-
ent with Baumard et al.’s perspective on mutual cooperation –
these groups are willing to give up something but expect some
type of social security in return. However, mutualism cannot
explain the consistent approval of self-sacriﬁce observed in
rural, agrarian communities in India.
We believe that morality in some societies is better represented
by relying on a system of duties. Although we discuss data from
one community, duty-based moral systems seem to be widespread
and might even be a precursor to a moral system based on rights.
We propose that mutualistic cooperation as described by
Baumard et al. matches a rights-based orientation more than it
does a duty-based one.
Not all mutualism is fair, and not all fairness
is mutualistic
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000878
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Abstract: The target article convincingly argues that mutualistic
cooperation is supported by partner choice. However, we will suggest
that mutualistic cooperation is not the basis of fairness; instead, fairness
is based on impartiality. In support of this view, we show that adults are
willing to destroy others’ resources to avoid inequality, a result predicted
by impartiality but not by mutualistic cooperation.
Jack Abramoff, one of the most notorious lobbyists in the last
decade, made millions of dollars by delivering huge proﬁts to
his clients at the expense of others and the public good (Stone
2006). Abramoff’s relationship with the legislators was a classic
example of mutualistic cooperation. He provided money to the
legislators and, in return, the legislators provided their votes on
key issues. This is precisely the sort of phenomenon for which
Baumard et al.’s theory offers an elegant explanation.
Yet, though the actions of the legislators certainly made them
effective partners in a mutualistic exchange, these actions would
not generally be regarded as paradigm examples of fairness. On
the contrary, in this case there is a direct conﬂict between the
aim of being a good partner and the aim of acting fairly. The
most fair thing to do in this situation would be to not show any pre-
ference for one’s own partner and simply to vote in a way that
advanced the public good.
Thus, we suggest that fairness is not reducible to mutualism.
Baumard and colleagues may be correct in their claim that the
best model of mutualistic cooperation involves partner choice,
but it would be a mistake to suppose that mutualistic cooperation
is itself sufﬁcient to explain intuitions about fairness. Instead, fair-
ness often acts in opposition to the discriminative generosity that
partner choice demands by asking individuals to treat others
impartially.
Although mutualistic cooperation and impartiality can be con-
gruent, they often make different behavioral prescriptions. In
repeated dyadic interactions, mutualistic cooperation and fairness
prescribe the same behavior. Reciprocity makes Bill both a good
mutualist and also impartial. However, things change once at least
three actors are involved. If Jack is overly generous to Bill in one
interaction, and Bill has resources to share with him and another
individual at a later date, then mutualistic cooperation and fairness
make different prescriptions. Mutualistic cooperation says Bill
should reciprocate the past generosity, giving more to Jack than
he does to other people. By contrast, impartiality says that Bill
should split the resources completely equally. To the extent that
people show such a preference for equality, their behavior
cannot be understood in terms of mutualism alone and must
also involve a concern for impartiality.
An especially striking example of people’s preference for equal-
ity arises in cases where people actually destroy resources to avoid
creating inequity (Blake & McAuliffe 2011; Dawes et al. 2007). In
an extreme display of this tendency toward destructive fairness,
Shaw and Olson (2012) presented 6- to 8-year-old children with
a choice between (a) giving a person an additional resource and
thereby introducing inequality or (b) simply throwing that
resource in the trash. The majority of participants chose to
throw the resource in the trash even when it was made clear to
them that the two recipients did not know each other and
would not know what the other received. This behavior shows a
strong concern with equality, but it is hard to see any way of
explaining it with models based on mutualism and partner
choice. If one were trying to develop a mutually beneﬁcial part-
nership with either of these individuals, then giving an additional
resource could improve this budding partnership.
To determine whether adults would exhibit similar tendencies,
we conducted a follow-up experiment. Forty participants (M =
37.5 years, SD = 10.2, 26 females) were assigned either to the
Equality Condition or the Inequality Condition. Participants in
the Equality Condition were told that two employees had each
received a $2/hour raise and were then asked what the company
should do with an additional $1/hour raise: (a) give it to one of
the two employees, or (b) give it to neither of them. Participants
in the Inequality Condition were told that one employee had
received a $3/hour raise, while the other had received a $2/hour
raise, and were asked the same question. All participants were
told that the employees did not know each other and would not
know about the other’s raise. In the Equality Condition, the
majority of participants (90%) chose not to give the dollar to
either employee, whereas in the Inequality Condition only a min-
ority of participants (10%) preferred this option, χ2 (1, N = 40)
=22.5, p < 0.001. These results suggest that adults, too, are
willing to destroy resources in the name of fairness; this would
not be expected under models of mutualistic cooperation. Mutua-
listic cooperation would predict that individuals should give an
extra beneﬁt to one of the employees, since doing so could
foster future cooperative interactions (Binmore 1998a) and
increase the employee’s work output (Fehr & Schmidt 1999). In
contrast, such destructive fairness is expected if fairness is
rooted in impartiality.
One open question is: Why would natural selection have
favored impartiality? The answer to this question may be rooted
in the dynamics of human alliances. The human tendency to
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form alliances nicely exempliﬁes the tension between favoritism
and impartiality. People rank their allies, but do not want others
to know that they rank their allies (DeScioli & Kurzban 2009).
One possibility is that people do not want to be explicit about
ranking others because they want to avoid negative reactions
from those who receive a low rank. This leads to a possible expla-
nation for why fairness may have evolved: as a way for people to
signal to others that they are impartial, and thereby avoid being
condemned by third parties for trying to demonstrate or initiate
alliances based on preferential sharing.
Abramoff and the legislators he inﬂuenced made a great deal of
money (based on mutualistic cooperation), but when their work
was revealed to the public, many of them paid a heavy price
(based on fairness). Although not normally reaching such
extremes, human social life often involves this delicate balance
between showing favoritism towards one’s partners and appearing
impartial to others. We suggest that neither of the two can simply
be reduced to the other.
Disentangling the sense of ownership from
the sense of fairness
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Abstract: Both evolutionary and developmental research indicate that
humans are adapted to respecting property rights, independently (and
possibly orthogonally) of considerations of fairness. We offer evidence
from psychological experiments suggesting that enforcing one’s rights
and respecting others’ possessions are basic cognitive mechanisms
automatically activated and grounded in humans’ sensory-motor system.
This may entail an independent motivation that is more profound than
considerations of fairness and impartiality.
Baumard et al. hypothesize that cooperative moves in the form of
transfer of money to other participants are often not forms of
altruistic giving but rather attempts to refrain from stealing
the money over which the others have legitimate claims.
Though we share with Baumard et al. the claim that people
take into account property rights when distributing monetary
resources, it is not clear whether this is in fact evidence that sub-
jects aim at a fair distribution motivated by a partner-selection
based morality.
Actually, respecting property rights may be an adaptation inde-
pendent from, and possibly orthogonal to, mutualistic morality.
Indeed, evolutionary and developmental work suggests that
humans (as many other animals) are equipped with a basic
sense of ownership that exploits a number of cues to establish
property rights over things. Sensitivity to these cues is an
evolved adaptation for mutual advantage, which, however, does
not need social selection to be explained (Maynard Smith &
Parker 1976). As far as low-value items are concerned, ownership
rights established by cues of ﬁrst possession and over the product
of one’s own labor can be explained in this way. In contrast, rights
over high-value resources that can be secured only through collab-
oration require the cultural evolution of some form of sharing
norms to be sustained (Gintis 2007). Developmental evidence
supports this view, too. Several studies show that infants have a
sense of ownership since their birth (Rochat 2011) and become
sensitive at property rights of others already at 3 years (Friedman
& Neary 2008; Kanngiesser et al. 2010; Rossano et al. 2011).
However, it is mainly due to the role of active teaching (especially
by their parents) that they learn to share with others from there on
(Rochat et al. 2009; Ross 1996). The ability to modulate one’s pos-
sessive behaviors is thus particularly important to favor the kind of
social harmony required in collaborative activities.
At the level of cognitive mechanisms, different studies indicate
that humans have a rather precocious sense of possession for
objects. Psychological experiments (e.g., Chen & Bargh 1999;
Freina et al. 2009) reveal that when presented with positive
words, participants tend to perform an approach movement, in
order to attract the objects they refer to; the opposite is true for
negative words. This advantage of the self for positive objects per-
sists even when participants are asked both to take an object for
themselves and to give a different one to others (Gianelli et al.
2011). This can obviously lead to competitive situations with
respect to objects’ possession (Gianelli et al., in press). These
studies suggest that humans have developed this basic tendency
to keep positive objects for themselves.
Beyond this very basic tendency to keep positive objects for
ourselves, a number of results suggest that an early sense of own-
ership develops as well. Recent experiments we performed (Scor-
olli et al. 2012) showed that the sense of ownership is a basic
mechanism, which is activated quite fast and automatically,
since it emerges even in tasks in which no reference to the
sense of ownership is made. We used the same context to evaluate
the relative weight of different cues in determining the sense of
ownership: physical proximity, discovery, and physical contact
with the same originally neutral objects. In different experiments,
participants were shown a virtual room with an object located on a
table. In one condition two actors were alone in the scene; in
another condition an external observer was present as well. The
external observer was introduced in order to verify whether the
sense of ownership would be modulated by the presence of a
third impartial person. Immediately after the virtual scene, par-
ticipants were presented with a sentence, referring to the owner-
ship of the object (e.g., “The girl owns the book”; “The book
belongs to the girl”). Their task consisted in evaluating whether
or not the sentences were sensible. Analysis of response times pro-
vided evidence of the development of a basic sense of ownership
based on object closeness in space (the object could be located
near to the protagonist or not), on discovery (the participant
would see the protagonist discovering the object), and on
contact (the participant would see the protagonist touching an
object). Finally, Constable et al. (2011) demonstrated that the
automatic tendency to respond to objects’ affordances (i.e.,
action potentialities evoked by objects) is inhibited once we
know that it belongs to someone else. In a stimulus–response
compatibility task (see Tucker & Ellis 1998), the classic compat-
ibility effect was abolished when participants had to respond to
an object owned by the experimenter. This suggests that the
action system is automatically inhibited and blind to the potential
for action toward another person’s possession. Taken together,
these studies provide initial evidence that a fast, possibly auto-
matic, embodied mechanism is at the basis of the development
of the early sense of ownership.
It would be really difﬁcult to explain these results by starting
from the idea that the respect of property rights is motivated
mainly by a biologically evolved sense of fairness. However, it is
possible that the existence of a basic sense of ownership, as that
for which we provide evidence, complements the inﬂuence of a
socially developed sense of fairness. We propose that these two
different mechanisms – the basic sense of ownership and the
evolved sense of fairness – differ along various dimensions: in cog-
nitive control (i.e., the ﬁrst mechanism is automatic while the
second is controlled); in time course (i.e., the ﬁrst is rather preco-
cious while the second occurs later); and in penetrability (i.e., the
second can be more easily modulated by social and cultural
context). So far, the results of our studies suggest that an early acti-
vation of the sense of ownership is based on different factors and is
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partly grounded in our sensorimotor experience. It is plausible
that the tendency to keep all good things for ourselves and the
acknowledgment of property rights co-occur, and that the compe-
tition between these two contrasting basic tendencies is won dif-
ferently, depending on the context. In the same vein, Neary
(2011) has suggested that children learn the appropriate contexts
where to override possessive inclinations in favor of sharing with
others. Thus, this ability of sharing could develop later, in contrast
with the more primitive need for rigid possessive behaviors.
Further experiments and studies are needed to investigate the
interplay between the primitive tendency to keep good things
for ourselves, the early sense of ownership, and the probably
later socially developed sense of fairness.
From partner choice to equity – and beyond?
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Abstract: Baumard et al. provide an intriguing model where morality
emerges from the dynamics of partner choice in mutualistic interactions.
I discuss evidence from human and nonhuman primates that supports
the overall approach, but highlights a gap in explaining the human
speciﬁcity of moral cognition. I suggest that an essential characteristic of
human fairness is to override concerns about merit in favor of
promoting the welfare in others who are needy.
A major claim underpinning the approach taken by Baumard and
colleagues is that partner choice (in which social agents choose
mutualistic partners and advertise their cooperativeness) plays a
critical role in the emergence of human cooperation and fairness.
In particular, partner choice may be more important than partner
control (in which agents decide whether to cooperate or defect in
a dyadic situation). These claims mainly derive from data with
human adults. However, given that this moral sense is supposed
to be unique to our species, it is important to understand the evol-
utionary changes and ontogenetic origins of these behaviors, as
well.
In fact, evidence from both human children and other species
suggests that partner choice is a fundamental mechanism
shaping cooperation both across ontogeny and in other species.
In nonhuman primates, observational and experimental studies
provide abundant evidence that individuals engage in long-term
reciprocal relationships that result from seeking out other coop-
erators (Schino & Aureli 2010). For example, chimpanzees selec-
tively choose skillful over unskillful cooperators for a mutualistic
task (Melis et al. 2006) and choose a partner who had chosen
them previously over one who ignored them (Melis et al. 2008).
In contrast, evidence for reciprocal exchanges in which individuals
temporally modulate their cooperation within a dyad contingent
upon the partner’s prior behavior (such as tit-for-tat) is weak to
nonexistent (Hammerstein 2003). In human infants, a similar
pattern has emerged. In the ﬁrst few years of life, children
begin to differentiate between cooperators and defectors (Kuhl-
meier et al. 2003), show a preference for cooperators over defec-
tors (Hamlin et al. 2007), and tend to cooperate with cooperators
over defectors (Dunﬁeld & Kuhlmeier 2010). However, tem-
porally contingent reciprocity in a dyadic relationship seems to
emerge much later: Children do not begin to selectively decrease
or increase their giving in response to what they received from a
partner until 3.5 years of age (Warneken & Tomasello 2009a).
Together, these data suggest that both nonhuman and human
primates might be better equipped for partner choice than for
partner control. On the one hand, this seems to support the
claim by Baumard et al. that partner choice is an important
mechanism supporting cooperative activities more generally.
However, this also raises a major challenge to this model’s expla-
natory power in illuminating human cooperation and morality
more speciﬁcally. If nonhuman primates also engage in mutually
beneﬁcial interactions and seek out other good cooperators, why
does this not scale up to a “full-ﬂedged moral sense” (sect. 4,
para. 2) characterizing humans? Thus, while morality may be a
“consequence” of mutualistic cooperation that includes social
selection (see target article, sect. 2.1.1, para. 4), this seems unli-
kely to be the full story, given these comparative and developmen-
tal ﬁndings. In general, this suggests that some other factors are
necessary to explain human-like morality beyond mutualism and
partner choice.
What might account for the emergence of the moral systems
that we see in humans? I suggest that one relevant feature is
the coupling of fairness norms with concerns for other people’s
welfare. As Baumard et al. suggest, merit-based principles
(based on assessments of work contributions) might emerge
from the dynamics of selecting partners and divvying up the
resulting beneﬁt of mutualistic interactions. However, this does
not appear to account for distributive justice more broadly con-
strued. That is, moral considerations in the domain of resource
sharing are not restricted to merit alone, but also can be used to
improve the situation of disadvantaged individuals. This distinc-
tion is already important in the domain of mutually beneﬁcial
cooperative interactions that are the focus here. In addition,
they become crucial in situations in which individuals must
decide whether to share resources with unrelated individuals
who are prevented from engaging in such mutualistic interactions
in the ﬁrst place. Prescriptive theories of justice try to account for
this situation. For example, Rawls’ difference principle suggests
that not everything should be left to talent and effort: inequalities
are permissible if they accrue beneﬁt to the disadvantaged (Rawls
1971). Moreover, descriptive models of adult behavior suggest that
people’s reasoning and behavior do not only concern equitable dis-
tributions, but also involve adjustments based upon others need
(Deutsch 1975). Such processes where fair distributions account
for other’s needs, moreover, are often fueled by empathy and sym-
pathy with the welfare of others (Hoffman 2000). Along these
lines, developmental studies indicate that children progress
through a developmental sequence reﬂecting the integration of
these different principles: Younger children focus on strict equality
and individual work contributions, but older children make need-
based adjustments (Damon 1977). In conclusion, it seems that the
essence of genuinely moral behavior in humans is to partly over-
ride mutualistic strategism, which poses a challenge for the
current model to integrate this characteristic of human behavior.
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Abstract: Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the
evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the
evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We
then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and
workings of fairness. In a ﬁnal section, we discuss the degree to
which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms
that are commonly considered moral even though they are
distinct from fairness.
R1. Introduction
The most important and inﬂuential contributions to the
study of human cooperation and morality in the past
thirty years have focused on group selection and altruistic
morality. Formal models, experimental economic games
studies, and cross-cultural investigations have remarkably
enriched the evolutionary study of morality. We are grate-
ful for these contributions, and we share the sense of intel-
lectual challenge and excitement they have created. Our
theoretical approach is, however, a different one. As we
explained in the target article, we see the evolution of mor-
ality as resulting from the individual-level selection of a
moral sense of fairness enhancing one’s chances of doing
well in the competition to be chosen as a partner in coop-
erative ventures. Our article focused on the presentation
and defense of this mutualistic view and on arguing that
it has deep and wide relevance to the study of morality.
In particular, we argued that the mutualistic approach pro-
vides an attractive interpretation of results of economic
games experiments that have been heralded as strong evi-
dence for group selection, and moreover that it explains
some subtle features of these results that have been rela-
tively ignored.
We chose to focus on economic games because they are
the methodology most used by evolutionary-minded behav-
ioral scientists and they provide a way to study a range of
moral behaviors (distributive justice, mutual aid, retributive
justice) with the exact same methodology (thus avoiding the
risk of cherry-picking the convenient peculiar experiment
ﬁtting with one’s prediction). However, we agree with
Clark & Boothby, Binmore, Dunﬁeld & Kuhlmeier,
and Graham that economic games, whatever their
merits, have serious limitations in the study of morality.
In the target article, for reasons of space, we could not
do more than allude to a variety of other sources of
evidence: economic anthropology, legal anthropology, be-
havioral economics (other than economic games), econo-
metrics, experimental psychology, and developmental
psychology (but see Baumard [2010a] for a comprehensive
review). Other ﬁelds, such as social psychology and in par-
ticular equity theory –we agree with Binmore – are also of
great relevance.
Our discussion of the economic games literature was not
meant to offer a knockdown argument for the mutualistic
approach and against the group selection altruistic
approach (which need not be seen as mutually exclusive).
Rather, it was meant to present an array of challenges to
uncritical reliance on group selection in explaining human
morality by highlighting, on many speciﬁc issues, alterna-
tive mutualistic explanations. These speciﬁc challenges
were not taken up in the commentaries, and, in conse-
quence, our response mostly focuses on the internal chal-
lenges of the mutualistic approach rather than on a
comparison with its altruistic counterpart.
The ﬁrst part of this response, section R2, is focused on
the evolutionary level and on issues raised by our account
of the evolution morality in terms of partner-choice mutu-
alism. The second part, section R3, is focused on the cog-
nitive level and on the characterization and workings of
fairness. In the third part, section R4, we discuss the
extent to which our fairness-based approach to morality
extends to norms that are commonly considered moral
even though they are distinct from fairness.1 We are very
grateful to all our commentators for thoughtful, insightful,
and constructive comments!
R2. Partner choice
The core notion of the theory put forward in the target
article is that of partner choice, a notion which is perhaps
best understood when contrasted to that of partner
control. In partner-control models, such as the iterated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, individuals cannot choose their partners:
They are stuck with a given partner, and they can only
either cooperate with this partner or defect, thereby losing
all the beneﬁts of the interaction. We argued that fairness
is unlikely to have evolved in such a constrained environ-
ment since the least powerful partner in the interaction
has no choice but to accept offers, even the most unfair
ones. By contrast, in partner-choice models, individuals
can choose their partners. The least powerful partner there-
fore always has the option to refuse being exploited and to
look for more generous partners. In the end, since individ-
uals have equal outside options, the evolutionary stable strat-
egy is to share the beneﬁts of cooperation impartially.
R2.1. Can partner control be as effective as partner
choice?
DeScioli mentions several ways in which even splits might
occur in speciﬁc games and under speciﬁc conditions
without outside options. However, he does not show how
these special cases might realistically generalize to the evol-
ution of fairness. True, the Nowak et al. (2000) article,
mentioned by DeScioli in his commentary, claims to
show that reputation does allow the evolution of fairness
in the absence of partner choice. André and Baumard
(2011b) argued, however, that this is an artifactual conse-
quence of a restriction of parameter space without which
Nowak et al.’s model could not yield fairness. DeScioli
suggests that the well-known Nash Bargaining Solution
provides another possible explanation of fairness (a solution
explored by Gauthier 1986). However, while it does indeed
sometimes correspond to fairness, the Nash Bargaining
Solution is not a strategic equilibrium of “standard” (i.e.,
non-cooperative) game theory; it is chosen rather on the
basis of a priori axioms (including Pareto optimality).
Hence, it cannot be seen as a way to explain the existence
of fairness in nature.
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DeScioli also mentions Thomas Schelling’s well-known
idea of salient coordination points. Could fairness, as
DeScioli suggests, simply emerge as such a salient point in
a game of coordination? Equality can be a salient point for
simple cognitive reasons (a pair of equal quantities stands
out among various pairs of unequal quantities). Not all fair
distributions, however, are equal; when contributions are
unequal, so are fair distributions. Then, either the relevant
salient point is equality, and unequal fair distributions are
not explained in terms of salient points; or else fair splits
are always salient – but, if so, presumably they are salient
because they are fair and people care for fairness, rather
than the other way around. This, of course, leaves wholly
unexplained the existence, evolution, and role of fairness.
It is partner choice, we have argued, that explains why
humans tend to coordinate on fair splits, leaving open the
possibility that saliency plays a role in explaining the how.
R2.2. Is partner choice as unconstrained as partner
control?
The multiplicity of equilibria (also known as the folk model)
stems from the fact that there are many different ways to
cooperate that are more proﬁtable to both partners than
not cooperating at all (see, e.g., Aumann & Shapley
1974). Classic mutualistic models, in the form of partner-
control models, typically fail to determine a single distri-
bution of the beneﬁts of cooperation, let alone a fair one.
Alvard, Binmore, and Fessler & Holbrook argue that
our approach suffers from the same weakness. A proper
discussion would require a formal development, but it is
worth informally explaining here why we disagree.
In contrast to partner-control models, partner-choice
models are characterized by individuals having richer
outside options than just forsaking cooperation altogether.
This strongly restricts the range of distributions that can be
mutually agreeable. Fewer outcomes are acceptable when
one can also cooperate elsewhere, differently, than when
one is trapped with a single partner. More precisely, the
richness of outside options in partner-choice models has
two relevant effects: First, it has an effect on the fairness
of cooperation (the distribution of the beneﬁts). Second,
it has an effect on the amount of cooperation (the
amount of beneﬁt). The ﬁrst is the only one we have for-
malized so far. If two individuals involved in an interaction
could each play the other’s role with third parties, this pre-
vents biased outcomes and secures fairness (André &
Baumard 2011b).
The effect of partner choice on the amount of cooperation
is less straightforward. If everyone in a population
cooperates exactly at a given intensity h, whatever may be
the value of h, partner choice cannot move the population
away from this state. If, for instance, everyone in a popu-
lation either hunts stag or hunts rabbit, it will be an equili-
brium in both cases, even with partner choice. Partner
choice therefore does not automatically eliminate the
diversity of equilibria with regard to the amount of
cooperation. In reality, however, populations are never
entirely monomorphic for a single level of cooperation (as
exempliﬁed by the experiments of Gill, Packer, & van
Bavel [Gill et al.]). There are always natural sources of
variations such that it pays to compare potential partners
and to choose the most cooperative, yielding a selective
pressure in favor of ever more cooperative individuals.
So, we would argue, both the fairness and the amount
of cooperation are constrained in partner-choice models
in a way in which they are not in partner-control models.
It is worth noting here – and this is the point at which to
answer Roberts’ important remarks – that the second con-
sequence of partner choice (its effect on the amount of
cooperation) is historically the ﬁrst to have been considered
by evolutionary biologists, in particular in Roberts’ own
seminal work (Roberts 1998; see also, more recently,
Aktipis 2004; 2011; McNamara et al. 2008; for discussions
on the importance of variability in social behavior, see
McNamara & Leimar 2010). We want to underscore the
key role that these predecessors have played in helping
the scientiﬁc community, including ourselves, understand
the importance of partner choice for cooperation. Our
own contribution is original as compared to these earlier
models in that we are primarily interested in the ﬁrst effect
of partner choice – its effect on the fairness of cooperative
interactions rather than on the amount of cooperation.
R2.3. Does fairness boil down to bargaining power?
We see partner choice, and hence market-like phenom-
ena, as the key factor in the evolution of human fairness.
However, DeScioli is right to underscore the relation-
ship that our model bears with bargaining theory. Even
more than with bargaining theory in general, our
approach to fairness is speciﬁcally related to the study
of bargaining in markets, as pioneered by Rubinstein
(1982).
This, however, leads to an apparent paradox, well high-
lighted by DeScioli and by Guala and also suggested by
Fessler & Holbrook. If fairness is a consequence of bar-
gaining with outside options, then fairness should be
nothing but a translation into moral norms of the relative
bargaining power of individuals, or, even worse, fairness
should simply be a form of bargaining. DeScioli and
Guala rightly remark that this would run counter to our
current understanding of fairness.
If fairness is a direct translation of bargaining power,
then why, for instance, should we be outraged by hotels
in New York increasing their prices after the 9/11
attacks? Why do we ﬁnd it unfair to raise the price of
snow shovels after a snowstorm? Why, more generally, do
we often ﬁnd free-market outcomes unfair? Why is our
moral compass, in other words, more stable and constant
than the caprices and versatility of bargaining power? The
answer is that individuals, in their social interactions, look
for good partners, and good partners do not behave in
accordance with their strategic options at each and every
instant. Let us explain.
In essence, the problem of cheating and the problem of
partiality are similar. Evolutionary approaches have focused
on the problem of cheating, but cheating can be described
as an extreme case of partiality consisting in taking the
beneﬁts without paying any cost. Cheating and partiality
are versions of the same problem of commitment and
have the same solution, namely, reputation. Just as it is
not advantageous for an individual to choose a partner
who is likely to cheat when in a position to do so (e.g.,
when his partner will have no other option but to accept
his decision, as in the prisoner’s dilemma), it is not advan-
tageous to choose a partner who is likely to be partial
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when he is in a position to be so (i.e., when his partner will
have no better option than to accept his offer).
The reason why individuals do not cheat on prices in a
focal interaction, for instance, when they sell snow
shovels after a snowstorm (Kahneman et al. 1986a), is
because their reputation depends on their being com-
mitted to being reliably fair over time, rather than each
time getting the best they are in a position to bargain for.
In the long-term interaction between customers and the
hardware storekeeper, there will be circumstances in
which either the customers (after a dry winter) or the store-
keeper (after a snowstorm) would be in a position to extract
a bigger share of the beneﬁts, but doing so would precisely
compromise the mutual commitment to fairness that is
beneﬁcial to both. The “fair” price is thus the price that cor-
responds not to each and every local bargaining situation,
but to the more long-term relationships that renders the
interaction between customers and shopkeeper mutually
advantageous. Of course, this price takes into account the
costs and beneﬁts of each partner (the production cost of
snow shovels, the transportation costs, etc.), but these
costs and beneﬁts are assessed with long-term consider-
ations in mind.
R2.4. On the relationship between partner choice and
group selection
In the three preceding subsections, we have answered
objections to our claim that, among mutualistic approaches,
partner-choice models provide a better explanation of
morality than do partner-control models. There are, of
course, altogether different approaches to morality. In par-
ticular, as we noted, a well-developed and highly inﬂuential
approach (or family of approaches) sees the evolution of
altruism through group selection as key to explaining mor-
ality. Several commentators (Atran; Binsmore; Rachlin,
Locey, & Saﬁn [Rachlin et al.]; and Gintis implicitly)
suggest that group selection may provide a better account
of at least some aspects of morality than does the mutualis-
tic approach.
Herbert Gintis is, together with Christopher Boehm,
Sam Bowles, Rob Boyd, Ernst Fehr, Joe Henrich, and
Pete Richerson, one of the developers of the most compre-
hensive and inﬂuential group selection (or multi-level
selection) approach to human cooperation, now called the
Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints (BPC) model (see
references in Gintis’s commentary), an approach that has
greatly contributed to making the ﬁeld an intellectually
exciting one. We were therefore both gratiﬁed and sur-
prised to see Gintis stating that “we are in broad agree-
ment” and that “all of the human behaviors afﬁrmed by
[us] ﬁt nicely into the BPC model, and are in no way in con-
ﬂict with [their] stress on altruistic cooperation and punish-
ment.” After all, we argue that partner-choice mutualism
evolved on the basis of individual-level selection and give
no role in our approach to group selection. We claim
that, among humans, partner choice created selective
pressure for the evolution of a moral sense of fairness.
We argue that this moral sense provides a better expla-
nation of evidence from economic games than does an
altruistic disposition resulting from group selection. It is
true that multi-level selection has no problem giving a rela-
tively minor role in its global picture of cooperation to the
individual-level selection of mutualistic disposition. The
stress on altruistic cooperation and punishment that
Gintis mentions implies, however, giving the main role in
the evolution of cooperation and morality to group-level
selection, and, on this, we beg to disagree.
What then is the relationship of our approach to group
selection? There are two ways to see this relationship.
The two approaches may be complementary (as Alvard
argues and Rachlin et al. suggest), or they could be
alternatives (as Binmore suggests). Let us consider these
two possibilities in turn.
Is group selection needed as a complement to partner
choice? Are we, in fact, proposing a mere amendment to
a general paradigm in which group selection would
remain a central component? Rachlin et al. implicitly
raise this question in their commentary. Alvard explicitly
argues that group selection does remain indispensable to
explain human cooperation, even with partner choice.
Here, we disagree. In our framework, group selection is
not necessary to explain the existence of human morality.
Indeed, group selection, at least in its latest form (see
Boyd et al. [2011] for a recent review), is presented as a
mechanism to select among the multiple equilibria entailed
by the folk theorem. As we have argued in section R2.2
above, partner choice can select among equilibria just as
well.
Partner choice and group selection do therefore offer
alternative accounts of human cooperation (as Binmore
suggests). The two theories entail different evolutionary
processes and predict partly different patterns of coopera-
tive interaction. In principle, group selection should lead to
utilitarian forms of social behaviors, whereby individuals
behave so as to maximize the total welfare of their group.
In contrast, partner choice, as we have argued, leads to a
fair form of cooperation, because no one can accept an
outcome in which she gains less than what she could gain
with other partners. Therefore, each time there is a
tension between the utilitarian outcome (maximizing
global welfare) and the fair outcome, the two theories
make different predictions. As we have argued in the
target article, most empirical observations show that
humans prefer fair, not utilitarian, arrangements, thereby
contradicting the predictions derived from group selection,
and supporting the predictions derived from partner
choice.
R2.5. Morality among nonhuman animals
In their comments, Bshary & Raihani and Warneken
raise the important question of the species-speciﬁcity of
the sense of fairness. After all, partner choice occurs not
only among humans but also among many nonhuman
species.
As long as there are mutualistic interactions between
individuals, choosing and being chosen do partly determine
one’s reproductive success. This may be the case among
great apes where some (though not many) mutualistic
interactions seem to take place (Muller & Mitani 2005).
This could occur in mutualistic interactions between
species (i.e., the standard biological ecological sense of
“mutualism,” as Bshary & Raihani justly remind us),
such as in the cleaner ﬁsh–client ﬁsh mutualism (Bshary
& Schäffer 2002), or in the interaction between terrestrial
plants and their symbiotic fungi (see, e.g., Kiers et al.
2011).2 In principle, this could be the case in all species
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in which individuals cooperate to hunt or to raise young
(Burkart et al. 2009; Scheel & Packer 1991). In every
case, the distribution of beneﬁts of the interactions is
open to a conﬂict of interests that could be resolved
through partner choice.
What, then, is fundamentally different in the human
case? In Warneken’s words:
If nonhuman primates also engage in mutually beneﬁcial interactions
and seek out other good cooperators, why does this not scale up to a
“full-ﬂedged moral sense” (…) characterizing humans? … [T]his
suggests that some other factors are necessary to explain human-like
morality beyond mutualism and partner choice.
Note that what deﬁnes morality is not fairness as a
property of interactions, but that these interactions are
guided and evaluated on the basis of a sense of fairness,
a property of the social cognitive capacities of the individ-
uals interacting. Consider a species involved in just one
type of mutualistic interaction; say, the collective
hunting of one kind of prey. The distribution of the
beneﬁts of this activity may be determined by partner
choice and may result in a fair distribution. The
members of that species, however, don’t have to choose
their partners on the basis of fairness, but only on the
basis of their behavior in hunting and sharing these
prey. To be chosen, individuals must have in this
respect, and in this respect only, a disposition to behave
in a quite speciﬁc way that we, the external observers,
might judge to be fair, but that is sufﬁciently and more
economically deﬁned by its behavioral properties.
In contrast, humans have a wide, diverse, and quite open
range of forms of interaction that may yield mutual beneﬁts
and where choosing the right partner and being chosen
matter. In such conditions, effective partner choice
involves inferring general psychological dispositions from
a wide variety of evidence – not only observation of behav-
ior but also communicative interaction with potential part-
ners and communication with third parties about
candidates’ reputations. The general psychological disposi-
tion that is desirable in a potential partner is, we claim, a
disposition to act fairly across situations, as we discussed
in the target article. This then creates a social selective
pressure for the development of a true sense of fairness.
At present, and in the current state of our knowledge, we
believe that the much narrower and relatively ﬁxed range of
mutually beneﬁcial interactions occurring in nonhuman
species (see Tomasello & Moll [2010] for a discussion of
cooperation among great apes) does not result in the
social selection of a general and hence properly moral
sense of fairness. It is conceivable, however, that we
might be underestimating the richness of nonhuman
cooperation. For instance, the diversity and complexity of
mutual aid in dolphins is extremely impressive (see
Connor 2007; Connor & Norris 1982), leaving open the
possibility that this species might be endowed with the
ability to evaluate the fairness of their partners in a way
that could be similar to our own.
R3. The sense of fairness
Before discussing speciﬁc aspects of fairness, we must
correct three misunderstandings. Some earlier mutualistic
approaches, for instance Gauthier’s, could be understood
as portraying mutualists as rational maximizers of their
own interest. In an evolutionary perspective, however,
the distinction between the evolutionary level and the cog-
nitive level allows combining selﬁshness (at the evolution-
ary level) and genuine morality (at the psychological
level). We may not have been clear enough on this since
Shaw & Knobe have based their discussion on an under-
standing of mutualism as mere self-interested reciprocity,
whereas we understood it as fairness – and we stressed
the distinction in our article. Therefore, we do not see
their examples and interesting experimental evidence as
weighing against our approach, but rather, quite the oppo-
site. Ramlakhan & Brook similarly have based their dis-
cussion on the incorrect idea that self-interest may
motivate one to behave fairly, when what we discuss is
the evolution of an intuitive sense of, and preference for,
fairness that is genuinely moral. Finally, it is important to
distinguish between people’s moral intuitions and the
rationalizations and folk theories they build on these intui-
tions (Haidt 2001). Hence, while we agree with Machery
& Stich that it may well be the case that “some cultures
do not distinguish moral from non-moral norms,” we do
not agree that, if so, then “the moral domain fails to be a
psychological universal whose evolution calls for expla-
nation.” Moral intuitions and folk theories of morality are
two very different things.
R3.1. An evolved sense of fairness?
Several commentators express broad skepticism towards
the central role we give to evolution in our approach to
morality: Rochat & Robbins “smell circularity” in our
appeal to evolution; according to Ainslie, our “proposal
of an innate moral preference … just names the phenom-
enon, rather than supplying a proximate mechanism,” and
what we set out to do “can be accomplished … without
positing a specially evolved motive.” Still – to move to
issues that are more speciﬁc and more open to fruitful dis-
cussion – everyone agrees that there must be evolved abil-
ities without which humans would not be a moral species,
that there is a developmental story to be told that is
crucial to explaining individual and cultural differences,
and that the proximate mechanisms of morality must be
described and explained. On our part, we certainly do not
believe, contrary to what Rachlin et al. attribute to us,
that the acquisition of a moral sense is “solely as an evol-
utionary process occurring over the history of the
species.”What we do believe is that the individual develop-
ment of moral capacities – and the cultural evolution of
morality on which Rachlin et al. rightfully insist – is made
possible by a domain-speciﬁc adaptation, a biologically
evolved moral sense. Some of our critics, on the other
hand, think that the relevant evolved dispositions are not
speciﬁc to morality.
Guala writes, “Humans may have evolved a much more
general capacity to normativize behaviour.” And, according
to Rochat & Robbins, “The product of natural selection
would be conformists rather than moralists. In this
account, moral values would derive from conventions,
and this is evident by looking at children in their develop-
ment.” While we do agree that “infants are born with …
a sensitivity for how things appear to be done in their
social surroundings” (Rochat & Robbins), we miss an expla-
nation of why and in what sense the norms this sensitivity
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would help stabilize across generations should be moral
norms.
For Ainslie, the psychological basis of moral choice is a
more general ability to adopt personal rules so as to resist
the lure of short-term rewards and pursue more valuable
long-term interest, since, he writes, “The payoffs for
selﬁsh choices are almost always faster than the payoffs
for moral ones.” Similarly, Ainsworth & Baumeister
point out that “fairness impulses must compete in the
psyche against selﬁsh impulses” and argue that self-regu-
lation – that is, “the executive capacity to adjudicate
among competing motivations, especially in favor of socially
and culturally valued ones” –must play “a decisive role in
social cooperation.” Rachlin et al. also underscore the
role of self-control in morality. We agree that being fair
typically requires forsaking immediate gratiﬁcation, that a
sense of fairness does not by itself provide the ability to
do so, and that therefore, for morality to be possible at
all, there must indeed be an ability to give precedence to
long-term goals (whatever the exact workings of this
ability). Such an ability, however, is relevant not just to
moral behavior but also to any form of long-term enter-
prise, from the raising of cattle to the waging of war. So,
at best, the ability to pursue long-term goals together
with a good understanding of the role of reputation in
cooperation might cause rational individuals to decide to
be systematically fair (as suggested by Gauthier 1986),
which is quite different from having an intuitive moral
sense.
At this point, evidence about the development of moral-
ity becomes particularly relevant. As recalled by Warne-
ken, classical studies in developmental psychology
(Damon 1975; Piaget 1932) suggested that a sense of
equity does not develop before the age of 6 or even later.
They seemed to indicate that judgments of justice
develop slowly and follow a stage-like progression starting
off with simple rules (e.g., equality) and only later evolving
into more complex ones (e.g., equity). This picture has
been very much altered, with several of our commentators,
Dunﬁeld & Kuhlmeier, Rochat & Robbins, and War-
neken, having contributed to our updated understanding
of moral development. As Dunﬁeld & Kuhlmeier summar-
ize: “Taken together, recent research supports the idea
that, under certain circumstances (e.g., instrumental need
as opposed to material desire), early prosocial behaviours
conform to the predictions of the presented mutualistic
approach to morality.”
Studies have shown that children as young as 12 months
of age react to an unequal distribution (Geraci & Surian
2011; Schmidt & Sommerville 2011; Sloane et al. 2012).
Baumard et al. (2011) show that children as young as age
3 are able to take merit into account and to give more to
a character who contributed more to the production of a
common good. This developmental pattern is found
cross-culturally. Children living in Asian societies, who
are often thought to be more collectivistic (Markus &
Kitayama 1991; Triandis 1989), also show an early develop-
ment of justice (Baumard et al., submitted). In the same
way, despite culturalist theories postulating that justice
and merit are linked to Western development (capitalist
market, state institutions, world religion; e.g., Henrich
et al. 2010), children living among the Turkana in northern
Kenya ﬁnd it equally intuitive to give more to the character
that contributed more to the common good (Liénard et al.,
submitted). We see this early and universal pattern as
strongly suggesting that true morality is not a sophisticated,
late, and non-universal intellectual achievement (as Kohl-
berg 1981 implied) but is based rather on an evolved
sense of fairness.
R3.2. Morality and the emotions
Several of our commentators bring up the important topic
of the relationship between morality and the emotions.
Humans are endowed with a wide range of emotions:
fear, disgust, anger, envy, shame, guilt, sympathy, pride,
joy, and so on. Some of these emotions are moral in the
sense that their proper function is to motivate individuals
to behave morally or to react appropriately to the moral
or immoral behavior of others. Most human emotions,
however, are non-moral, and have other functions: mana-
ging one’s reputation, deterring future aggressions, motiv-
ating self-interested behavior, helping one’s close
associates, and the like.
As Cova, Deonna, & Sander (Cova et al.) observe, if
the mutualistic theory is true, then moral emotions should
conform to the mutualistic logic of impartiality while others
need not do so. This gives us a principled way to contrast
moral and non-moral emotions. Consider sympathy (or
empathy), mentioned by Dunﬁeld & Kuhlmeier,
Gintis, Rochat & Robbins, and Warneken, and often
considered moral because of its prosocial character. Of
course, sympathy often plays a role in motivating moral be-
havior. Still, it is not always in line with morality: It may lead
us to be partial, for instance when we unduly favor our
friends at the expense of others or when, in order to
protect those we love, we put others at risk. This suggests
that sympathy is not an intrinsically moral emotion; its func-
tion is not to cause us to be fair, but to help individuals –
friends, spouses, children –whose welfare matters to us.
Shame is not intrinsically moral either. We can be
ashamed of our physical aspect, of our ignorance, or of
our relatives. When we are ashamed of our wrongdoings,
we hide them rather than repairing them and we ﬂee
from our victims rather than confront them (Tangney &
Dearing 2002). The function of shame, indeed, is not to
be moral but to manage one’s reputation (Fessler &
Haley 2003), which explains why it may lead us to hide
our crime rather than to do our duty. By contrast, guilt
has been described as a purely moral emotion, and, in
line with the mutualistic theory, it follows quite neatly the
logic of fairness: It motivates us to repair our misdeeds,
to compensate the victims, and, if not possible, to inﬂict
some costs to ourselves so that we feel even with the
people we harmed (Tangney & Dearing 2002; Trivers
1971).
Similarly, anger (discussed by Cova et al.) – as opposed
to outrage –may contradict morality. This is the case, for
instance, when people are angry at infants for crying too
much or at animals for being dirty. Anger is an ancient
psychological mechanism, present in many nonhuman
species (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995), that does not aim
at being fair but, mainly, at deterring future aggressions
(McCullough et al. 2010) and at using physical force to
coerce or to obtain a better bargaining position (Sell et al.
2009).
Of course, moral and non-moral emotions are often at
play at the same time. For instance, when someone harms
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our interests, we feel both angry and outraged simul-
taneously. Our anger comes from our wanting to retaliate
and defend ourselves, while our outrage arises from the
injustice that was inﬂicted on us. This, as we note in the
target article, explains why humans seem to be motivated
to altruistically punish wrongdoers while, we suggest, they
are just defending their interests by inﬂicting a cost to
someone who is likely to attack again if not deterred
further. The reason why we think they are punishing
others is that their retaliation is not blind (as it would be if
they were solely motivated by consideration of deterrence).
It is limited by consideration of fairness and is proportionate
to the cost originally inﬂicted on us. We can thus distinguish
between retaliation, a non-moral behavior motivated only
by anger, and revenge, an act of anger aimed at inﬂicting
a cost to the other party without going beyond what
justice prescribes (Baumard 2010b). In line with this dis-
tinction, people discuss whether someone’s retaliation is
fair (proportionate) or unfair (selﬁsh).
Similarly, disgust and outrage are sometimes triggered
by the same events. If someone farts during a meal, we
may feel both disgusted and outraged. Does this mean
that disgust is a moral emotion, as claimed by Ramlakhan
& Brook? We would argue that what can be seen as unfair
and immoral is the causing of disgust. Similarly, wantonly
causing physical pain or causing disappointment, and
more generally inﬂicting any kind of cost on others
(unless this cost is unavoidable or imposed as a price
justly paid for a beneﬁt), are commonly seen as immoral.
Disgust in itself is not more intrinsically moral than pain
or disappointment; it is the unfair causing of such negative
emotions that is morally objectionable. We can agree there-
fore with Ramlakhan & Brook that “inﬂicting harm without
justiﬁcation” is immoral, but this is, we would suggest, not
because of a distinct harm-based moral principle, but
because doing so is grossly unfair.
Of note (see Graham) is that disgust can also bias moral
judgment. We suggest that such a bias occurs not because
disgust is at the basis of moral judgment but more simply
because disgust biases the evaluation of the costs inﬂicted
upon others. When a judge is tired or hungry, for instance,
she may be more irritated or exasperated by a criminal be-
havior and consequently will inﬂict harsher punishment on
the criminal (e.g., Danziger et al. 2011). Non-moral feel-
ings can thus impact on moral judgments.
R3.3. Mutualistic versus utilitarian and deontological
view of human morality
One way to test a theory is by spelling out some of its con-
sequences. Bonnefon, Girotto, Heimann, & Legrenzi’s
[Bonnefon et al.’s] commentary is relevant to such an
endeavor by highlighting a possible case of conﬂict
between fairness and reputation. They describe the
dilemma of an individual who “obtains an unfair beneﬁt
and faces the dilemma of hiding it (to avoid being excluded
from future interactions) or disclosing it (to avoid being
discovered as a deceiver).” They argue convincingly that
an individual guided by a fairness morality should solve
this dilemma in a principled way and disclose the
unfair beneﬁt. We appreciate the suggestion and agree. It
would be very valuable to have experimental conﬁrmation
of this prediction. It would conﬁrm our claim that, while
the biological function of fairness morality is to enhance
one’s reputation, the psychological mechanism is that of a
genuine moral preference.
Another way to test the theory empirically is by compar-
ing it to its rivals. In moral philosophy, the standard theory
is utilitarianism, the doctrine according to which morality
aims at maximizing the welfare of the greatest number of
people. In the last ten years, a range of works have consist-
ently demonstrated that humans are not utilitarian (a point
noted by Atran and Kirkby, Hinzen, & Mikhail [Kirkby
et al.]): They prefer a society that is less efﬁcient and
poorer but that treats everyone in a fairer way (Mitchell
et al. 1993); they refuse to sacriﬁce one life to save many
(Cushman et al. 2010; Mikhail 2007); they refuse harsh
punishment even if it provides beneﬁts (Baron & Ritov
1993; Carlsmith et al. 2002; Sunstein et al. 2000); and
they don’t see themselves as having the duty to share part
of their resources with others in need even when this
would beneﬁt society (Singer 1972; Unger 1996). Of
course, it is possible that human morality, albeit based on
utilitarianism, often fails to follow the utilitarian doctrine
(Baron 1994; Cushman et al. 2010; Sunstein 2005). A
more parsimonious way to explain this consistent departure
from consequentialism, though, is to abandon the idea that
morality is about maximizing the welfare of the society in
favor of the view that it is about the impartial distribution
of the beneﬁts of cooperation.
In their comments, Kirkby et al. suggest another way to
account for the non-utilitarian structure of the moral sense:
the idea that morality is deontological. According to this
view, the maximization of welfare would be constrained
by a set of principles such as the prohibition of intentional
battery and the principle of double effect (Mikhail 2007).
Though we believe that these principles are to a large
extent descriptively valid, we do not consider them as “ulti-
mate moral facts” but rather as moral regularities that, at a
deeper level, can be better explained in terms of fairness
(Baumard 2010a).
R3.4. Is the sense of fairness universal?
A universal sense of fairness can combine with different
beliefs (linked to the social context and to the information
available) and yield quite different judgment or decisions.
Is this sufﬁcient to explain why, as Cappelen & Tungod-
den note, even in the well-controlled environment of the
lab, “there appears … to be considerable disagreement
about what are legitimate sources of inequality in distribu-
tive situations”? Participants with very similar backgrounds
have, they observe, “three distinct fairness views: egalitar-
ians (who always ﬁnd it fair to distribute equally), merito-
crats (who ﬁnd it fair to distribute in proportion to
production), and libertarians (who ﬁnd it fair to distribute
in proportion to earnings).” How can we account for such
a diversity of opinions?
Fairness, we argued, is based on mutual advantage.
There are always several ways to consider what might be
mutually advantageous. Consider this example given by
Gerald Cohen (2009). We usually see a camping trip as a
communal enterprise:
There is no hierarchy among us… . We have facilities with which to
carry out our enterprise: we have, for example, pots and pans, oil,
coffee, … . And, as usual on camping trips, we avail ourselves of
those facilities collectively… . Somebody ﬁshes, somebody else prepares
the food, and another person cooks it. People who hate cooking but
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enjoy washing up may do all the washing up, and so on. (Cohen 2009,
pp. 3–4)
As Cohen notes, we could also imagine a very different
camping trip where:
everyone asserts her rights over the pieces of equipment, and the talents
that she brings, and where bargaining proceeds with respect to who is
going to pay to whom to be allowed, for example, to use a knife to
peel the potatoes and how much he is going to charge others for
those now-peeled potatoes that he bought in an unpeeled condition
from another camper, and so on. (p. 6)
Of course, this kind of organization would destroy what
makes a camping trip fun (besides being quite time con-
suming and inefﬁcient), and most people would hate it.
Cohen’s example shows that, for any kind of cooperative
interactions, there are many ways to organize both the con-
tributions of the cooperators and the distributions of the
resources. Similarly, they are many ways to interpret an
economic game. Moreover, their very artiﬁciality means
that they have no conventional interpretation. Neither
the situation nor the cultural background provides partici-
pants with clear and univocal guidance as to the kind of
cooperative interaction they are having with one another:
Is it more mutually advantageous to consider the game as
a communal interaction (and be egalitarian), as a joint
venture (and be meritocratic), or as a market exchange
(and be libertarian)?
Public goods games, as Gill et al.’s commentary
suggests, raise similar questions: One may or may not con-
tribute to the common good, depending on whether one
considers that participants’ mutual interest is in cooperat-
ing and earning money together or that the conﬁguration
of the game (its anonymity, its artiﬁcial character) makes
the sole pursuit of proﬁt the only reasonable option
(because one cannot trust other participants, or because
it is windfall money). Moreover the “consistent contri-
butors” identiﬁed by Gill et al. may be systematically
obeying what Ainslie calls a “personal rule” independently
of the particular of the situation, with, in the long run, repu-
tational gains that offset the failure to take advantage of
possible short-term gains, and also, as they show, a ben-
eﬁcial inﬂuence on other cooperators.
Ultimately, the mutualistic approach considers that all
moral decisions should be grounded in consideration of
mutual advantage. Tummolini, Scorolli, & Borghi
[Tummolini et al.] may be right in arguing that there is
an evolved sense of ownership found also in other species
and independent from fairness. We see that as a reason
to claim that mere ownership, in the sense of possession,
is not a moral fact. What transforms possession into prop-
erty – that is, a right – is the consideration of mutual advan-
tage. People acknowledge that it is mutually advantageous
to recognize the property rights of one another, allowing
everyone to feel secure, make transactions, invest, and so
on (De Soto 2000; North 1990). However, the same con-
siderations limit property rights: Expropriation in the
public interest is considered legitimate; owners of architec-
tural landmarks or recognized works of art are not free to
destroy them or transform at will, and so on. The reason
for these limits is that a wholly unbounded property right
would be less mutually beneﬁcial.
Given the diversity of situations where issues of fairness
arise and the fact that quite often they can be interpreted in
more than one way, a universal fairness morality does not
imply that across cultures or even within a culture there
should be unanimity as to what is fair or not fair. So,
when Cappelen & Tungodden say that “it seems that a
truly mutualistic process should make us all libertarians,”
or when DeScioli says that our model “seems to predict
that humans will perceive free-market capitalism as maxi-
mally fair,” we do not agree. Yes, people who defend liber-
tarianism or free-market capitalism may do so in the name
of fairness, but a fairness-based critique of libertarianism or
capitalism is also possible and in fact common. These
opposed views, we suggest, are based on different
interpretations of the arrangements to which the same fair-
ness criterion is being applied. The fact that people dis-
agree about what is fair no more entails that they have a
different conception of fairness, than the fact that people
disagree about what is true entails that they have a different
conception of truth.
The obvious fact that people commonly depart from fair-
ness in their behavior is even less an argument against the
idea of a universal sense of fairness. We agree with Fessler
& Holbrook that “most people appear somewhat ﬂexible
in their moral behavior in general, and in their mutualistic
behavior in particular. True, many people behave in what is
locally construed as a moral manner much of the time, but
this is not the same as being invariantly moral or invariantly
fair.” We do not see this, however, as an objection to our
account. The sense of fairness is only one of the psychologi-
cal factors at work in taking decisions, for obvious evol-
utionary reasons: achieving and maintaining a good moral
reputation is not the sole priority of individuals. They also
have to secure other kinds of goods (food, safety, sexual
partners, etc.) and to make trade-offs between these
goods and their moral reputation (for a review of life-
history trade-offs, see Stearns 1992). Hence, we agree
with Ainslie that “people continue to have a disposition
to be selﬁsh as well.” This is no evidence against the
claim that a sense of fairness is a human adaptation.
R4. Extending the mutualistic framework
For a long time, scholars of morality, from moral philoso-
phers (Gauthier 1986; Rawls 1971) to evolutionary biol-
ogists (Alexander 1987; Trivers 1971) and developmental
psychologists (Kohlberg 1981; Turiel 2002), have focused
almost exclusively on the sharing of jointly produced
resources and the prevention of harm. In this context, con-
ceiving morality in terms of fairness seemed if not manda-
tory, at least quite reasonable. In the last two decades,
though, following in particular the impulsion of Richard
Shweder (cf. Shweder et al. 1987) and Jonathan Haidt
(cf. Haidt et al. 1993), scholars of morality have enlarged
their inquiry to a much wider range of normative issues,
such as care for the needs of others, coalitional behavior,
hierarchical relationship, and issues of purity and impurity.
Many commentators (Atran; Graham; Machery &
Stich; Ramlakhan & Brook; Rochat & Robbins;
Sachdeva, Iliev, &Medin [Sachdeva et al.];Warneken),
accepting this broadening of the moral domain, have ques-
tioned the scope of an account of morality in terms of fair-
ness: Can it explain morality in general, or is it relevant to
just a subset of moral phenomena? For several of these com-
mentators, amutualistic theory offers a plausible evolutionary
and psychological account of interactions clearly governed by
considerations of fairness, but its relevance beyond this is
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questionable. AsGrahamwrites: “This is a good ﬁrst step; the
theory’s predictions should now be tested in other domains,
using other methods, to determine how well mutualism can
explain the moral sense in all its instances.”
There are, from a mutualistic point of view, two main
ways in which to approach this challenge, one involving a
broader and the other a narrower understanding of moral-
ity. On the one hand, one could make the argument
that the mutualistic framework well understood readily
extends to all these normative systems, providing a way to
unify morality understood fairly broadly. This position
does not deny that humans are equipped with a variety of
other dispositions, such as kin altruism, coalitionary psy-
chology, or disgust, that evolved to solve other evolutionary
challenges (such as raising offspring or avoiding pathogens).
It claims that in so far as these behaviors are moralized,
they are so because they are regulated by considerations
of fairness. The argument is similar to the case of anger
previously discussed (see sect. R3.2). Anger did not
evolve to motivate individuals to behave morally, and
indeed it often leads individuals to be immoral. Sometimes,
however, it is regulated and constrained by moral consider-
ations, for instance, when individuals accept not going too
far in their retaliation. In these cases, anger appears to be
regulated by considerations of fairness (proportionality
between the tort inﬂicted on the victim and the harm
inﬂicted on the attacker). Thus, according to this view, fair-
ness does not give rise to sexual or maternal behaviors, but
regulates their expression in mutually advantageous
situations.
According to a second, narrower approach to morality,
many norms, including some norms associated with a
sense of rights and duties, are not moral norms. Not only
are parental care or in-group versus out-group preferences
largely governed by domain-speciﬁc dispositions such as kin
altruism or group solidarity, but also these dispositions are
typically given a normative expression in thought and in
communication (with important cultural variability). This,
however, is not enough to make these norms moral
norms. This approach does not deny that considerations
of fairness are relevant to behavior in these domains and
that fairness-based, hence truly moral norms may also
apply. It is often difﬁcult, moreover, to pry apart norms
that are truly based on the moral sense from norms
that are based on other dispositions, and some
norms may be either ambiguous or mixed in this respect.
In some cultural contexts, moreover, all these norms, what-
ever their evolved basis, are thought of as part of a single
system (often with a strong religious tenor). As we have
argued earlier, the existence of broad cultural views of mor-
ality is compatible with a narrower scientiﬁc view of moral-
ity proper as interacting with, but not encompassing, all
systems of rights and duties.
These two approaches – arguing that the fairness
approach readily extends to morality broadly construed,
or doubting that the fairness approach can be sufﬁciently
extended to account for all the relevant norms and
arguing that some of these norms, however strong and
respected, are not in fact moral norms – are both compati-
ble with the theory presented in the target article. We, the
authors of that article, do not agree among ourselves as to
which of these two approaches might be the best:
Jean-Baptiste André and Nicolas Baumard are keener to
explore the broad approach, and Dan Sperber the narrow
one (while we all three entertain the possibility that a pos-
ition more ﬁne-grained than we have been able to develop
so far would cause us to converge on a compromise
approach). In answering our commentators on the issue
of the extension of moral systems, we brieﬂy outline, there-
fore, not one but two possible answers, both of which are
compatible with the mutualistic theory and either one of
which, we believe, would address their legitimate concerns.
R4.1. Need-based morality
In the target article, we stressed proportionality, merit, and
rights. But, as Clark & Boothby, Warneken, as well as
Sachdeva et al. observe, not all interactions are based
on these considerations. “Communal interactions,” in par-
ticular with friends, are based on needs. We help our
friends when they need us, without expecting from them
a strict compensation for our help (see Clark & Jordan
[2002], Deutsch [1975], and Fiske [1992] in social psychol-
ogy, as well as the literature on care [Gilligan 1982] in
developmental psychology). Does this mean that humans
do not “have just one general moral strategy” (Clark &
Boothby)? Or that, in some situations, morality does not
rely on fairness but rather on empathy (Warneken)? Or
again, that while some moralities are based on rights and
reciprocity, others are based on duties and needs (Sachdeva
et al.)?
As we pointed out (sects. 2.2.2 and 2.3.2 of the target
article), cooperation is not restricted to exchange and col-
lective actions; it also takes the form of mutual help. Indi-
viduals are members of formal or informal mutual
insurance networks in which they help those in need and
expect to be helped when in need themselves. Morality
in mutual help (or “communal relationships” to use
Clark & Boothby’s term), however, may follow the same
“general moral strategy” as in collective actions (or
“exchange relationships”).
Consider, for instance, the duty to help our friends. A
priori, it seems to be based only on the notion of need,
and there is no bookkeeping of who brings what to the
relationship: One friend can help the other more than
she is helped. And yet, impartiality is everywhere: “I
spent a week at the hospital, and she never visited me.
Yet, it was just a thirty-minute drive!”; “Do you think that
I can ask her to come every day to water my plants while
I am away? I mean, she has her children and it is quite
far away”; “I know that he does not understand anything
about computers, but this is the third times this week
he’s asked me to come over to his home and help him
with his new software!”. In each case, the cost of helping
needs to be proportionate to the beneﬁts of being
helped, just as the cost of buying insurance needs to be
in proportion to the beneﬁt provided by the insurance.
Here, being partial would mean paying less than what
mutual insurance requires (not visiting one’s friend when
the journey is quite short) and asking others to pay more
than what the same mutual insurance requires (being
helped each and every time one has a computer problem,
no matter other people’s priorities).
In this perspective, “right based moralities” and “duty
based moralities” (to use Sachdeva et al.’s terms) may in
fact be two sides of the same coin. Duties are the counter-
part of rights, and emphasis on independence or interde-
pendence can be a matter of contextual constraints and
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opportunities. In societies where individuals depend
heavily on one another, it makes sense to emphasize inter-
dependence, collective goals, and duties toward others
because failing in one’s duty is the most obvious way of
harming others’ interests. In contrast, in societies where
individuals rely less on solidarity and mutual help, individ-
ual goals, rights, and freedom are more salient. In both
cases, social interactions follow the logic of fairness. As eth-
nographic studies show, members of traditional societies
where duties dominate are nevertheless quite capable of
recognizing and defending their rights (Abu-Lughod
1986; Neff 2003; Turiel 2002).
To what extent can the argument be extended to the
case of help among kin? In the course of a normal life,
people are in turn helpless children with strong needs,
parents with greater capacities to help, and elders with
limited capacities and greater needs. Given this plurality
of individual positions, it makes sense to consider the
duties of adults and, in particular, of parents towards
needy children and adult children towards needy elderly
parents, as a matter of not reciprocal but nevertheless
mutual help over time, governed by considerations of
fairness.
According to the narrow approach to morality, some of
the main norms governing the care of one’s children and
other close relatives are grounded in an evolved disposi-
tion to favor carriers of one’s own genes (Hamilton
1964a; 1964b). There are cases of conﬂict between these
and fairness-grounded norms; for instance, in the treat-
ment of biological children versus stepchildren. In such
cases, not only do people often behave unfairly to children
who are part of their household but not their own biologi-
cal children, they commonly consider that they are
entitled to do so. For them, the right thing to do in
these cases is not the fair thing to do. Still, among
humans, fairness considerations do play an important
role in care for relatives (arguably a decisive role when
people too old to help with the family chores are neverthe-
less being cared for). On this narrow view of morality,
then, care for relatives involves both moral and non-
moral norms (independently of how the people them-
selves think of morality).
R4.2. Group-based morality
Atran, drawing on his own work on “sacred values” (Atran
2010), questions whether a mutualistic account of everyday
moral interactions throws light on what Choi and Bowles
(2007) call “parochial altruism,” which they deﬁne as the
combination of altruism towards fellow group members
and hostility towards members of other groups (see also
Bernhard et al. 2006). To answer, we ﬁrst note that mutu-
alism does not at all imply that an individual should have
the same duties and expectations toward everyone. On
the contrary, mutual moral commitments depend on
social relationships and the opportunities they offer for
mutually beneﬁcial interactions. If being moral is having
the qualities and behaving in a way that makes you a
good partner, then it stands to reason that moral duties
and rights are different among, say, spouses who spend
their lives together and people who occasionally greet
one another at the bus stop, or among members of the
same soccer team and soccer players in general.
The logic of mutual advantage thus explains why people’s
sense of moral obligation is modulated according to close-
ness, distance, or absence of social relationships. In particu-
lar, since helping other members of one’s group and
beneﬁting in turn from their help is precisely what makes
belonging to the group advantageous, treating everyone
in the same way independently of afﬁliation would under-
mine the value that we accord to our stronger relationships.
Hence, group solidarity is a direct consequence of mutua-
listic relationships. As mutualists, people recognize each
other’s right to have special commitments to members of
their groups and networks. This right entails its own
limits because it is normal and rightful to belong to
several nested and overlapping groups, each of which is a
source of legitimate rights and duties. If we want to enjoy
the beneﬁt of groups, we need to favor in-group
members just as we expect them to favor us – not in
every respect, but in those respects that make the group
beneﬁcial to its members. Thus, when David Kaczynski
denounced his brother Theodore (a.k.a. the Unabomber),
he felt that his duty to help his brother did not include
being an accomplice in his serial bombings, whereas his
duty as a citizen included helping to free others of the
threat of such bombings, given that he was in a unique pos-
ition to do so. In both cases, his duties were mutualistically
calibrated to what he assumed he was entitled to expect
from others, as a brother and as a citizen.
In this perspective, mutual interest may even command
individual heroism. In special circumstances where the
interest of individuals become identiﬁed with those of a
group, as in the case of a military squad in an ambush or
of citizens in an insurrection against a dictatorship, self-
sacriﬁce of some of its members may be necessary for the
group to achieve its goal or simply to survive. So, it is argu-
able that the “heroism, martyrdom, and other forms of
self-sacriﬁce for the group” mentioned by Atran, while
appearing to go well beyond fairness, are in fact a marginal
but striking application of mutualism in extraordinary
circumstances.
An alternative narrower approach to morality would give
a greater role in explaining parochial morality to the
hypothesis that in-group solidarity and out-group hostility
have evolved as autonomous human dispositions. They
may have evolved as a biological adaptation, as has been
argued with regard to other primate species (e.g., Wilson
& Wrangham 2003) and as has been developed by John
Tooby and Leda Cosmides (see Tooby & Cosmides
2010). And/or they may have evolved culturally, in relation-
ship to religion, as argued in particular by Atran and
Henrich (2010). Either way, humans would be endowed
with motivations to act for their own group and against
other groups. Such motivations are distinct from fairness-
based moral motivations. They nevertheless give rise to a
sense of rights and duties. In the name of one’s religion,
for instance, one may feel entitled to kill members of
another religion, including children. One may see this as
one’s sacred duty without necessarily seeing it as fair to
one’s victims: it is just that one’s sacred duty takes pre-
cedence over fairness considerations. Again, this narrow
approach to what is truly moral does not involve denying
the role of fairness considerations in attitudes and behavior
to in-group and out-group. What it involves is denying that
all or even most of the relevant norms are ultimately
grounded in such considerations.
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R4.3. The morality of social hierarchies
According to the mutualistic theory, human morality is
about impartially sharing the costs and beneﬁts of social
interactions. At ﬁrst blush, this seems to lead naturally to
the idea that, by default, resources should be shared
equally. There are exceptions, of course: Fairness departs
from equality when partners make unequal contributions
to the common good. As Guala and Sachdeva et al.
note, the mutualistic theory thus seems to apply well to ega-
litarian societies such as the hunter-gatherer groups in
which our ancestors evolved or, to some extent, the
modern capitalist societies where equality of rights is at
least afﬁrmed. By contrast, it seems at odds with traditional
hierarchical societies.
How can the mutualistic theory account for the accep-
tance of rigid inequalities? How is it possible that
humans, despite their taste for fairness, condone the endur-
ing privileges of a minority? It may help, in addressing this
question, to remember that in modern, which are in prin-
ciple egalitarian societies, inequalities in resources are actu-
ally far greater than they have ever been in most traditional
hierarchical societies. One could say say of modern
societies exactly what Sachdeva et al. say of traditional
societies: “those at the bottom give considerably more to
those on the top without reaping the reward of their contri-
bution.” Still, leaving aside very high incomes (like those of
ﬁnance managers or rock stars) that are quite often seen as
unfair, most people in modern societies do not ﬁnd unfair a
ratio of, say, 1 to 10 in income (between a cashier and a
lawyer or a surgeon, for instance). They commonly consider
that professionals deserve to earn more because they bring
more to society than unskilled workers do (Piketty 1999).
The other main source of inequality, inheritance, is also
commonly accepted as legitimate. People think that
parents should be allowed to pass their wealth to their chil-
dren, and that forbidding this would unfairly deprive
people of the product of their life-time’s work. This
shows that accepting high inequalities is, for many
people, quite compatible with the view that the distribution
of resources should be fair.
Also in traditional societies, inheritance and market
exchanges are a main source of inequality of resources
that may, to that extent, also be seen as fair. Still, there is
more to social hierarchies than differences in skills and
inherited capital. Being an aristocrat or a slave, or
member of a given caste, with all the differences of rights
these entail, is hardly ever thought of as a matter of fairness.
Nevertheless, even in such birthright hierarchies, it can be
argued that social interactions retain a clear mutualistic
character. Shweder et al. (1997; cf. Shweder et al. [1987]
mentioned by Sachdeva et al.) observe, for instance,
that in India:
The person in the hierarchical position is obligated to protect
and satisfy the wants of the subordinate person in speciﬁed
ways. The subordinate person is also obligated to look after
the interests and “well-being” of the superordinate person.
(Shweder et al. 1997, p. 145)
Hierarchies are considered, it seems, as something given,
the natural of the god-given order of things. Fairness-based
morality may be prevalent within this given order.
When we look at such arrangements from outside, we do
not consider each interaction in particular or ask whether it
is fair. What we consider is the “basic structure” (Rawls
1971), and we typically judge it unfair. When we live
inside a society, however, we rarely if ever focus on its
basic structure. We take it for granted and evaluate social
interactions within it. The individual behavior of aristocrats,
slave owners, or members of high caste is judged more or
less fair, rather than automatically considered unfair.
Still, there are circumstances when people look at their
own institutions with a fresh eye, as did the American,
the French, and the Russian revolutionaries, and then
they often question their fairness. Moreover, a range of
empirical works suggest that, even in the daily life of tra-
ditional societies, women do occasionally revolt against
men, the poor against the wealthy, the young against the
elders (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1986; Neff 1997; Turiel 2002).
In other terms, hierarchies are to some extent protected
from moral evaluation. When they are, however, being so
evaluated, and when moral issues arise within hierarchical
societies, the morality involved is grounded in consider-
ations of fairness.
An alternative approach to the norms that regulate be-
havior in hierarchies is to claim that, to a large extent,
they are grounded not in a sense of fairness but in an
evolved sense of hierarchy (that has counterparts among
other primates). Even if hierarchy is not something that
all humans accept, it is something that they all intuitively
understand from infancy (Mascaro & Csibra 2012) and
that, when they accept it, they view it as a source of auth-
ority and legitimacy in its own right. Hence, there are
rights and duties that follow from hierarchical relationships
and are not grounded in fairness. In some societies, they
permeate all of social life. They often take precedence
over the consideration of fairness. On a narrower view of
fairness-based morality, this means that these norms of
hierarchy are not intrinsically moral.
R4.4. The morality of purity
In a famous study, Haidt et al. (1993) showed that a
majority of participants in Brazil and the United States
found objectionable the behavior of a man who buys a
dead chicken in the supermarket and has sexual intercourse
with it before cooking and eating it, even though they
agreed that no one was harmed by this behavior.
At ﬁrst blush, as many commentaries suggest
(Ramlakhan & Brook; Graham; Rochat & Robbins;
Machery & Stich), sex with the dead chicken seems to
refute the idea that, to be morally condemned, an action
should inﬂict a prejudice on someone. However, as
Weeden et al. (2008) note, sexual practices and sexual
proximity actually do inﬂict a cost on individuals, men
and women, involved in a committed relationship:
For men pursuing these strategies, the basic bargain is that
they are agreeing to high levels of investment in wives and
children while foregoing extra-pair mating opportunities. In
return, they receive increased paternity assurance and
increased within-pair fertility. Given that these men are
making high levels of familial investment, their central risk is
cuckoldry.
For women pursuing these strategies, the basic bargain is
that they are agreeing to provide increased paternity assurance
and within-pair fertility while foregoing opportunities to obtain
sexier genes for their children. In return, they receive
increased male investment. Their central risk is male
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abandonment, especially when they have higher numbers of
young children. (Weeden et al. 2008, p. 328)
In this context, those who do not restrain their sexual
activities and freely pursue their desire inﬂict a cost on
others. In promoting sexual promiscuity, they render mar-
riage more difﬁcult and threaten the arrangement and the
very possibility of monogamous families. In line with this
observation, Weeden et al. (2008) show that people’s own
mating strategies are a very good predictor of their moral
opinion not only about sexual issues, but about a range of
others practices, indirectly related to monogamy, such as:
“pornography, divorce, cohabitation, homosexuality, drink-
ing and drug usage (which are transparently associated with
promiscuity), and abortion and birth control (which reduce
the costs of promiscuity and enhance the ability of small-
family strategists to produce well-funded children)” (p.
329; see also Kurzban et al. 2010). Again, fairness deﬁnes
and regulates puritan morality: If one considers strong
relationships as mutually advantageous, then promoting
sexual promiscuity amounts to enjoying the beneﬁt of
living in a well-regulated society (with strong commitment,
secure children, etc.) without paying its cost (i.e., restrain-
ing one’s sexual behavior).
This is, of course, just an example of the way in which the
broad approach to morality would seek to show that moral
norms that seem unrelated to fairness are, on closer analy-
sis, based on it.
The narrow approach to morality, while not denying that
fairness considerations may in some cases play a role in
norms of purity, would not assume – in fact, would be skep-
tical – that it is systematically so. It would be ready to dis-
cover that many or most of these norms owe their cultural
evolution and their psychological robustness to evolved dis-
positions linked to disgust and a “prophylactic” function.
R5. Conclusion
Let us, in conclusion, again express our gratitude to all the
commentators. Our goal in writing this particular target
article was (1) to give a synthesized and detailed outline of
the mutualistic approach to morality that we have developed
in various places (André & Baumard 2011a; 2011b; Baumard
2010a; 2011; Baumard et al. 2011; Baumard & Sperber,
2012; Sperber & Baumard 2012), and (2), in so doing, to
put right what we see as an imbalance in the current discus-
sion of the evolution of morality where altruistic group selec-
tion approaches (the obvious importance of which we of
course acknowledge) are often the only locus or only focus
of the debate. The present discussion has shown, we hope,
that a mutualistic approach can truly contribute to our
understanding of morality and enrich the debate.
NOTES
1. One commentary, that of Iran-Nejad & Bordbar, does not
ﬁt in these sections. We are grateful to these commentators for
sharing their ideas about the possible relationship between “bio-
functional understanding” and our mutualistic approach.
2. Note incidentally that in inter-speciﬁc mutualism the two
sides have profoundly different outside options. While partner
choice regulates the distribution of beneﬁts in inter-speciﬁc mutu-
alism (Bshary & Schäffer 2002), we do not expect that this distri-
bution will obey the same logic of equilibrium that can be found in
intra-speciﬁc interactions. Fairness, that is, the equilibrium of
cooperative interaction, is, we have argued, a consequence of
the equipotency of partners that can be found only within species.
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